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Abstract
Andrew Feenberg, a philosopher of technology, argues for a democratic
rationalization of technology, whereby subjugated actors intervene in the design
process to achieve their interests. He claims that environmentalism represents one
of the greatest opportunities for this kind of intervention. His suggestion seems
viable; most if not all of the current environmental problems stem from
maladaptive technologies. Transforming these technologies is therefore
imperative if we are to move toward more sustainable societies. Feenberg,
however, does not address the details of his proposal or offer more than a few
brief examples of what he is advocating. I use Feenberg’s Critical Theory of
technology to analyze and assess various environmentalisms. Along the way I
expose the deficiencies of his theory and attempt build on his work. One
problem, however, is that environmentalism is by no means a homogonous entity;
rather, it is composed of numerous strands with their own unique histories, aims,
and strategies. I argue that of the various environmentalisms grassroots
environmental justice resonates most with Feenberg’s theory. To illustrate, I
present a case study of the toxics movement that emerged out of the Love Canal
incident. I conclude by showing how grassroots environmental justice could
enhance their effectiveness by employing the suggested Critical Theory of
technology.

Acknowledgements
I wish to thank my committee members for helping me through this
grueling process, and especially Tim Luke for his wealth of knowledge and
practical advice. In addition, I am indebted to my fellow graduate students, Wyatt
Galusky for his willingness to hear me out and Piyush Mathur for his enduring
example. I am also grateful to my colleagues at St. Andrews Presbyterian College
for their continued patience and for granting me time to complete the project.
Most of all, I wish to thank my family – Becky, Hannah, Sarah, Emily,
Joshua, and Zeke – for standing by me through thick and thin and enduring this
long strange trip…

Tyler Veak
December 16, 2003
Laurinburg, North Carolina

iii

Concretizing Sustainable Worlds:
Environmentalism as a
Politics of Technological Transformation

Table of Contents
Chapter One

Introduction

1

Chapter Two

Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology

18

Chapter Three

Critiquing and Expanding Feenberg’s Theory

45

Chapter Four

Environmentalism Through the Lens of
Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology

73

The Toxics Movement as an Instantiation of
Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology

103

Human Need, Commodification,
and Sustainable Societies

133

Chapter Five
Chapter Six
Bibliography
Appendix

151
Interview with Larry Yates,
CHEJ Grassroots Organizing Mentor

163

iv

List of Charts
Chart 1: Feenberg’s Theory of Instrumentalization

39

Chart 2: Breakdown of Environmentalisms

101

v

Chapter One
Introduction

This project is motivated by my long-standing interest in environmental
issues, combined with a more recent interest in philosophy of technology. In
particular, the project was inspired through reading Andrew Feenberg’s work on the
politics of technological transformation. Feenberg takes a critical theory1 approach
and suggests that various actors can shape technology for their own interests. He
(1999) claims that environmentalists' struggles with technology represent "the single
most important domain of democratic intervention into technology" (93), and that
environmentalism, as it brings other values to bear on the technological design
process, is one of the most promising terrains for accomplishing his proposed
democratic rationalization of technology.
On the face of it, Feenberg’s proposal sounds reasonable. Most if not all of
the environmental problems facing us today are connected to technology in some
way. It seems, therefore, that environmentalism at least has the potential to transform
technology into less threatening forms. One problem, however, is that
“environmentalism” is not a homogenous entity; rather it is a term used to describe a
large and diverse collection of social movements, ideological programs, and cultural

1

By which I mean contemporary Western Marxism, particularly as emanating from the Frankfurt
Institute (School).
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values. Feenberg’s critical theory perspective offers a sophisticated way of analyzing
and assessing the various approaches of environmentalists.
Feenberg has accomplished a tremendous amount of work with regard to a
critical theory of technology—a trilogy of books (1991; 1995; 1999) and a score of
articles and book chapters. Nevertheless, I believe his theory is incomplete as it
stands. I draw on Feenberg’s own critical theory tradition and examples from the
history of technology to critique and build on his work. With regard to
environmentalism, Feenberg acknowledges that there is a spectrum of views, but he
does not discuss the subtleties. I use his critical theory of technology to map out the
various environmentalisms and then present a case study of the toxics movement as
an instantiation of his theory. At the end, I discuss the problems and possibilities of
linking environmentalism, so defined, with a critical theory of technology.

Significance of Project

I earnestly believe in what I am arguing here, and my hope is that activists can
fruitfully employ what I have said. Philosophy is about changing the world. Beyond
this, the project should also make a scholarly contribution. Technology studies is a
rapidly developing field; however, the number of works focusing on the politics of
technology remains scant. In addition, although there exists a great deal of literature
on contemporary environmentalism and an increasing number of works in the
philosophy of technology and technology studies, there has been no systematic
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attempt to bring these two disciplines together. This project attempts to fill these
voids.

Background

Technology is the medium for our relationship with nature, but it is also the
expression of our very lives—of who we are, what we desire, and the kind of world
we wish to live in. The drive to free ourselves from nature has been the dream of
Western society since the Scientific Revolution.2 In practice, technology has been
the primary means of achieving this liberation; it is the essence of the modern
project.3 However, in liberating ourselves from nature we have become increasingly
dependent on second nature—the built environment. Freedom thus conceived is a
double-edged sword. Technology liberates and ensnares, benefits and destroys,
provides and pollutes. Looked at in this way, the “question of technology” becomes
extremely momentous, not only for environmentalists, but for us all.
Critical theorists have from the beginning attempted to address the
exploitative practices hidden behind progressive ideals of increased production for the
benefit of all. Max Horkheimer, one of the original members of the Frankfurt School

2

The author recognizes that the term "Scientific Revolution" is loaded, but uses it here as it is
popularly understood.
3
Of course, the question of liberation for whom always remains.
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(Institute),4 made it clear that their motivation was human emancipation through the
alleviation of suffering (Kellner 1989). Critical theory is, in short, a search for an
alternative modernity.
One of the most significant insights of the Frankfurt Schoolers was to link the
domination of humans to the domination of nature.5 Obviously the subjugation of
nature is necessary to some degree for human subsistence. Marx also accepted this;
however, the Frankfurt Schooler’s called into question Marx’s unqualified acceptance
of the idea that technological progress equates with human progress. With their
“technology-as-domination” thesis, the Frankfurt Schoolers proclaimed that the
technological domination of nature ultimately led to the domination of humans—a
central theme of Adorno and Horkheimer (1972 [1944]) and Marcuse (1964).
Institute members attempted to develop a new social theory that could address
society, culture, and production in "totality." Addressing technology—as the
knowledge, tools, and human organization required to build the worlds we want—
was central to this project. Much of this came from responding to Max Weber’s
theory of modernity. Weber (1968) argued that the benefits of modernity (i.e.,
material progress) were achieved through the “differentiation” of the technological
and social spheres of modern society.

4

What has come to be known as the Frankfurt School of critical theory originated in the Institute for
Social Research (Institute) as part of the Frankfurt Institute in 1923. Key members of the Institute
included Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Theodore Adorno, Friedrich Pollock, Erich Fromm, and
Leo Lowenthal (Kellner 1989: 12).
5
This is not unique to the Marxist tradition. Social ecologists and ecofeminists, for example, also
make this connection.

4

Feenberg argues against the idea that technology necessarily leads to a
differentiation of technological and social spheres. He claims that certain actors
maintain control of the technological design process for their ends. Democratizing
the design process, and reversing the process of differentiation can therefore achieve
technological transformation. However, even if humans, and not technology, are
responsible for the dominating and destructive consequences of technology, we are
still left with the question of how to best achieve the goal of a more sustainable and
just world.
I use Feenberg’s critical theory of technology to assess the four major strands
of environmentalism—mainstream reform, wilderness preservation, radical, and
environmental justice.6 Although there are isolated examples of progress (e.g.,
improved water quality), many of the "headline" environmental problems—acid rain,
rain forest depletion, species extinction, global warming, and ozone depletion—
continue unabated. More significantly, basic living conditions (e.g., potable water)
for the majority of the world's population continue to deteriorate. Granted, one can
get lost in endless bantering over the interpretation of scientific data with regard to
these problems,7 but in the end the fact remains—mainstream environmentalism is
failing to achieve the goal of a more sustainable world (however conceived). I argue
that this failure is due to three reasons: an ineffective legislative approach, an

6
7

The justification of for this breakdown will be discussed in chapter four.
See, for example, the controversy over the work of Lomborg 2001.
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overemphasis on the preservation of non-human nature, and a failure to effectively
engage technology.
Langdon Winner (1990), explains how for good or ill, the world we now live
in is both materially and ideologically framed by technology:
Our whole way of life is increasingly technologically mediated. You
can't separate society from technology any more, or politics from
technology, or culture from technology. The life around us is very
largely influenced by choices in design and shape of technology (1).
Increasingly, we find ourselves embedded in large technological systems; many of
these systems, such as fossil fuel burning electric power, are inherently nonsustainable (Hughes 1983). Any theory of eco-social transformation must, therefore,
engage these systems to recreate the built environment.
Stereotypes of environmentalists must be overcome. Environmentalists are
frequently portrayed as falling into one of two camps (Pepper 1996). Technooptimists, or technocrats, believe that whatever environmental problems exist can be
resolved with existing or future technologies. Many policy-makers and mainstream
environmentalists would likely fall into this camp. Neo-Luddites, on the other hand,
tend to blame technology, either directly or indirectly, for environmental problems.
Radical environmentalists, such as the Environmental Liberation Front (ELF) who
advocate doing away with modern technology altogether, are representative of this
genre. But neither celebrating technology nor dismissing it out of hand is the answer.
We are deeply embedded in technological systems that are often destructive to the
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environment; consequently, these systems must be transformed, if we are to move
toward more sustainable societies.
Until recently (after 1970), environmentalists focused primarily on the impact
of humans on non-human nature, that is, on protecting “wilderness.” This is no
longer practical. If the sole focus of environmentalists is preserving islands of
pristine wilderness, even these so called paradises will eventually sink into the mire
of development. How we live in the built environment effects non-human nature as
well.
Focusing on non-human nature without considering human nature creates a
paradox: it perpetuates the culture-nature dualism that lies at the root of our
maladaptive relationship with nature. Moreover, exalting wilderness reproduces the
same values that environmentalists seek to reject. It feigns responsibility for the way
we live in the nature that we do inhabit (Veak 2002). The irony is that "only a people
whose relationship to the land was already alienated could hold up wilderness as a
model for human life in nature" (Cronon 1996: 80). We must instead concentrate on
the "middle-ground" where we live. Fortunately, some environmentalists are
engaging technology and attempting to transform the middle-ground (i.e., the built
environment) for the better. In the process, activists expose the inequalities hidden
within the built environments in which we live.
Environmental problems are social problems; they cannot be separated
without slighting either humans or nature (Commoner 1990). Sparked by issues of
class, race, and gender, the new emphasis—commonly known as environmental
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justice—has caught the attention of the entire environmental movement. Although
justice has become a central issue within environmentalism, efforts to resolve
injustices involving race, class, and gender are frequently ineffectual because they do
not address the technological (material) forms of these injustices. I will argue that
there exists a connection between these concretized injustices and environmental
degradation. The built environment, not only as physical structures but as social
organizations, must be addressed. To do so requires a sophisticated theory of the
technology-society relationship.

Literature Review
My claim is that there is virtually no literature that attempts to assess
environmentalism and technological transformation from a critical theory perspective.
Feenberg (1999) has dabbled in it, along with Luke (1997; 1999), and Marcuse (1972;
1992); none of these, however, go in depth into the issue in the systematic way I am
attempting here. Langdon Winner is one of the few contemporary theorists who have
attempted to address technology from an explicitly Marxist perspective. However,
Winner’s Autonomous Technology (1977) is primarily a summary on the emergence
of technocracy; and although his Whale and the Reactor (1986) is specifically
directed at environmental issues, it does not offer a clear prescription for sociotechnological transformation. His central point is that we have become trapped in
large technological systems that take on their own imperatives (i.e., autonomous
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technology), and that these systems necessitate choices that self-perpetuate and
exclude the influence of human values.
Winner advocates a "political theory of technology" because technology is
now the primary means of constructing our society. Along with Mackenzie and
Wajcman (1985), Winner (1985, 1986) argues that artifacts embody politics/interests.
His conclusion is that we must think long and hard about the systems we choose
because they can be either constraining or flexible in terms of future choices. At the
end of the day Winner provides little guidance on how these choices can be achieved,
other than to say that the process should be more "democratic."
Marxist historians of labor and manufacturing, such as David Noble (1977;
1984), have made some contribution to understanding how the interests of dominant
actors become embodied through the design process. However, the more detailed
sociological studies of technological design that have proliferated in the last fifteen to
twenty years (Mackenzie and Wajcman 1985; Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987; Bijker
and Law 1992) are, by and large, politically benign. Feenberg is the one theorist who
attempts to combine the conclusions of these detailed studies with a critical theory
perspective. Hence, this project centers largely on his work.
But as useful as it is, there are problems with Feenberg’s suggested critical
theory of technology. I use his own critical theory tradition, and examples from the
history of technology to expose the weaknesses in his theory. My central argument is
that Feenberg places far too much emphasis on the micro-level of technological
design, ignoring the rationalizing and homogenizing effects of entrenched systems.

9

Although there are many primary and secondary sources pertaining to
Western Marxism, there are few that specifically address technology. Marx (1906)
himself did not see technology as particularly relevant to social transformation, and
usually wrote about it in relation to the labor process or automation. The majority of
secondary materials on Marx and technology are either histories of technology, such
as David Noble (1984), or pertain to the issue of technological determinism, such as
Leo Marx (1994).
Some of the most pertinent aspects of Marx and technology, such as his
critique of the commodity form, only became evident with the emergence of the
Frankfurt School and critical theory. The majority of their key texts are readily
available in single author collections, or anthologies, such as Arato and Gebhardt’s
The Essential Frankfurt School Reader (1982). Many have also been reprinted in
Leftist journals, such as Telos.8 In addition, there are a number of excellent
secondary sources on the Frankfurt School (Jay 1973; Held 1980; Kellner 1989;
Bronner 1994; Wiggershaus 1994) that discuss the origins of critical theory, as well
as their views on technology.
I support the theoretical discussion of technology with concrete examples
from the history of technology. Specifically, I examine the development of railroads
and electrical power systems in the United States. Chandler (1977) and Nye (1990)
are especially useful, although there are many others. Primary sources are not

8

In addition, Douglas Kellner is involved in a project to publish The Collected Works of Herbert
Marcuse (1998; 2001).
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necessary for this section because the point of these histories—that in modernity
technology tends to coalesce into systems and move toward differentiation—is not
especially contentious (although I recognize that the details of this progression are).
In terms of mainstream reform environmentalism and wilderness
preservationism, there are a plethora of sources available that address both the history
(e.g., Nash 1967; Hays 1987; Sale 1993) and their current state (e.g., Norton 1991;
Dowie 1996; Schabecoff 1993; Rotham 1998). There are also several good sources
that discuss the emergence of radical environmentalism (Manes 1990; Scarce 1990;
List 1993; Zakin 1993). However, Robert Gottlieb's Forcing the Spring (1993) is the
only comprehensive history of environmental justice (although there are many case
studies). Urban poor and minorities have historically born the burden of pollution,
both where they live and where they work. These inequalities persist, and have given
rise to the present global environmental justice (EJ) movement on which there is a
growing body of literature (Pulido 1996; Schlosberg 1999; Szasz 1994; Wenz and
Westra 1995; Camacho 1998; Faber 1998).
Since the EJ movement links environmental issues to broader social issues
and focuses on resisting specific technologies (e.g., toxic waste incinerators), it offers
one of the more promising means of engaging technology. To illustrate the workings
of grassroots EJ, I present a case study of the toxics movement. This section relies
most heavily on primary sources. I use works written by activists (Gibbs 1998),
guidance literature from grassroots-based organizations, and personal interviews
(Appendix). Funding from a Virginia Tech Graduate Research Development Award
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enabled me to visit the Center for Health, Environment and Justice (CHEJ) in
northern Virginia where I interviewed9 one of their grassroots organizers and
surveyed their guidance literature.

Methods
My approach is primarily philosophical; however, it is also historical in the
sense that I use examples from the history of technology to support my argument and
discuss the ideas of critical theory and environmentalism in a historical fashion. For
the most part, I accept the “constructivist” and “systems” approaches used by
historians of technology, but I recognize that these methods are by no means
universally accepted. They are, however, utilized by some of the most prominent
scholars in the field—Thomas P. Hughes and David Nye. One could also say that my
approach is sociological in that the subject of my examination is a contemporary
social movement (i.e., environmentalism) and because an interview plays a central
role in my case study of the toxics movement. I should also point out that my
approach is both normative and descriptive, in that sense that I use Feenberg’s critical
theory of technology to both analyze and critique10 environmentalism.

Scope
9

The interview was prearranged. Questions were prepared beforehand, but only the subject and
purpose of the interview were discussed with the interviewee.
10
By “critique,” I mean both a critical analysis, or review, and a normative assessment. It is both
normative and descriptive.
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There is a substantial amount of work being done in the philosophy of
technology. Hence, some justification for taking a critical theory approach is
necessary. One reason is that the majority of this work does not address the
transformation or democratization of technology. Rather, it deals more with
metaphysical and epistemological issues, such as trying to define technology (Ihde
1990) or explaining the nature of technological knowledge (Pitt 1992). This is not to
say that these issues are unimportant to the goal of technological transformation or
that others have not suggested ways of transforming technology. Albert Borgmann
(1984), Joseph Pitt (2000), and Richard Sclove (1995), to name a few, all address
technological transformation.
I have, however, chosen to limit this project to the Western Marxist tradition,
primarily because it centers on the work of Andrew Feenberg, who is tied directly to
this tradition. Feenberg studied with Herbert Marcuse at the University of California
at San Diego, completing a dissertation on Georg Lukács.11 In addition, he served as
the editor of the Leftist journal, Telos, for a number of years, and was actively
involved with the New Left (and the French May Events of 1968) until he decided to
focus exclusively on scholarship. This, in conjunction with his explicit attempt to
develop a “critical theory” of technology, justifies the focus on critical theory in
general, and on his work in particular.

11

Marcuse was an original member of the Frankfurt Institute, and Lukács played a central role in the
shift to Western-philosophical Marxism, or what is now known as critical theory.
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But in addition to this, the Marxist theoretical tradition offers a number of
conceptual advantages for the project at hand:
•

In that dialectical processes are the basis for all life, a dialectical
(Marxist) interpretation of the human-nature relationship resonates
well (Parsons 1977)

•

Marxists view technology as an extension of the human body for the
purpose of appropriating nature and fulfilling needs

•

Marxism relies heavily on a constructivist view of “nature” and the
concept of “limits” in nature (Hughes 2000).

•

Later Marxists made the important distinction between “true” and
“false” needs (Marcuse 1964)

•

Beginning with Marx, there is an underlying assumption that
technology embodies politics

In sum, the Western Marxist tradition taken as a whole offers an extremely useful
approach to understanding the relationship between humans, nature, and technology.
And while some theorists, such as Feenberg and Winner, have touched on the need to
connect environmentalism with technological transformation, this has not been
sufficiently explored.

Outline of Chapters
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Chapter two is devoted to laying out Feenberg’s critical theory of technology.
I frame Feenberg’s agenda as a response to, or critique of, modernity in the tradition
of the Frankfurt School. To provide the necessary background, I briefly discuss Max
Weber’s theory of modernity and the Frankfurt School’s response. Although the
Frankfurt School’s portrayal of technology was rather foreboding, some of them did
offer prospects for liberation. Marcuse, in particular, attempted to spell out a theory
of emancipation—a “technique of liberation.” I follow Marcuse with Habermas’s
reply but devote the majority of the chapter to Feenberg’s work, focusing especially
on his theory of primary and secondary instrumentalization. I conclude by
summarizing the insights gained from Feenberg’s work, claiming that his theory of
instrumentalization is particularly useful for analyzing micro-level engagements with
technology.
In chapter three I critique and build on Feenberg’s work. I argue that although
the Frankfurt School’s portrayal of technology as an autonomous-rationalizing force
is somewhat exaggerated, it is largely correct. I draw on Feenberg’s own tradition to
argue that modernity is characterized by the differentiation of technological and
social spheres. I support this with examples from the history of technology, railroads
and electrical power systems in particular. These systems provide examples of
“technology as ideology” and as “social process,” and they demonstrate that over
time technological systems tend to take on their own imperatives and become more
deeply entrenched (and differentiated). I argue that what Feenberg’s theory needs is a
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theory of commodification, which I borrow from the recent work of Paul B.
Thompson.
Having outlined Feenberg’s critical theory of technology, I move on to discuss
environmentalism, in chapter four. I examine various “environmentalisms” through
the lens of Feenberg’s critical theory of technology. I argue that of the four main
strands of environmentalism—wilderness preservation, radicals, mainstream reform,
and grassroots EJ—the last resonates most with Feenberg’s theory. Grassroots EJ
takes a direct-action approach and focuses on transforming the built environment
where people live. That is, like Feenberg’s critical theory of technology, EJ focuses
on socio-technological transformation.
To illustrate the grassroots EJ approach, I provide a case study of the toxics
movement in chapter five. I begin with a discussion of the Love Canal incident
(1978), where the toxics movement originated. From there, I move on to examine the
background theory and strategies employed by the Center for Health, Environment
and Justice (CHEJ). I argue that the methods employed, and particularly the
strategies used by grassroots-umbrella organizations such as CHEJ, are analogous to
Feenberg’s theory of instrumentalization.
The final chapter is more normative, as I discuss the details of how a critical
theory of technology can enhance environmentalism as I have defined it. My
conclusion is that Feenberg’s suggestion of linking environmentalism with a politics
of technological transformation is viable. There are, however, some difficult hurdles
that must be overcome. One crucial issue is that grassroots activists have a fairly
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naïve view of technology which prevents more sweeping transformations. In short,
they fail to see that the risks threatening their communities stem from maladaptive
production, and that their own over-consumptive lives fuel the problem. A critical
theory of technology opens the black-box of “pollution” to expose the
interconnections between production and consumption. I argue that at the center of
this problem lies the issue of human need—that is, who defines it, and how?
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Chapter Two
Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology

Feenberg’s project is best understood as a vision and a path toward alternative
modernities. He reasons that if modernity as we know it is established through a
process of rationalization, then alternative rationalizations are necessary in order to
create alternative modernities. “There are ways of rationalizing society that
democratize rather than centralize control” (Feenberg 1999: 76). Viewed in this way,
environmentalism offers paths toward alternative modernities. He believes that the
current modernity is characterized by a particular rationality—a technological code—
and that this rationality has been embodied in the technological designs of modern
society. Democratizing technology means expanding technological design to include
alternative interests and values.
Feenberg offers both a theory of technological transformation—a democratic
rationalization of technology—and a critique of the existing cultural horizon. His
(1999) approach is therefore two-pronged: one focusing on the micro-level of
technological design and the second focusing on the meta-level of worldview, or
hermeneutic (i.e., the presuppositions and biases inherent in our present relations with
technology) (202). This two-level approach seems appropriate; to be successful local
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movements, whether environmental, technological, or other, must be coupled with
overarching meta-level critiques of society.
This chapter is intended primarily as an explication of Feenberg’s politics of
technological transformation. However, before moving on to a discussion of his
work, some understanding of the context of his ideas is necessary. Feenberg’s work
is largely a response to, or continuation, of Max Weber’s theory of modernity. As
such, he both critiques and builds on his Frankfurt School predecessors who were also
responding to Weber. He draws most heavily from Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen
Habermas to formulate his “critical theory of technology.” I will therefore begin with
a brief discussion of Weber’s theory of rationalization and then move on to the
Marcuse-Habermas debate over technology.

Max Weber and the Frankfurt School

Weber (1968) claimed that the process of modernization fueled by
capitalism’s emphasis on formal rationality necessarily led to a “differentiation”
between technological and social spheres. In short, the progress of modernity was
achieved at the expense of moving away from the personal (substantive) relations of
traditional societies to the impersonal (formal) relations of modern society. Weber
(1968) distinguished between formal and substantive rationality. He considered a
system to be formally rational “according to the degree in which the provision for
needs, and which is essential to every rational economy, is capable of being expressed
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in numerical, calculable terms” (85). Conversely, systems that “apply certain criteria
of ultimate ends, whether they be ethical, political, utilitarian, hedonistic, feudal,
egalitarian or whatever, and measure the results of economic action … against these
scales” (85) are substantively rational. According to Weber, capitalism adopts formal
rationality to achieve increased control, the end of which is total bureaucracy—the
“iron cage” (Marcuse 1968: 203). Driven by human needs, capitalism attempts to
maximize production through formal rationality. The more rationalized a system
becomes the more it produces. End of story. There cannot be a normative
assessment of such a value-neutral system.
The degree to which Frankfurt Institute members12 borrowed from the work of
Weber cannot be overemphasized. Max Horkheimer, Hebert Marcuse and others
drew heavily on Weber’s ideas of “rationalization” and the “iron cage” of capitalism,
focusing especially on his concept of “formal rationality,” or instrumental reason
(Held 1980: 65). There are, however, significant differences between Weber and the
Frankfurt School.
Like Weber, Adorno and Horkheimer held that in the context of capitalism,
“useful” translates into economically valuable (Held 1980: 153). However, they
(1972 [1944]) attributed the rise of instrumental reason to the Enlightenment thinkers
who claimed that only that which is useful in nature is valuable. “Rational” was coopted by capitalism to find the most efficient means of producing a product. Science

12

Key members of the Institute included Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Theodore Adorno,
Friedrich Pollock, Erich Fromm, and Leo Lowenthal (Kellner 1989: 12).
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and technology provided tools for carrying out the prescribed program (Tar 1977:
80). Although the drive for domination was not new to the Enlightenment, it was the
employment of new tools of domination -- science and technology -- that made the
Enlightenment program unique. Technology as instrumental reason was one of the
primary means of instilling this domination (Held 1980: 170).
Horkheimer and Adorno (1972 [1944]) argued that the subjugation of nature
led to the subjugation of humans: “what men want to learn from nature is how to use
it in order wholly to dominate it and other men” (4). While it is true that
developments in science and technology led to improved methods of quantifying,
calculating, and organizing nature, at the end of the day, these tools were turned back
on humanity to provide new ways of ordering and rationalizing society. Reason was
therefore not the road to emancipation hailed by Enlightenment thinkers, but a new
method of shackling humanity.
To achieve the capitalist goal of maximized production, total bureaucratic
control is the inevitable outcome—the “iron cage.” Weber, however, did not view the
establishment of the apparatus of administrative bureaucratic control negatively. For
him, it is simply the way things are (i.e., fate). There is no intentionality or
subjectivity in the capitalist machine. Marcuse (1968), on the other hand, argues that
what Weber calls fate is actually domination, because in fact someone, or some
group, chose a particular “fate” over another:
Who decrees the fate? Industrialization is a phase in the
development of men’s capacities and needs, a phase in their
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struggle with nature and with themselves. This development can
proceed in very different forms and with very different aims; not
only the forms of control but also those of technology and hence of
needs and of their satisfactions are in no way “fatal,” but rather
become such only when they are socially sanctioned, that is, as the
result of material, economic, and psychological coercion (214).
Weber’s formal-technical rationality is actually a political rationality, because
“coercion” constrains the choice of technology. If technology is a social-political
choice, then a “technique of liberation” could be chosen over a “technique of
domination” (Marcuse 1968: 225).

Marcuse’s Technique of Liberation

Marcuse’s (1964) proposal for liberation involves three elements: a critique of
the existing technological consciousness, a new technique of pacification, and a new
subject, or agent. He (1964) claims that the contradictions created by the hyperrational, technological society open the door for critique (225). This is not a belief in
the inherent breakdown of economic conditions as scientific Marxists argued.
Marcuse, instead, argues that late capitalism generates enough negative externalities
to make us question the rational nature of the given technological society. This is
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where critical theory comes in; it “strives to define the irrational character of the
established rationality” (Marcuse 1964: 227).
Marcuse (1964) claims that the choice of an alternative technology is limited
by: (1) the “stuff” of nature, however defined, as it confronts the subjective
interpreter, and (2) the form of interpretation in a given cultural historical context
(218). In other words, both the inherited technological context and the preestablished technological consciousness represent important constraints on
technological choice. Alternative historical projects must be at least imaginable for
the possibility of “an ingression of liberty into historical necessity” (Marcuse 1964:
221). However, alternatives are difficult to achieve because of the hegemony of the
few who have control over the productive process. The possibility of alternatives,
Marcuse (1964) claims, depends on this ingression of freedom by “men who
comprehend the given necessity as insufferable pain, and unnecessary” (222).
The issue of agency is crucial; someone must be capable of acting. Although
not particularly hopeful, Marcuse believes that the best opportunity for alternatives
lies with the excluded, or marginalized. That is, the revolutionary standpoint rests
with the outsiders, and outcastes, such as people of color, the persecuted, and the
unemployed. All they need is the consciousness to act (Marcuse 1964: 256).
Although it is a given that nature must be pacified for human existence, this
mastery can be either repressive, or liberatory (Marcuse 1964: 236). Marcuse
suggests a new “technique of pacification” to replace the established technology of
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domination. Significantly, Marcuse believes that science and technology can be
redirected to non-destructive paths. Because he ties problems such as war, violence,
and environmental destruction together into a “technique of domination” (or
domination of rationality), they can all be addressed through a transformation of this
technique—a transformation of technology itself. From this perspective, resolving
environmental destruction becomes part of a larger, more totalizing project. Marcuse
(like Feenberg) therefore sees environmentalism as one path for moving toward
liberation—a pacified existence (alternative modernity).
To accomplish this, Marcuse claims that technology must be redefined as an
“art of life” (338). He (1978) sees the development of the aesthetic dimension as
central to this liberation project. Beauty must become a form of freedom. “Rather
than being the handmaiden of the established apparatus, beautifying its business and
its misery, art would become a technique for destroying this business and this misery”
(Marcuse 1964: 239). And with the emancipation of Nature comes the simultaneous
emancipation of human senses. We are thereby liberated to experience gratification
from Nature in a multitude of new ways (Marcuse 1972). Humans, however, must
begin to appreciate Nature for its own sake— “a subject with which to live in a
common human universe” (Marcuse 1972: 60). Marcuse thus suggests a reversal of
the much-discussed domination of nature, not through doing away with technology
but by refashioning it as a “technique of liberation.”
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Habermas’ Reply

Jürgen Habermas fundamentally opposes Marcuse's call for a new technology.
According to Habermas (1968), technology is essentially the unburdening of needs
that are rooted in human nature through purposive-rational action (i.e., work).
Technology is who we are—the innate faculty of "purposive-rational action" is what
enabled humans to control their environment and set themselves apart from the rest of
nature. According to Habermas (1968), Marcuse’s suggested “new” technology is
therefore impossible:
as long as the organization of human nature does not change
and as long therefore as we have to achieve self-preservation through
social labor and with the aid of means that substitute for work, we
could renounce technology more particularly our technology, in favor
of a qualitatively different one (87).
For Habermas, suggesting a new technology is as absurd as suggesting a new human
species. Liberation cannot be achieved by transforming technology because
technology simply cannot be altered.
Habermas claims that Marcuse is misguided in his call for a revision of the
human-nature relationship with an alternative mediating technology. Marcuse (1992)
envisions humans as inter-subjectively engaging nature via a new technology. The
problem is that Marcuse fails to distinguish between two different types of action.
According to Habermas (1968), the human-nature relationship is necessarily
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governed by “purposive-rational action,” and what Marcuse is advocating is actually
“communicative action” (88).
Habermas admits that the technological rationalization of society is
problematic but that technology itself is not the cause. The source of the trouble lies
in the tension between the spheres of work and communication. The domination of
work, or purposive-rational action, over traditional forms of communication is a
defining feature of the modern period (Habermas 1968: 96). Rational-bureaucratic
institutions arising from the Enlightenment eventually replaced traditional societies
which were governed by social institutions and symbolic interaction. Capitalism
played a central role in this transformation by demanding improved means of
quantification and calculation. Habermas therefore frames the rise of modernity
similar to Weber, the difference being that he does admit that this is problematic.
Like Weber (and the Frankfurt School), Habermas (1968) sees technology as
instrumental rationality; specifically, he defines technology as "scientifically
rationalized control of objectified process" (57). However, his approach to resolving
the problem is somewhat different: "Rationalization at the level of the institutional
framework can occur only in the medium of symbolic interaction itself, that is,
through removing restrictions on communication" (1968: 118). Emancipation is
therefore achieved not through a new technology as Marcuse advocates but by
limiting purposive-rational subsystems through “new zones of conflict” (Habermas
1968: 120). The central problem is not technology itself because, again, technology
cannot be changed.
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Instead, Habermas (1968) claims that technologically induced domination can
only be overcome "by the development of a political decision-making process tied to
the principal of general discussion free from domination" (61). A “technocratic
consciousness” co-opts the political decision making process, such that social
problems are necessarily reduced to technological problems (1968: 64). Technocrats
frequently attempt to structure society such that only “scientific” and “technological”
problems exist, as the case of Love Canal illustrates (chapter five). Obviously this is
not always possible, because irrationalities continue to emerge in the face of
increasing attempts to rationalize society.
Although Habermas largely agrees with Marcuse and the rest of the Frankfurt
School in their characterization of technology as instrumental rationality, his view is
suspect for attempting to tie technology to human nature.13 He opens himself up to
standard critiques against essentializing by connecting technology to an ontological
claim (Kellner 1984: 332). To his credit, Habermas suggests a way around Marcuse's
problem of containment14 by separating the spheres of work and communication.
However, in doing so Habermas appears to reify Marx’s original distinction between

13

Post-modernists have convincingly argued against any notion of a universal essence of human
nature.
14
Marcuse (1964) collapses the social and technological relations, a framing that created an almost
inescapable problem. That is, his conception of a one-dimensional society that co-opts any and all
negations made the possibility of escape seemingly impossible.

27

the forces of production on the one hand, and the relations of production on the
other.15

Andrew Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology16
Feenberg (1999) argues against what he calls “essentialist” theories17 of
technology whether rooted in human nature (Habermas) or tradition (The Frankfurt
School). Although he draws heavily from Marcuse and Habermas to formulate his
critical theory of technology, he attempts to eliminate their essentialist base. He
claims that this tendency to essentialize is due primarily to an overemphasis on the
meta-level of culture. In the case of Habermas, his sidelining of the technologysociety relationship to focus on the meta-level of language and communication had
the same effect. This is even more obvious in the case of the case of Frankfurt
Schoolers, like Marcuse, who framed technology as an autonomous, rationalizing
force acting hand-in-hand with capitalism to produce agentless workers/citizens of a
one-dimensional society. Their infatuation with Weber’s concept of rationalization,
combined with the philosophical shift in Marxism,18 predisposed the Frankfurt School
to focus on consciousness, or ideology. As discussed below, the crux of the issue is
15

Marx divides the labor process into the “productive forces,” the machines, tools, and worker skills;
and the “productive relations,” the forms of property and power relations in society (O'Connor 1998:
35).
16
Portions of the following have been adapted from a previously published work (Veak 2000).
17
According to Feenberg (1999), essentialist philosophies of technology originated with Heidegger and
were further developed by the Frankfurt Schoolers.
18
The failure of a proletariat led revolution initiated a shift in Marxist thought in the early twentieth
century. In short, this involved a moving away from Scientific Marxism, or economism, to a more
philosophically oriented theory.
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whether or not technological progress necessarily leads to a differentiation between
technological and social spheres, as Weber argues.
Feenberg’s central point is that technology can only be misconstrued as an
autonomous-rationalizing force if the contingency evidenced at the micro-level of
design is ignored. In short, there is no "essence" of technology, according to
Feenberg. Recent work in technology studies supports the idea that technology can
only be defined contextually and locally by the particular technology-society
relationship.

The Social Construction of Technology
Feenberg (1999) argues that scholarly interpretations of the social
construction of technology (SCOT) establish convincingly that the technology-society
relationship is not unilinear (78-83). He broadly conceives SCOT to include social
constructivists, contextualist historians of technology, and actor-network theorists.19
Feenberg has been criticized for too readily accepting the reified packaging of this
extremely diverse school (Stump forthcoming). Although this may be true, his use of
SCOT as a whole seems appropriate. These studies do in fact reveal a number of
significant insights about the technology-society relationship.
First, SCOT theorists tend to avoid essentialist portrayals of technology
altogether. Instead, these theorists permit the analysis to contextually define
19

There have been a number of edited volumes on the SCOT since the current rage began in the early
1980's (Mackenzie and Wajcman 1985; Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987; Bijker and Law 1992).

29

technology.20 The end result of such analysis, however, has much to do with the
particular approach. Historical approaches tend to be rather "loose" or even messy,
while sociological and actor-network approaches tend to frame technology within a
particular model (Bijker and Law 1992: 7). Feenberg takes away from this the
notion of “interpretive flexibility,” that is, the idea that the design process is
composed of a number of competing interpretations.
Secondly, SCOT studies reveal that technology can be analyzed at three
different levels, or layers: the artifact itself, the activities and processes that generate
the artifact, and finally the knowledge necessary to develop the artifact (MacKenzie
and Wajcman 1985: 3). Sociologists typically approach the study of technology
through a bottom-up micro-analysis of case studies from which generalizations, or
models, are derived. This approach is clearly in contrast to the Frankfurt School’s
conception of technology, which, as discussed above, tends to be more of a macrolevel analysis.21
Finally, SCOT sheds light on the nature of the relationship between
technology and society. The first question that must be addressed in this regard is
whether or not technology should be considered distinct from, or outside of, society.

20

The degree to which the sociologist "hides" behind this mask of impartiality is an immensely
important topic in itself. It is not, however, the focus of my discussion here. See Hans-Georg
Gadamer (1975) and/or Paul Diesing (1991) for a discussion of "interpretation" and the social sciences.
21
On the surface, it may appear that critical theory's discussion of technology is more explicitly
"political." However, many sociologists of technology would no doubt agree that their choice of a
model for analysis is also politically motivated. Latour and Woolgar (1979), for example, specifically
rebut the claim that their sociological analysis is simply "bourgeois sociology of science" by
attempting to pull the rug (i.e., science itself) out from under the appeals for a radical (Marxist)
science. I am not so sure.
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Bijker and Law (1992) refer to this as the "interactive" perspective. If technology is
portrayed as distinct from society, then three possible relationships exist: technology
determines society; society determines technology; or technology determines
technology.22
On the other hand, if technology and society are collapsed into one "seamless
web," in which there is no inside or outside, the relationships between the various
elements of society and technology become much more contingent and emergent in
character (Bijker and Law 1992: 8). According to John Law (1987), a seamless web
of social, political, and economic factors meshes together to form a complete
technological system (e.g., electric power with all the related sub-systems and
artifacts constructed to accommodate this system). Such approaches focus on key
"system builders," such as Thomas Edison’s role in the development of electric
systems (Hughes 1989).
There is also the question of whether the technology-society relationship is
heterogeneous or homogenous. The conclusions drawn about this relationship differ
greatly depending on how this question is answered. As discussed above, because
they accepted Weber’s differentiation thesis, the Frankfurt Schoolers conceived of
technology as having a rationalizing, or homogenizing, effect on society. Actornetwork theorists employ a seamless web model to analyze artifact construction,

22

This bifurcation is no doubt one of the primary reasons why Marx has been frequently mislabeled as
a technological determinist. That is, his distinction between the forces of production (technology) on
the one hand, and the relations of production (society) on the other, no doubt provokes such an
interpretation.
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where many elements interact to produce an artifact: "the stability and form of
artifacts should be seen as a function of the interaction of heterogeneous elements as
these are shaped and assimilated into a network" (Law 1987: 113). The social is
therefore not a privileged element that operates outside the system, driving it in a
deterministic fashion but simply one element within the system. John Law (1987)
explains:
Thus the point is not ... to emphasize that a particular type of element,
the social, is fundamental to the structure of the network; rather it is to
discover the pattern of forces as these are revealed in the collisions that
occur between different types of elements, some social and some
otherwise (114).
Actor-network theory extends the constructivist notion of symmetry23 to all the
elements of the network—social, economic, political, technical, natural, and scientific
(Law 1987: 130).

To summarize, Feenberg (1999) draws on SCOT to demonstrate that the
design process is not deterministic. There is a significant degree of contingency,
difference, or, “interpretive flexibility” in society's relationship with technology (76).
SCOT studies help to expand the definition of technology to include the knowledge
and processes that go into the development of particular artifacts. And finally, the
23

The concept of symmetry has its origins in the “Strong Program” of the sociology of scientific
knowledge. The idea is that the analyst must suspend truth or falsity in order to give all perspectives a
fair analysis (Bloor 1976).
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idea of a seamless web is helpful in overcoming essentialist characterizations of
technology as an autonomous-rationalizing force. Including all the elements in the
analysis offers a more complete explanation.
While SCOT reveals a number of insights about the technology-society
relationship, Feenberg (1999) rightly points out its deficiencies. SCOT is too
narrowly focused on the development of particular technological artifacts, or systems
(11). Wanting to include all elements in the analysis is understandable; however,
SCOT has taken the concept of symmetry too far in an attempt to level the playing
field. SCOT ignores the larger issue of how particular design choices are made over
other choices, which, as Feenberg argues, is an inherently political question.24 He
(1999) claims that since technology can never be removed from a context, it can
never be neutral (213). Technological design is inherently political; consequently, the
observed constraint on design choice is not some essence of technology but evidence
of the hegemonic control of the design process by privileged actors.

Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology

With Weber as a backdrop, Feenberg combines the insights from SCOT with
the critical theory of Marcuse and Habermas to arrive at his own “critical theory of
24

On the other hand, Feenberg has been criticized for his over emphasis on the social/political (Stump
forthcoming), a point I discuss in more detail below.
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technology.” He believes Marcuse was correct to argue that technology is to a large
extent socially shaped and that the form of technology is a political choice. The
problem with Marcuse’s perspective is that he does not acknowledge the contingency
within the technologically dominated one-dimensional society. It is either all or
nothing—a technique of domination or a technique of liberation. This is what leads
Marcuse to argue that transformation must come from “outside” the system; those
within the one-dimensional society are simply too constrained to act. Feenberg
(1999) rejects this appeal to outsiders as the basis for transforming society (153). He
(1995) argues that the goal is "not to destroy the system by which we are enframed
but to alter its direction of development through a new kind of technological politics"
(35). The goal, in other words, is to steer the system from within through subtle
hybridizations not mass revolution.
With modifications, Feenberg employs Habermas's (1984; 1987) model of a
democratic speech community as the means for liberating technological design choice
from hegemonic constraints. According to Feenberg (1995), Habermas is mistaken to
conceive of technology as instrumentally neutral (79). Technology can never be
neutral because it cannot be separated from a particular cultural context. SCOT
studies demonstrate that actors are able to successfully shape design choice for their
own non-instrumental ends. Groups of actors can influence the design process to
accommodate a variety of interests. However, Feenberg (1999) claims that the
struggle over design choice is rational (105).
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Whereas Habermas argues for the exclusion of rationality from the lifeworld
of communicative action, Feenberg brings rationality into Habermas' vision of a
democratic community to arrive at his suggested "democratic rationality." Contra
Habermas, this process of transforming technology must take place within the social
(Feenberg 1995: 81). The possibility exists to choose rationally more liberating
technological designs that further the various interests of the community of actors.
As Feenberg (1999) states, "there are ways of rationalizing society that democratize
rather than centralize control" (76).
There is, however, an obvious tension between the contingency observed at
the level of design choice, and the constraints placed on design by the larger culturalpolitical milieu. Feenberg (1999) characterizes this tension as the "ambivalence" of
technology, which he conveys in the following two principles:

1.

Conservation of hierarchy: social hierarchy can generally be

preserved and reproduced as new technology is introduced. This principle
explains the extraordinary continuity of power in advanced capitalist
societies over the last several generations, made possible by technocratic
strategies of modernization despite enormous technical changes.

2.

Democratic rationalization: new technology can also be used to

undermine the existing social hierarchy or to force it to meet needs it has
ignored. This principle explains the technical initiatives that often
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accompany the structural reforms pursued by union, environmental, and
other social movements (76).

Feenberg admits that advanced societies concretize power through technologically
mediated organizations that prevent their citizens from meaningful political
participation. Focusing on this aspect of culture led the Frankfurt School to
characterize technology as an autonomous, rationalizing force. The problem is that
they ignored the existence of the second principle of “democratic rationalization.”
Feenberg (1999) is optimistic that democratic rationalization can overthrow this
entrenched power "from ‘within,’ by individuals immediately engaged in technically
mediated activities and able to actualize ambivalent potentialities suppressed by the
prevailing technological rationality" (105). The crux of his proposal centers on the
degree to which democratic rationalization can override capitalism's conservation of
hierarchy.
He claims (1999) that “strategic” actors are able to concretize their particular
biases in to the technological designs. These biases stem from:
aspects of technological regimes which can best be interpreted as
direct reflections of significant social values the ‘technical code’ of the
technology. Technical codes define the objects in strictly technical
terms in accordance with the social meaning it has acquired. These
codes are usually invisible because, like culture itself, they appear selfevident (Feenberg 1999: 88).
According to Feenberg, control over design choice is not always economically
motivated, as Marxists frequently argue. That is, the utilitarian efficiency of the
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market is not always the motivating factor. Frequently, the aim is to either de-skill
workers, or for management to maintain operational autonomy (Feenberg 1995: 87).
A centralized-hierarchical power structure is perpetuated because technological
designs (codes) are intentionally chosen to maintain operational autonomy. Feenberg
(1995) therefore admits that although technocratic power is foundationless and
contingent, it nevertheless has a "unidirectional tendency" (92).
Despite this fact, he believes that it is possible for “tactical” actors to subvert
the established technical code through their own democratic rationalizations.
Feenberg provides examples of what he considers successful democratic
rationalizations of technology, such as the struggle over the Internet (1999) and AIDS
activist's reform of the FDA drug approval process (1995). Although the Internet was
originally designed for the transmission of data, interpretive flexibility enabled a
multitude of users to shape the Internet for their own uses (Feenberg 1999: 126). In
the case of AIDS treatment, activists collectively challenged traditional medicine’s
technocratic view of treatment. Activists forced a dialogue with research scientists,
and the FDA. In the end, they successfully altered the entrenched government
bureaucracy to gain access to experimental medicines, which in turn led to significant
advancements in treating AIDS (Feenberg 1995: Ch. 5). Feenberg sees
environmentalist’s engagements with technology as having the same potential.

Primary and Secondary Instrumentalization
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The tensions between the principles of the “conservation of hierarchy” and
“democratic rationalization” can also be discussed in terms of instrumentalization.
Feenberg (1999) distinguishes between “primary instrumentalization” in which the
functional, reifying aspects of technology are emphasized, and “secondary
instrumentalization” where objects are actually constituted into their particular social
contexts. Primary instrumentalization is therefore analogous to Weber’s (and the
Frankfurt School’s) discussion of technology as formal rationality. Habermas, in
agreement with Weber, sees differentiation (i.e., between technological and social
spheres) as the unavoidable consequence of technological modernization. Feenberg
in contrast argues that this differentiation is more apparent that real. That is, looking
at technology at the meta-level makes it appear that technology has a differentiating
effect.
He characterizes primary instrumentalization with four moments. Technology
has the effect of decontextualizing entities from their original context. The qualities
of objects are reduced to quantifiable terms so that they can be easily controlled with
the established laws of science and technology. Those in control seek to position
themselves strategically in order to more easily exert their power. All of this assumes
a degree of autonomization, or distancing, between those in control and the objects
being controlled (Feenberg 1999: 203—204).
Feenberg suggests that primary instrumentalization and the process of
differentiation can be overcome not through containment, as Habermas argues, but
through a process of subversive, or secondary, instrumentalization. The overall thrust
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of this level is to concretize elements that have been decontextualized through the
process of primary instrumentalization. Feenberg offers four secondary moments to
counter the reifying moments of primary instrumentalization. Actors must seek to
systematize elements that have been decontextualized.25 In response to the
Differentiation

Primary instrumentalization

Secondary instrumentalization

Decontextualization

Systematization

Reduction

Mediation

Autonomy

Vocation

Positioning

Initiative

Concretization
Chart 1: Feenberg’s Theory of Instrumentalization26

25

Feenberg claims that this is roughly analogous to Bruno Latour’s discussion of “enrolling” actors into
networks. Latour (1988), for example, uses Pasteur’s development of germ theory to illustrate how
system builders enroll actors into their networks.
26
Used by permission of author (Feenberg 1999: 221).
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reductionism of primary instrumentalization, actors can re-instill objects with
secondary qualities. Aesthetic and ethical mediations are added to technological
objects when recontextualized. Autonomization can be overcome through vocation,
or the actual way in which users engage technologies. Although the distancing effect
of technology is real, actors can make choices in the way in which they actually
employ technologies. Finally, tactical actors can exert their initiative to counter the
positioning of strategic actors attempting to control them through technology
(Feenberg 1999: 205—207). The potential for combating and overcoming primary
instrumentalization with secondary instrumentalization will be further discussed in
the case study of the toxics movement (chapter five).

Technological Consciousness

In order to move toward concretization the hegemony constraining design
choice must be exposed through what Feenberg calls a “reflexive-hermeneutic
technology." What is needed, according Feenberg (1999), is a theory of cultural
change: "A new culture is needed to shift patterns of investment and consumption and
to open up the imagination to technical advances that transform the horizon of
economic action" (98). He draws on a number of intellectual tradition—hermeneutics
from Heidegger, cultural theory from Foucault and Baudrillard, and critical theory—
to reveal how the interests of certain actors achieve and maintain control of the design
choice process.
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Feenberg argues that the essentialist view of technology as inherently
differentiating is actually a product of a reified technological consciousness. He
(1999) compares this consciousness to Marx’s discussion of commodity fetishism in
which commodities are reified and treated as actually existing, autonomous entities:
The fetishistic perception of technology similarly masks its relational
character: it appears as a non-social instantiation of pure technical
rationality rather than as a node in a social network. Essentialism
theorizes this form and not the reality of technology (211).
The technological consciousness reifies the split between primary (functional) and
secondary (all other) qualities. Feenberg, however, argues that this division follows
from modern society’s exaggerated emphasis on functionality. In its extreme form
this begins to look much like modernity’s hyper-rationalization of society through
capitalism’s emphasis on utilitarian efficiency. It is possible, however, to describe
technological objects using both functional and social language, which is what
Feenberg means by contrasting the moments of primary and secondary
instrumentalization.
The examples he provides, such as the Internet, concretely illustrate this
possibility. Of particular note (the motivation for this project) is Feenberg's claim
(1999) that environmentalists' struggles with technology represent "the single most
important domain of democratic intervention into technology" (93). He believes that
environmentalism, as it brings other values to bear on the technological design
process, is one of the most promising terrains for evoking this change.

41

Summary and Conclusions
Feenberg offers a number of insights on the politics of technological
transformation. One of his most worthwhile suggestions is to move the locus of
transformation inside the social. Marcuse’s appeal to outsiders is probably the
greatest flaw in his theory of liberation; there is no inside or outside. If a group is
confronted by a technology, then they are part of that system even though they may
only experience the negative aspects. Viewing technology as a social process helps
actors to see themselves as the living material of these systems. To the degree that
they are able, actors possess the ability to shape systems for their ends. However, they
must be able to determine who is in control. Feenberg’s critical theory of technology
is helpful in this respect.
Given a particular technological design, Feenberg suggests the questions of
who wins, and who loses? Looking for the “technological code,” or signature, of
those in control of the design process is useful in identifying the locus of power and
where pressure should to be applied. Related to this is his distinction between
“strategic” and “tactical” actors. Distinguishing those that wish to maintain the status
quo (positioning) of a technological system from those that have a stake in changing
the system (initiative) is vital in moving toward transformation. And his distinction
between primary and secondary instrumentalization provides a language in which to
discuss these changes.

42

Finally, Feenberg’s employment of SCOT to overcome the one-sidedness of
essentialist philosophies of technology is also valuable. SCOT studies provide
evidence that a great deal of contingency exists early on in the design process.
However, they also indicate that as time goes by technological systems move toward
“closure,” at which point transformation becomes much more difficult. One obvious
point that follows from this is that actors have a greater opportunity to alter
technological systems if they become involved early in the design process. In short,
if some amount of contingency exists either because the system is still in the early
stages of development or because of a crisis, then Feenberg’s characterization seems
applicable.
However, there are problems with accentuating the pre-closure period, as
Feenberg does. The examples that he uses are either not entrenched (e.g., the
Internet) or less dependent on material technology (e.g., AIDS activism). This should
motivate activists to be more proactive, but realistically citizens tend to become
motivated once they are confronted by an existing (entrenched) system.27 As I will
discuss below, thinking about this issue with regard to the technologies confronting
environmentalists brings a host of problems to bear. I am therefore less sanguine
about the notion of contingency, and the prospects for democratic rationalization than
Feenberg.

27

In addition, when activists do attempt to pre-empt a questionable technology (e.g., GMF), it usually
leads to endless debates over scientific data. The toxics movement (chapter five) dramatically
illustrates this struggle.
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In sum, Feenberg’s critical theory of technology is practical both for assessing
the merits of a movement (e.g., environmentalism) and for guidance on transforming
technology. However, as I have indicated, there are problems with his proposal. It
should be clear by now that one of the most important points with regard to
technological change is the tension between the micro-level of design and the macrolevel perspective of system (and ideology). That is, as technological systems expand
they appear to increase differentiation between the technological and social spheres.
Feenberg clearly believes that this tendency is overstated and that it can be overcome.
From Feenberg’s own critical theory tradition, and from the history of technology, I
will argue otherwise.
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Chapter Three
Critiquing and Expanding Feenberg’s Theory

Feenberg’s effort to move beyond the Frankfurt School’s conception of
technology as instrumental rationality is commendable, although the degree to which
they were “essentializing” technology is subject to debate. The key works of Adorno
and Horkheimer (1972 [1944]), and Marcuse (1964) could be read as attempts to
historicize rather than essentialize the emergence of technological domination.
Moreover, Feenberg also appears to essentialize at times, for instance, by invoking
ahistorical moments in his theory of instrumentalization (Stump forthcoming).
Nevertheless, his central point that the Frankfurt School ignored the design-level of
technological engagements is clearly relevant, as are the insights gained from SCOT.
Eliminating determinism and admitting contingency does not mean, however,
that anything goes or that people are necessarily free to make choices about
technology. While Feenberg (1999) acknowledges that capitalism is the greatest
hindrance to a more liberatory politics of technology—"Technological design must be
freed from the profit system" (57)—he nevertheless argues that this hindrance can be
overcome through the struggle of various local movements over technology (Note
especially his suggestion about environmental movements). Granted, these
movements sometimes succeed and are no doubt significant to the participants.
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However, it is not enough to simply celebrate these small victories, if the goal is to
significantly transform the face of modernity into more sustainable and just societies.
One can question this goal altogether, but if Feenberg’s critical theory of technology
is to meaningfully connect with environmentalism, then some such goal must be put
forth.
Feenberg seems to argue that technological transformation is successful if it is
democratic (as he defines it). However, focusing on particular relations with
technology obscures the fact that the context of capitalist hegemony and the process
of rationalization thwart the majority of local “victories.”28 Although Feenberg
(1999) acknowledges this hegemony, he is clearly optimistic about the prospects for
overcoming:
But are such movements truly emancipatory? Do they simply deepen
our involvement with technology in accord with the dystopian logic of
modernity? … And it is true that advanced societies enroll their
members in ever wider technical networks which, as dystopian
pessimists claim, do indeed constrain behavior significantly. But
absolute opposition to technology leaves no room for practical
criticism and reform. Even as technology expands its reach, the
networks are themselves exposed to transformation by the individuals
they enroll (128).
28

I am in no way discounting the achievements of social reform movements over the last one-hundred
plus years. My point of contention is primarily concerned with the actual prospects of technological
reform, and where exactly this reform is headed.
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In the long run, emphasizing the local obfuscates the hegemony that on the one hand
Feenberg acknowledges, but on the other offers no real strategy for addressing other
some vague notion of a "reflexive technological hermeneutic." Simply arguing that
technology is not inherently differentiating, and that we must re-contextualize the
functional aspects with the social is not sufficient.
I want to challenge the efficacy of his proposal for a "democratic
rationalization" of the design process. In focusing on the micro-politics of local
struggles over technological design, Feenberg tends to minimize the rationalizing
tendencies of technologically-based capitalism. Technology, at least as it has been
manifested in modernity, does appear to have a differentiating effect. The history of
technology reveals that the “essentialist,” or “dystopian” view (e.g., the Frankfurt
School) of “technology as rationality” is to some degree accurate. A brief
examination of the development of two large technological systems—railroads and
electric power—serves to illustrate. Importantly, these examples from the history of
technology resonate in many ways with the Frankfurt School’s (and Weber’s)
characterization, which Feenberg flippantly dismisses as essentialist and dystopian.
Viewed in this way, Feenberg’s own critical theory tradition becomes a critique
against him.

Technology as Rationality
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As long as humans have engaged in trade, individuals and institutions have
attempted to manipulate markets for their own benefit. By the nineteenth century,
however, technology began to play a central role in shaping markets. Where formerly
markets were regional and fairly isolated,29 they became connected through the new
transportation and communications systems. Economies of scale increased to such an
extent that power shifted away from particular companies, or markets, to those that
controlled the technological systems.
Alfred Chandler,30 in his well-known work The Visible Hand (1977), details
the emergence of the modern business enterprise, which he claims “was the
organizational response to fundamental changes in processes of production and
distribution made possible by the availability of new sources of energy and by the
increasing application of scientific knowledge to industrial technology” (376). Most
significantly, Chandler argues that the modern business enterprise was largely
established through technological developments in transportation and communication.
Beginning in anti-bellum United States, he traces the transition from family, or
entrepreneurial capitalism, to present day managerial capitalism.
The enormous expansion of railroads that occurred in the later half of the
nineteenth century contributed to increased competition among the various railroad
companies. Railroad managers established cartels in an effort to coordinate the

29

I recognize that “world trade” has long existed, but the nature and extent of this trade has increased
exponentially.
30
William Cronon’s (1991) analysis also supports the rationalizing effects of railroads, although his
analysis is more explicitly Marxist and limited geographically (Chicago area).
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markets and control competition (Chandler 1977: 123, 143). The modern business
structure, or what Chandler calls managerial capitalism, emerged during this period.
Railroads internalized many business processes (e.g., distribution, manufacturing, and
accounting) to create multi-unit firms. Because owners could no longer oversee all
the operations of these complex multi-unit enterprises, management diverged from
ownership for the first time. Once this shift occurred specialization among
management rapidly increased (Chandler 1977: 87). Hierarchical structures were
then established to coordinate and control the complex task of safely and efficiently
distributing goods and people (Chandler 1977: 107).
In an effort to control distribution interconnections, management went on a
system-building spree in the 1880s. More miles of track were laid in this decade than
in any other. By 1900 railroads had increased their hegemony over the distribution
market by gaining control of all the major steamship lines (Chandler 1977: 188).
With the advent of refrigeration technology, distribution capabilities increased even
further. Companies began to incorporate more and more business activities into a
single enterprise. In a sense, the market had been literally internalized by the multiunit corporations. As such, the market came under the control of the “visible” hand
of the corporate managers (Chandler 1977: 285-86). By 1917, the modern industrial
enterprise, which integrated mass production and mass distribution within a single
business form, was largely in place as the dominant form. After World War I it was
simply a matter of perfecting the structure and clarifying the roles of middle and top
managers (Chandler 1977: 454, 456).
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Where the railroads were the cornerstone of the U.S. economy from 18351890, electricity filled this role from 1890-1935 (Nye 1990: 169). Electrification
served to increase the economies of scale initiated by railroad and communication
companies. The rationalizing effects of electric power are evident both in the
evolution of the systems themselves and in their affect on society. In terms of the
former, Thomas P. Hughes' (1983) comparison of electric systems illustrates.
Hughes examines the development of electric power in Chicago, London, and
Berlin and shows how initially each system was shaped by the particular context.
Chicago was dominated by laissez-faire economics, Berlin by heavy government
regulation, and London by parochialism—each giving a unique face to electricity.
London held out the longest against standardization with its extremely fragmented
and non-standardized conglomerate of electrical systems. Nevertheless, Hughes
(1983) claims that by the 1930s all three systems were homogenized (or rationalized)
by the system demands of utilitarian efficiency.31 Hirsh (1999) argues convincingly
that, in the case of the U.S., a group of managerial elites further entrenched the
system with decisions intended to maintain the status quo.32 Viewed in this way,
electric power represents a clear instance of the differentiating, and rationalizing
effect of technology.
31

While Hughes (1983) admits that "load factor" was a technological limitation driving the direction of
the electrical utility industry, he also concedes that the industry would look considerably different in a
society that did not count "capital cost." That is, if the industry was driven by values other than
utilitarian efficiency and the "bottom-line" of the market (463).
32
In the same book, Hirsh explains how this hegemony was overcome through various circumstances.
This will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter.
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Both railroads and electric power illustrate that system growth was not driven
entirely by economic considerations. Chandler, for example, stresses that although
financiers were important to this growth, top managers determined the overall
strategy and mode of operation. The growth of railroad systems was clearly driven
by a desire to expand markets; however, the economies of scale increased to such an
extent that enormous administrative-managerial machines were necessary to maintain
their operation. Once established, the managers began making decisions that would
preserve their power; it was not simply about money in other words. The same thing
occurred in the case of electric power with the establishment of public utility systems.
The technological imperatives and the objectives of the system managers become
mutually reinforcing. This is roughly analogous to the Frankfurt School’s discussion
of the administrative takeover of society under Nazism, or state capitalism.
Nazism and the lack of a proletariat revolution led to a questioning of the
traditional Marxist emphasis on the centrality of economics. Friedrich Pollock's
(1982 [1941]) essay on state capitalism convinced a number of Frankfurt Institute
members that the means of maintaining hegemony was not simply economic. Pollock
claimed that the threat of collapse was no longer immanent under the Nazi system,
which he termed “state capitalism.” While orthodox Marxists argued that capitalist
economic systems necessarily led to collapse, Pollock suggested that Nazi Germany
had managed to overcome these contradictions through a system of controls.33

33

Another Institute member, Franz Neumann, countered Pollock’s thesis, claiming that the highly
administered society created by National Socialism was merely a façade. Complete chaos lay under
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Granted, capitalism may have facilitated the development of fascism, but once
achieved it seemed to take on a life of its own, no longer subject to traditional Marxist
economic analysis. Under state capitalism the priority of economics became
subjugated to the state administrative apparatus. The imperative, therefore, was to
address the bureaucratic machine that created and maintained this hegemony (Dubiel
1985: 81).
In sum, the development of railroads and electric power support the idea that
technological systems have a tendency to move toward autonomous, rationalizing
systems. The drive for efficiency and standardization created enormous systems of a
uniform nature in both instances. Indeed, in order to expand it seems almost
inevitable that systems move in this direction. Although technological determinism is
certainly an overstatement, there is a sense in which technological systems build up
momentum as they expand (Hughes 1989). There comes a point at which large
technological systems take on their own imperatives (Winner 1977). That is, in order
for the system to expand and increase efficiency (i.e., to make the product/service
increasingly affordable), then clearly these imperatives will come to dominate the
decision making of the system managers. According to Weber (1968), the
differentiation between the technological and the social spheres facilitates this

the surface of the highly structured Nazi machine. This debate between Pollock and Neumann lead to
a division among Institute members (Held 1980: 63). Adorno and Horkheimer sided with Pollock,
which may explain the overt pessimism of their later work (1972 [1944]). More significantly, the
debate instigated a concerted effort to understand the techniques of Nazism and fascism.
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growth. Importantly, as systems gain momentum and became more entrenched the
prospects of transformation appear to diminish.

Technology as Social Process

In terms of electric power’s wider impact on society, one of its most
significant effects was in the factory. The massive distribution network created by
railroads and telegraphs led indirectly to mass production technologies34 (Chandler
1977: 240). Dramatically increasing the availability of raw materials and fuel
sources (i.e., coal) opened the door for technological innovations in production
(Chandler 1977: 240). According to David Nye (1990), "Electricity opened up new
possibilities for restructuring the factory, by making changes in both the environment
and the process of production" (187).
The effects on the factory and the productive process itself were profound.
During the period of electrification (1890-1940) production increased three hundred
percent (Nye 1990: 186). This, in turn, led to changes in the way factories were
managed but also to determined responses on the part of the workers (Noble, 1977:
55). From the worker’s perspective, the changes brought about by electricity were
both good and bad. On the one hand, electricity provided a cooler and safer work
environment; however, it also helped to establish the automated assembly line which
34

What mass production is, and when it was actually achieved is a subject of considerable debate.
Hounshell (1984) argues that the key ingredient in mass production—interchangeability of parts—was
not achieved until after 1885 (122).
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dramatically altered worker life both inside and outside the factory. Automation led
to deskilling and a more fluid work force. Like the parts of a machine, workers
became interchangeable. As a result, women and children frequently took over
positions traditionally held by men, although at considerably lower wages (Nye 1990:
210).
However, the primary cause of worker dissatisfaction was not the deskilling,
or the grueling tedious work but the loss of control over the rate of production.
Worker autonomy had long been an issue, but until the introduction of the fully
automated assembly lines, workers had managed to exert some sense of agency by
controlling the speed of production. Assembly lines, however, forced workers to
follow the dictates of the line speed, which was faster and continuous (Nye 1990:
190).
Of greater consequence to the worker, assembly lines enabled tasks (and
workers) to be highly regulated. Machines were only half of the assembly line
equation; the workers themselves the other. The workers’ bodies were conditioned to
conform to the automated processes. Thus began the Scientific Management35
movement, the essence of which was the streamlining of human action in the
production process. Frederick Taylor (1967 [1911]) is credited with initiating this
movement in which engineers shifted from managing and manipulating machines to

35

Also known as “Taylorism.”
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managing and manipulating people (i.e., workers).36 Taylor focused primarily on time
and task studies to determine the "optimal" production rate (i.e., literally how fast the
worker could function at a sustained rate) (Noble 1977: 82).
However, Taylor's conception of work (and humans) was overly simplistic.
His rigid methods led to a number of worker uprisings including a strike at a
government arsenal at Watertown in 1911. These events ended with the banning of
Scientific Management methods in federal arsenals altogether (Noble 1977: 272). As
a result of these conflicts with workers, later analysts gave more consideration to the
psychological aspects of the workers. The objective shifted to determining ways of
eliciting consent and cooperation from workers37 (Noble 1977: 274).
Taylorism represents one of the most extreme examples of technology as
social process and supports the idea that “like every other social process, technology
is alive. People—particular people in particular places, times, and social contexts—
are both the creators of modern technology and the living material of which it is
made” (Noble 1977: 167). Under Taylorism, the workers were not only organized
around assembly lines, their very movements were quantified and forced to conform
to the machines. They became the machines. Moreover, the later shift in emphasis to
obtaining worker consent is analogous to the Frankfurt School’s discussion of
technology as ideology.

36

Antonio Gramsci's (1971) discussion of Fordism and Taylorism provides an early Marxist critique of
the modern industrial form.
37
This was essentially the beginning of industrial psychology.
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Technology as Ideology

One of the central ideas of the Frankfurt School was that an ideology of
technology supports the hegemony of particular forms of technology. Horkheimer
(1982[1941]) argued that fascists transformed and co-opted the Enlightenment
thinker’s conception of reason: “the new order of fascism is reason revealing itself as
unreason” (46). Where reason had once represented critique and skepticism, it
became just the opposite under fascism:
The process which hardens men by breaking down their
individuality—a process consciously and planfully undertaken in
the various camps of fascism—takes place tacitly and
mechanically in them everywhere under mass culture, and at such
an early age that when children come to consciousness everything
is settled (Horkheimer 1982[1941]: 41).
Where Enlightenment thinkers, such as Kant and Locke, had hailed reason as a means
of preserving the individual, the rationality of domination instituted by National
Socialism paradoxically led to the destruction of the very individual that reason was
intended to protect.
Fascist techniques of control became so ingrained that they appeared natural.
“Rational” equated to conformity with the system (Marcuse 1982 [1941]: 148).
“Technology as rationality” mystifies the process by which humans are brought into
conformity. Horkheimer (1982[1941]) claimed that this process created a
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“technological veil,” where the “tattered veil of money has been replaced by the veil
of technology” (44).38
Marcuse elaborates on these themes in his discussion of a “one-dimensional
society.” According to Marcuse (1964), technology has been co-opted through a
political choice to establish the present form—“technological rationality” (154-55).
Late capitalism contains its antithesis, or negation, through this technological
rationality. He (1964) argues that reason manifested through technology serves as an
instrument of domination: “today, domination perpetuates itself and extends itself not
only through technology, but as technology … Technological rationality thus protects
rather than cancels the legitimacy of domination” (158-59).
Marcuse claims that the discourse of rationality which is established and
maintained by the mass media, essentially negates all opposition. The discourse loses
its play, dialogue, mediation, and consequently its ability to create new alternatives.
It becomes tautologous, and in doing so it contains those aspects of the discourse that
could offer an alternative to the status quo. It has, in Marcuse’s words (1964), created
a one-dimensional society: “there is only one dimension, and it is everywhere and in
all forms” (11). Class-consciousness attained in the context of late capitalism is
necessarily a false consciousness. “And this false consciousness has become
embodied in the prevailing technical apparatus, which in turn reproduces it” (Marcuse
1964: 145). In the one-dimensional society, whatever “is” is right, and wrong is only
38

His framing of technology as a veil that mystifies the domination of the Nazi machine is clearly
analogous to Marx’s discussion of the commodity form mystifying the exchange process (discussed in
more detail below).
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that which is antithetical to the whole—the one-totalizing, all-pervading, selflegitimating discourse of truth.
Feenberg seems to acknowledge such an ideology of technology. His
discussion of “technological fetishism” (chapter two) is similar to Horkheimer’s
“technological veil” and Marcuse’s “technological consciousness.” Feenberg,
however, is more optimistic about the prospects of overcoming such an ideology.
Looking again at a concrete example from the history of technology illustrates the
power of ideology in developing and maintaining large technological systems.

Evidence of Technology as Ideology in the Development of Electric Power

Electricity was at first a novelty of conspicuous consumption for the rich and
was therefore not solely utilitarian (Nye 1990: 245). Streetlights and Christmas tree
lights were just a few of the non-functional uses of electricity at the turn of the
century. People were enthralled by the "Great White Ways" created by streetlights
and advertising. The euphoria over electricity was due in large part to the grand
exhibitions and fairs at the turn of the century (Nye 1990: 27). Fairs helped establish
“electrification” as a correlative for the ideology of progress. In a time when
smokestacks represented progress, electrification translated into civic pride (Nye,
1990: 18).
In the 1920s, electric companies focused on developing a consumer market.
Executives, such as Samuel Insull, believed that electric appliances were the key to
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increasing residential demand for power. Advertising campaigns were designed to
sell Americans on time and labor saving appliances and on the benefits of better
lighting. Advertising taped into progressive ideals that linked technological progress
to a "better world for everyone" and into the already prevalent view that "things were
an extension of the self" (Nye 1990: 278; 280).
Even with the heavy push from corporate advertising, residential demand
remained primarily from lighting until well into the 1920s39 (Platt 1991: 154). The
situation finally began to change in the 1930s when appliance sales dramatically
increased. David Nye (1990) argues that the shift in sales resulted from the context of
progressive ideals and the rhetoric of corporate advertising that co-opted these
ideals.40 Technology was seen as the means of liberation for the common person
(Nye 1990: 339). Corporations, such as General Electric and Westinghouse, tapped
into the "technology as liberation" rhetoric with futuristic exhibits at World Fairs and
Expositions. These exhibits fueled the notion that progress equates to possessing the
latest consumer product (Nye 1990: 375). Technology, progress, and consumerism
were packaged into an ideology in such a way that Americans believed that in buying
new appliances they were helping achieve a better world.41 Clearly, it was not simply

39

With the exception of the iron, eighty to eighty-five percent of residential electricity consumption
was for lighting (Platt 1991: 154).
40
Ronald C. Tobey (1996) interprets these changes differently. He claims that FDR's New Deal policy
changes were largely responsible both for gaining access to electricity and for the modernization of the
home.
41
But contrary to popular belief, electricity actually served to maintain traditional family roles.
Amenities tended to flow mostly toward males, as the gender lines were redrawn (Nye 1990:278). The
industrialization of the home meant "more work for mother" (Cowan 1983). Liberating women from
the drudgery of housework with electrical appliances simply meant that they were free to take on more
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about developing and expanding the material technology. The consumer had to be
“developed” along with the technologies. Ideology was therefore crucial to the
expansion of these systems.

Implications for Feenberg’s Theory

Acknowledging the power of ideology has significant implications for
Feenberg. Although he attempts to address this in his discussion of technological
fetishism, one is left with the question: can the technological hermeneutic ask
questions deep enough to undermine the prevailing attitude of "technology equates to
economic progress"? In short, it is difficult to understand Feenberg's optimism when
he admits capitalism's "unidirectional tendency" toward "conserving hierarchical
structures." The Frankfurt School’s characterization of technology supported by
examples from the history of technology suggest otherwise.
Emphasizing the local successes over technological design, as Feenberg does,
may not only leave us far short of the goal of a more just and sustainable modernity, it
may in fact blind us to a head-long plunge into an ever increasing environmental
degradation. In celebrating the "democratization" of technology in these limited
contexts, Feenberg largely ignores the fact that we are becoming increasingly
responsibilities. In fact, Tobey (1996) argues that the "electrical labor-saving appliances in the 1920s
culminated a century-long embourgeoisment of the home; they did not initiate an era of democratic
electrical modernization" (6).
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embedded in technological systems that remove us further and further from the real
world in which many still face crucial life threatening environmental problems.
Nor can it be denied that much of the disparity—whether in terms of
consumption, or unequal distribution of pollution burdens—is a result of the wasteful
energy systems in which we are embedded. In a world where fifteen percent of the
population consumes almost seventy percent of the energy, technologically induced
overconsumption must be addressed (EcoWorld 2000). The increasing
embeddedness in large technological systems with their associated consumptive
lifeworlds contributes greatly to this disparity (Mellor 1997). This is a central reason
why Feenberg's faith in environmental resistance movements is unfounded, at least
with his current proposal. Any attempt to merge a critical theory of technology with
environmentalism must therefore address our increasing embeddedness in
technological systems (i.e., second nature), or conversely our increasing
disembodiedness from the material world (i.e., first nature).42
Feenberg’s theory of instrumentalization fails on this account. Suggesting
that actors “concretize” highly differentiated technologies is worthwhile but
insufficient. It is possible to successfully concretize technologies through Feenberg’s
secondary instrumentalization while the system, as a whole, remains disconnected or
alienated from (first) nature.

42

First and second nature are terms used to distinguish between the humanly constructed world of
culture and technology and non-human nature. Granted, there is no true "first" nature left, hence we
are talking about degrees.
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I believe these shortcomings can be addressed in two ways. First, the
connection between technology and nature necessitates a theory of human need and
how that need is satisfied through the appropriation of nature. The importance of this
issue will become more clear in the chapters on environmentalism, and will be
addressed in more detail in the final chapter. Second, what Feenberg’s politics of
technology lacks is a theory of commodification (or alienation). Ironically, he
acknowledges that commodification has been an emphasis of Western Marxists from
Marx to Lukács to the Frankfurt School; nevertheless, he sidelines the issue in his
own theory. Below I briefly discuss the origins and history of the theory of
commodification, then suggest how it can fruitfully connect with Feenberg’s critical
theory of technology.

Critique of the Commodity Form

According to Feenberg (1981), a clear link can be made between the early
Marx discussion of “commodity fetishism,” Lukács idea of “reification,” and the
Frankfurt School’s focus on technology as a “domination of rationality.” However, to
understand Marx’s critique of the commodity form, it is first necessary to understand
his conception of the human-nature relationship.
For Marx, “The whole of nature is socially mediated and, inversely, society is
mediated through nature as a component of total reality” (Schmidt 1971: 79).
Humans and nature are essentially one until humans begin to dominate nature for

62

their ends. Once humans achieve mastery, nature becomes “external” nature, or
humanity’s “inorganic” body (Schmidt 1971: 82). But even with the subordination of
nature, humans continue to directly engage nature to produce objects of utility (i.e.,
use value). It is only with the shift to a capitalist mode of production that objects of
production take on value in the economic sense (i.e., exchange value) (Marx
1967[1867]: 87).
According to Marx, capitalist production divides the product of labor into use
value and exchange value. The use value is a product’s actual utility; while the
exchange value, unique to the capitalist mode of production, originates only when the
product of labor is exchanged as a “commodity” (Marx 1906: 84). Under capitalism,
workers encounter themselves for the first time as an “objective other” (Marx
1967[1867]: 77). The worker is estranged from the product of their labor but also
from the relations that create the product. The commodity form mystifies the
productive relations that go into the product and thereby hides the exploitative labor
relations that produce the commodity. Marx (1967[1867]) explains how this
resembles religious fetishism:
In [the religious] world the productions of the human brain appear as
independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both
with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of
commodities with the products of men’s hands. This I call the
Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as
they are produced as commodities (77).
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The commodity form appears to take on a life of its own, with its own set of abstract
regulating laws. For this reason, political economy uses abstract formulas, or laws, in
an attempt to represent the actual material processes (Marx 1964[1932]: 106). In
doing so, political economy conceals, or mystifies, the estrangement created by the
capitalist mode of production (Marx 1964[1932]: 109). Marx wanted to demystify
the class interests hidden in bourgeois ideology and recontextualize their voice
(Gouldner 1976: 44, 51).
Georg Lukács43 extended Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism from the
market to all of society (Feenberg 1981: 78). Lukács (1971) claimed that “there is no
problem that does not ultimately lead back to that question and there is no solution
that could not be found to the riddle of the commodity structure” (83). To this end,
Lukács developed the concept of reification—the process by which relationships and
people take on a more thing-like, objective quality in the commodity form. Using
Weber, Lukács (1971) argued that capitalism's emphasis on specialization and
calculation leads to a progressive rationalization of every aspect of society (88, 96).
In reified thought the subject necessarily attempts to understand the objective world
as a rational system. Indeed, once reified through the laws of capitalism, the world
can only be comprehended by the internal logic of capitalism (Feenberg 1981: 102).
Through the process of reification, capitalism reproduces the social forms (e.g., the
43

The link between Marx and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School lies in the revival of Hegelian
Marxism or what later became known as Western Marxism. The two most influential theorists in this
regard were Karl Korsch, and Georg Lukács (Bronner 1994: 12). Together they initiated a shift away
from scientific Marxism, or economism, toward a more philosophical Marxism that culminated in what
is now referred to as critical theory.
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state, and system of laws) that support the commodity form (Lukács 1971: 95).
Lukács (1971) stressed the “totality” of the reification process achieved under
capitalism: “The structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more
fatefully and more definitely into the consciousness of man” (93).
In terms of ideas, Lukács’ concept of reification was crucial to the Frankfurt
School’s development of the concept of “technology as instrumental rationality” (Jay
1973: 174). In essence, the Frankfurt Schoolers replaced the totalizing consciousness
of the commodity form discussed by Lukács with the idea of a technological
consciousness. His discussion of how the commodity form mystifies social relations
is (as discussed above) later replaced by Horkheimer’s concept of the “technological
veil” (1982[1941]). Marcuse (1964) expands this notion with his discussion of how a
pervasive “technological consciousness” serves to establish a “one-dimensional
society.”
Feenberg’s discussion of technological fetishism is somewhat of a
continuation of the Frankfurt School’s discussion of technology as ideology. Hence,
there exists connection between Lukács, the Frankfurt School and Feenberg in this
regard. The problem, however, is that Marx’s original critique of the commodity
form—of commodification—has been lost along the way. Feenberg does not discuss
the alienating or commodifying aspects of technology at all.44 Although his theory of
instrumentalization touches on the reifying aspect of technology, his concept of

44

“Commodification” does not even appear in the index of his latest work Questioning Technology
(1999).
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“concretization” is inadequate. It is possible to imagine actors employing Feenberg’s
secondary instrumentalization (chapter two) to achieve their interests (i.e., concretize
a particular technology for their ends), while the system, as a whole, remains entirely
commodified.
His discussion of the Internet is a good example of this. Granted, Internet
users are sometimes able to concretize their particular needs and interests from the
existing system, but to what end? With regard to the environment, the case of the
Internet may not appear problematic.45 Clearly, there are technological systems, such
as fossil fuel generated electric power, that explicitly damage the environment. In
cases such as this we can certainly imagine actors achieving their interests (e.g., more
power), while the commodified system of electric power roles on destroying the
environment and human health.
Feenberg might argue that his democratic rationalization of technology could
instill environmental values into these systems. But how, or to what end? His theory
of instrumentalization is simply inadequate as it stands. As argued, Feenberg
provides no means of addressing the commodifying aspects of technology. His focus
is on actors achieving their interests within a given system. There must be a more
totalizing critique of commodified, destructive technological systems.

A Theory of Technological Commodification

45

However, one could certainly argue that the Internet is fueling the fetishized consumerism which
ultimately contributes to environmental destruction.
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Paul B. Thompson (forthcoming), a philosopher of technology, suggests a
way of extending Feenberg’s theory of instrumentalization with a theory. Thompson
borrows from the field of institutional economics and the philosophy of Albert
Borgmann46 to formulate his own theory of “technological commodification.”
Thompson (forthcoming) acknowledges the traditional interpretation of
commodification as “the transformation of something that is not bought and sold into
something that is, or to the extent that something can be bought and sold in varying
degrees, and increase in the degree to which it is.” This is the sense in which Marx
(1906) uses it when he describes how, under the capitalist mode of production, labor
is transformed into something that can be bought or sold (84). Although Thompson
acknowledges his debt to the Marxist tradition, he focuses on the more general
definition of commodity as “something routinely bought and sold.” Specifically, he
wishes to emphasize the degree of interchangeability associated with
commodification.
Thompson (forthcoming) details the various manifestations of
commodification, claiming that it occurs in four different ways:
1) Alienability (the ability to separate one good from another, or from
the person of a human being) is altered. 2) There is a change in
excludability (the cost of preventing others from use of the good or
service). 3) There is a change in rivalry, or the extent to which
46

Borgmann’s most well-known work is Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life (1984).
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alternate uses of goods are incompatible. 4) Goods are standardized so
that there is an increase in the degree to which one sample of a given
commodity is treated as equivalent to any other sample. Goods that
exhibit the commodity form tend to be alienable, excludable, rival and
standardized. These four parameters constitute the ideal type for the
commodity form.
But in addition to these four parameters, Thompson makes the important distinction
between “structural” commodification and “technological” commodification.
Structural commodification involves changes in the rules, laws, or social customs
associated with a particular technology. In this instance, the actual physical
technology itself is not altered. Marx’s discussion of wage labor is an example of
structural commodification. Under capitalism labor becomes a commodity that can
be bought or sold. Although “labor” itself did not change, the associated laws
changed to accommodate the new capitalist mode of production.47
In the case of technological commodification, the technological artifact itself
is altered. The four parameters of alienability, excludability, rivalry, and
standardization are actually built into the technological design. Thompson offers the
invention of sound recording as an example of this type of commodification.
Developments in recording technology allowed music to be exchanged as a
commodity. Recorded music separated, or alienated, the artist from their music, and

47

Although technological changes to the production process obviously did occur, the first step was to
organize labor under the capitalist mode of production.
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the ability to mass produce recordings and sell them for profit created the conditions
of excludability.48
Of course, transformations can involve both technological and structural
commodifications. In the case of electric power for example, the actual physical
technologies became more standardized overtime which resulted in a reduction in
cost for the consumer. In Thompson’s terminology, the “excludability” of electric
power was reduced to allow more people to purchase it. But in addition there were a
number of significant structural changes associated with the development of electric
power. The establishment of government regulated public utilities created a structure
that increased the average citizens “alienation” from electric power, as well as the
utility manager’s ability to “exclude.”
Thompson (forthcoming) explains that “the advantages of the new vocabulary
are an increased capacity to map the complexities of commodification and
decommodification, and in a clearer way to express how technology and
technological innovation affects those processes.” He illustrates the merits of his
suggested vocabulary by re-examining Feenberg’s examples of AIDS activism and
the Internet. With regard to environmentalism, I believe Thompson’s distinction
between technological and structural commodification is extremely useful, and will
be applied to environmentalism below (chapter six).
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As Thompson notes, technology can also be used to overcome exclusion. The current (2003)
struggle over downloading music from the Internet is just one such instance of this.
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Conclusions

While Feenberg’s suggested critical theory of technology is admittedly useful,
I have in this chapter attempted to critique and build on his work. One of my central
criticisms of Feenberg’s theory is that he too readily discounts the rationalizing
tendencies of large technological systems. These tendencies are evident in the
examples of railroads and electric power, and are supported by the Frankfurt School’s
characterization of technology. Feenberg acknowledges this tendency in his principle
of the “conservation of hierarchy,” but he too quickly dismisses this characterization
as “dystopian” or “essentialist.” In other words, there is some truth in what Weber
and the Frankfurt Schoolers argued with regard to the differentiating aspect of
technology.
Nor is it enough to say that the apparent differentiation between the
technological and social spheres is a result of technological fetishism. The rise of
large technological systems, and their impact on society is more than “appearance.”
They have in fact engulfed society such that the technological has to some extent
taken over. Although it is sometimes possible to thwart a deleterious technology
before it becomes concretized, this is clearly the exception. In the majority of cases,
citizens confront environmentally destructive technological systems that are already
entrenched. For example, nuclear power was largely a victim of the activist oriented
1960s (and the media’s portrayal of the Three Mile Island incident), but it also failed
because the system was still in its infancy. Under different circumstances, we would
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most likely be far down the road of nuclear power as in the case of many European
countries. For these reasons, I want to give credence to perspectives, such as those of
the original Frankfurt School, which acknowledge the differentiating and
rationalizing effect of technology.
Of course, one could argue that technologies have changed from the period of
the Frankfurt School’s analysis, and that the new information technologies do not
display these tendencies. However, there is no reason to believe that current systems
inherently differ from the ones discussed. We already see the Internet moving toward
standardization with the monopolization of operating systems, and the cooptation by
corporate advertising. In fact, it appears that these systems are becoming entrenched
even more rapidly than the ones discussed. If nothing else, such systems take us even
deeper into the virtual worlds created by techno-elites.
Another problem with over emphasizing the micro-level, as Feenberg does, is
the issue of direction. That is, what direction is a particular system moving? Relying
on the needs and interests of participants is not sufficient. Given that human needs
are constructed along with the technologies themselves, they tend to become
synonymous with the needs and imperatives of the system. Therefore, human need,
as well as the aims and purposes of a given technology, must be explicitly addressed.
This can be accomplished through democratically agreed on norms or guiding
narratives, but the point is that the technological context itself cannot be the sole
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source.49 With regard to the environment, we must recognize that many of our
modern technological systems have significantly removed us from first nature. As a
consequence, our needs no longer take nature into consideration.

49

Nor can the rejection of a particular technology.
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Chapter Four
Environmentalism Through
the Lens of Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology

Having outlined Feenberg’s critical theory of technology, I now use this theory to
examine environmentalism. However, defining environmentalism is somewhat of a problem
in itself. The media and culture industry have created the idea that environmentalism is a
single entity, while in fact just the opposite it true. Environmentalism is a "polyglot of
groups, lacking any coherent strategy, badly fragmented, and consequently unable to muster
sufficient political power to realize their goals" (Brulle 2000: 271). One way to gain an
understanding of this polyglot is to look at what the various groups mean by the
"environment":

The simple label 'the environment' encompasses a huge range of political
subjects requiring very different policy approaches and involving a wide
variety of interest groups and institutions…The motivations behind the
different issues are after all very different (Jacobs 1997: 1).
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Groups lumped under the heading of environmentalism encompass a vast array of
agendas, from protecting wilderness from logging to protecting children from lead
paint.
Despite this variance there does appear to be at least four distinct strands of
environmentalism: wilderness preservationism, radical environmentalism,
mainstream (reform) environmentalism, and grassroots environmental justice (EJ).50
Preservationists and reform environmentalists are considered more “mainstream” and
receive the most attention in terms of their agendas and numbers of constituents.
However, radical environmentalists are receiving increased attention with the
emergence of eco-terrorist groups such as Earth First! and Environmental Liberation
Front (ELF). Radicalism is in short a reaction to the perceived failures of
preservation-minded environmentalists. EJ, on the other hand, can be read as a
response to the failure of reform environmentalists.
Looking at the origin and progression of the different strands of
environmentalism offers insights into their radically different aims and approaches.
More importantly for the project at hand, this analysis reveals which strand best
resonates with Feenberg’s critical theory of technology. From his critical theory
perspective, there are two important distinctions that emerge. One is whether the
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There are many ways of parsing environmentalism, but the literature seems to agree with at least
these four main divisions. I will define each as I discuss them individually below.
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focus is the built environment or non-human nature.51 In addition, environmentalists
can be divided according to their preferred action strategy, that is, direct action versus
legislative.52 The majority of the large national organizations, based primarily in
Washington, D. C., focus on lobbying and legislating and when necessary taking legal
action. In contrast, there are literally thousands of small single-issue grassroots
groups using direct action to protect forests, as well as their families.
My analysis therefore attempts to parse out groups according to their focus
(i.e., built environment versus non-human nature) and their primary strategy (i.e.,
direct action versus legislative). Choosing to focus on these distinctions is by no
means arbitrary; there are many ways to analyze environmentalism. However, as will
become clear, the “focus” and “strategy” of environmentalists relate directly to
Feenberg’s critical theory of technology. Nor is this analysis comprehensive; it is
rather intended to illustrate how Feenberg’s critical theory of technology can be used
to assess various environmentalisms. Like Feenberg’s, my approach is both
normative and descriptive; that is, my “analysis” is at the same time a “critique” of
the different environmentalisms. The overarching theme is that the various
environmentalisms represent different ways of dealing with the problem of
“differentiation,” as discussed in chapter two.
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I do not concede this dichotomy; there is no unmediated nature left. However, for the sake of
explication I use the distinction which too many accept.
52
By “legislative” I also mean the corollary aspects of regulation and enforcement.
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Wilderness Preservationism
The history of wilderness preservation is closely tied to the conservation
movement. George Perkins Marsh's Man and Nature (1965 [1864]) is considered one
of the first enunciations of American conservationism (Shabecoff 1993: 65). Using
many examples, Marsh argues that civilization subdued nature to its own detriment
(Nash 1967: 104). By the mid-nineteenth century, excessive erosion, worn out farms,
deforestation, and species extinction gave clear evidence of the excesses imposed on
nature by civilization. The United States was no longer the land of plenty—a land
flowing with milk and honey—with unlimited resources free for the taking.
Acknowledging limits led, in turn, to efforts to conserve the remaining resources.
Conservation, as the efficient use of resources for a sustained yield, was first
applied to forests. Gifford Pinchot learned techniques for the scientific management
of forestry in Europe. On returning to America in the 1890s, Pinchot applied his
knowledge to the management of George W. Vanderbuilt's "Biltmore Estate" in North
Carolina (Shabecoff 1993: 66). Pinchot proved that with proper management (i.e.,
conservation) principles, forests could be sustainably harvested and also more
productive (Miller 2001).
In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt appointed Pinchot head of the recently
established U.S. Forest Service (Nash 1967: 139). Pinchot had a ready listener in
Roosevelt, a self-proclaimed outdoorsman, and together they passed a number of
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foundational forest management acts (Rothman 2000: 25). They used progressive
conservationist ideals to dramatically change the way public lands were managed.
Robert Brulle (2000) explains:
This version of conservation emphasized the wise technical
administration of natural resources for the enhancement of material
life and the support of distributive justice. At its core, Progressive
conservation was an attempt to manage natural resources to provide
the material conditions for a liberal democracy (152).
Progressivism emphasized government intervention to curtail laissez-faire capitalism,
and was the driving ideal in post-Civil War United States from 1865 until the 1890s
(Rothman 2000: 16-17). Conservation ideals, on the other hand, stem from the
Utilitarian concept of the “greatest good for the greatest numbers” (Mill 1998
[1861]), and emphasize the needs of the community as a whole over the needs of the
individual.53
During this same period a wilderness preservation movement ran parallel to
the conservationist movement. Its origins, however, are entirely distinct.
Preservationism is rooted in nineteenth-century landscape artists and romantic
writers, who emphasized nature as a source of aesthetic and spiritual enjoyment.
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In this day where cost-benefit analysis is used to justify practically anything, it may seem difficult to
believe that the founders of Utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham (1948 [1789]) and John S. Mill (1998
[1861]), did in fact intend their theory as a reply to unrestrained capitalism.
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Preservationists pushed to set aside the few remaining wilderness sites, as they saw
them quickly disappearing. Naturally, the places that were "appreciated" were the
ones ultimately protected from destruction (Hargrove 1989). Like conservationism,
preservationism is in some sense rooted in the realization of limits. Artists and
writers constructed nature as an aesthetic "resource" that was rapidly diminishing and
therefore needed protection.54
Until the early twentieth century, preservationists and conservationist worked
together. John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club, was one of the chief proponents of
setting aside wilderness areas, such as Yosemite Valley, as national parks.
Originally, Muir worked closely with Roosevelt and Pinchot to protect the
environment. However, when the question of what to do with the newly established
forest reserves arose, the incompatibility of conservation and preservation became
clear. Muir believed the forests should be set aside, while Pinchot thought they
should be managed for the benefit of civilization as a whole (Nash 1967: 136-137).
The Hetch Hetchy dam controversy (1908-1913) put a permanent wedge
between the two. The impetus for the dam grew out of San Francisco's burgeoning
water needs. The Hetch Hetchy valley, located in Yosemite National Park, was
suggested as a possible reservoir site. In addition to the fact that Hetch Hetchy was
located within a National Park, it also contained one of the last remaining stands of
Redwoods. As such, it was considered sacred to preservationist-minded individuals,
54

To be enjoyed by those that could afford to do so.
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such as Muir. Roosevelt and Pinchot, however, approached the issue from a
conservationist perspective and put the needs of the community over Muir's sacred
valley. The dam was constructed (Nash 1967: 164). The split between
preservationist-minded wilderness advocates and resource-minded conservationists
was permanent.
Hetch Hetchy, a disheartening loss, was also the beginning of a distinct
preservationist movement. Although the 1920s and 1930s were dominated by a
conservation ethos (Rothman 2000: 60), preservationists were not idle. The
Wilderness Society, for example, was started in 1935 by wilderness advocates Bob
Marshall, Aldo Leopold, and others (Brulle 2000: 169). Today, preservationistoriented organizations are the most powerful in terms of members and annual income
(Brulle 2000: 243, 244)
Despite their power and popularity, there is little chance of wilderness
advocates connecting with Feenberg’s critical theory of technology. Their focus on
non-human nature and legislative approach to reform precludes such a marriage.
Technology is not engaged but ignored, almost entirely. One could argue that, at
least in the short term, their success has little to do with the built environment and
technology. That is, preservationists can fence off so-called “pristine” wilderness,
while the lived environment continues on its destructive path.
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There is also a problem of split allegiance among wilderness advocates, that
is, between constituents and the corporations that provide funding. With corporations
sitting on their boards and providing a large part of their funding, it is not difficult to
see the problem. Regardless of their source of income, the bifurcation among
wilderness advocates runs far deeper than between their stated goals of protecting
nature and appeasing corporate partners. The constituents themselves embody
contradictions. Upper-middle class members of organizations such as Sierra Club,
Wilderness Society, and Nature Conservancy write their annual checks, but fail to
address the way they live in the built environment (Luke 1997)

Radical Environmentalism55
While many preservationists believed that compromise was the only way to
achieve their goals, there were a few stalwarts such as David Brower, a long-time
president of the Sierra Club. For Brower and a small group of environmentalists, this
compromise was unacceptable. From the late 1950s, the Sierra Club and other
environmental organizations fought vigorously to prevent dams from being built in
pristine wilderness areas. Eventually, however, the wilderness supporters
compromised. In exchange for promises not to build proposed dams in the Dinosaur
55

I am focusing primarily on the praxis of a particular strand of radical environmentalists. There are
many other so-called “radical” schools of thought, such as social ecology, and the various ecofeminisms. However, it is difficult to connect any of these theories to particular movements within
environmentalism.
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National Monument, environmentalists agreed to allow one to be built in Glen
Canyon just north of the Grand Canyon (Harvey 1994). Christopher Manes (1990)
explains how the dam:
represented what was fundamentally wrong with the country's
conservation policies: arrogant government officials motivated by a
quasi-religious zeal to industrialize the natural world, and a diffident
bureaucratic leadership in the mainstream environmental organizations
that more or less willingly collaborated in this process…[The dam]
remains an important event in the iconography of the radical
environmental movement, dramatizing what a growing number of
activists believed: that our technological culture with its intrusions on
the natural world had to be curtailed, perhaps even undone, to keep the
ecology of this planet and our role in it viable (5, 7-8).
In much the same way that the Hetch Hetchy dam controversy had earlier divided
conservationists and preservationists, the Glen Canyon dam divided modern
wilderness advocates. Those fed up with the current course went their own way; the
result was the birth of "radical" environmentalism.
Following Brower's dismissal from the Sierra Club in 1969 (largely for his
unwillingness to compromise), he formed his own organization—Friends of the
Earth—to take a more aggressive stance in defending wilderness (Shabecoff 1993:
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101). Brower's organization, along with later groups such as Earth First!,
Greenpeace, and the Sea Shepherds, launched a straight-ahead, no-compromise attack
on any and all who they deemed responsible for destroying nature.
With some success, these groups have used every means possible, including
putting their own bodies in danger, to stop new wilderness roads, protect endangered
species, and prevent the logging of old growth forests. Although most
environmentalists consider these acts extreme, it is the practice of "ecotage" that has
garnered so much attention. While there is an immense degree of ideological
diversity among radicals, the practice of ecotage appears to be the one commonality
(Manes 1990: 16). Ecotage, or ecological sabotage, was inspired by Edward Abbey's
The Monkey Wrench Gang (1975). Abbey tells the story of a small group of
environmentalists who decide to commit acts of sabotage to stop environmental
destruction. Ecotage includes acts such as: spiking trees, destroying heavy
machinery, toppling power lines, and ramming whaling boats. By 1990, Manes
estimates that as many as twenty to twenty-five million dollars were being lost every
year to these activities (9). With extremely narrow profit margins in natural resource
industries, any losses can be significant. For example, the loss of a $100,000
bulldozer to the "creative mechanics" of a few environmentalists could jeopardize a
small logging project. Actions such as tree spiking, however, are potentially much
more costly and dangerous.
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Driving steel spikes into trees, while it does not damage the trees themselves,
makes them almost impossible to harvest. The spikes, if undetected, can cause
considerable damage to the equipment, as well as the operators. Although there have
been few injuries related to spiking (primarily because the saboteurs freely disclose
areas that have been spiked), injuries, nevertheless, can and do occur. Radicals claim
that their intentions are not to injure humans but many of them are not terribly
apologetic either. Dave Foreman, for example, has openly proclaimed to be at war
with those responsible for destroying the earth, and that as in any war casualties can
be expected (Zakin 1993).56
Taking or even endangering human life to save nature is obviously wrong, but
there is another issue—is the practice of ecotage even effective in reducing or
eliminating environmental destruction? If not, then risking human life cannot be
justified even by the radical's own ideology. Ecotage activities have undoubtedly
brought attention to the needless destruction of the environment, enlightening and
inspiring others to take further action (Scarce 1990: 260). These actions, however,
are frequently exploited by anti-environmentalists to create a backlash. In the
process, environmentalism as a whole is denigrated. If the goal of the radicals is
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Foreman, however, was forced to recant these statements after prosecution (Zakin 1993).
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genuinely to protect nature at any cost, then they would refrain from actions that
jeopardize the movement.57
The problem, however, is that many radicals believe that a retreat from
extremism (i.e., ecotage) leads to compromise. Given that the justification for
initiating a distinct movement was largely because of the compromising stance of
mainstream environmentalists, relaxing their agenda is simply not an option for most
radicals. On the other hand, radicals make the agendas of more moderate
environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club seem more palatable. Although
mainstream environmental groups do not explicitly sanction the actions of their more
radical cousins, they nevertheless admit that they benefit from them (Manes 1990: 18,
19). Radicals bring awareness of environmental issues, and thereby fill the coffers
and membership lists of mainstream organizations. Hence, there are pros and cons to
the controversial actions of radicals for environmentalism as a whole.
Although radical environmentalists may provide a useful catalyst to the
movement, they will remain a "fringe" element because of their ideological
commitments. Their ideology prevents them from connecting with broader social
movements—a connection that must be made to transform the destructive tendencies
of the present culture into something more sustainable (Brulle 2000: 205-206). In
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This obviously assumes that the environmental movement as a whole is somewhat successful which
the radicals do not.

84

terms of their ideology, one of their central tenets is the belief in the inherent value of
all life/nature (i.e., bio/ecocentricism).
Drawing largely on Deep Ecology,58 radicals argue for an extreme
egalitarianism that places humans on the same level with all other species59 (List
1993: 6). While in theory this may sound legitimate, carried to its logical conclusion
it becomes deeply problematic. For example, Dave Foreman claimed that AIDS is
actually beneficial, because it reduces the human population (Manes 1990: 233).
Clearly, most people would argue that condoning the AIDS epidemic to save nature is
absurd, but this is in fact the logical outworking of ecocentricism. Hence, it is not
difficult to see that the radical's ecocentric perspective is at odds with the goals of
other, more anthropocentric, social movements (as well as critical theory). In fact,
some radicals have openly rejected any affiliation with broader social and political
movements (List 1993: 6). Their failure to offer a realistic agenda for broader social
transformation is undoubtedly the greatest shortcoming of radical environmentalists.
Although the wholesale dismissal of modern society may not be entirely misguided, it
will take more than a few radicals spiking trees to raze the ground on which the
present environmentally destructive edifice is built.
The radicals’ anti-technology stance is also problematic for the project at
hand. For the most part, radicals are Luddites; the less technology and development
58

See the works of Arne Naess and George Sessions.
I am speaking here of high profile groups such as Earth First! There are a plethora of fringe groups
that draw their inspiration from ecofeminism, social ecology, and many other sources.
59
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the better (Scarce 1990: 12). Radicals therefore want to solve the problem of
differentiation, as discussed in chapter two, by eliminating (de-differentiating)
technological progress altogether. Granted, reducing the human population to a few
million hunter-gatherers would probably be better for the earth as a whole, but the
likelihood of achieving this goal is minimal. Any path to a more just and sustainable
society must necessarily begin with a theory of how to transform the lived
environment—the built environment and the technological infrastructure supporting
it. We, therefore, need an environmentalism that can fruitfully engage technology, or
“concretize” technology to use Feenberg’s term, not destroy it entirely.

Modern Reform Environmentalism
The roots of modern reform environmentalism lie in the postwar period.
Samuel Hays (1987) argues that the ideology of modern environmentalism was
established in the American mind through the post-war quest for a "better life."
Whereas many environmental historians have argued for continuity between the
earlier conservation-preservation movement and modern environmentalism, Hays
claims that the transition from conservationism to modern environmentalism was
categorically different.
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Whereas conservationism was concerned with production (i.e., with the
efficient use or production of resources), modern environmentalism focuses on
consumption (Hays 1987: 13).60 The post-war push for an improved quality of life
seeped into American's relationship with nature and fostered an aesthetic
appreciation. This fact, in conjunction with a dramatic increase in mobility (i.e.,
affordable automobiles and an interstate system) enabled many Americans to partake
of the "great outdoors."61 Nature was commodified as a source of leisure for
Americans. Oddly, as the appreciation of nature was mounting, so was the
destruction. The same post-war development boom that enabled Americans to set
aside nature for their aesthetic appreciation, also contributed to its demise.
There was a dark side to the postwar “progress.” Hailed as the universal
answer to humanity’s ills, the development of the petro-chemical industry following
WWII was in reality a mixed blessing. Synthetic fertilizers and pesticides drastically
increased agricultural production, and produced a constant flow of cheap goods to
consumers; but at the same time, unseen toxics (e.g., DDT) were creating visible
damage to humans and the environment. A paradox existed: Americans enjoyed and
desired the "good life" created by technological advancements but at the same time
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Hay’s (1987) claim that modern environmentalism arose from the post-war affluence seems
plausible; people are only concerned about the environment if they can afford to be. However, Hays
distinction between conservation and modern environmentalism is less clear; production and
consumption are inextricably linked. It should also be noted that EJ is focused primarily on
(by)production. The real issue is a failure to make a connection between production and consumption.
61
See Paul Sutter, Driven Wild (2002) for a discussion of the role of the automobile in wilderness
conservation.
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they disliked the deleterious effects of technology. Modern reform environmentalism
emerged from this paradox.
When modern environmentalism actually began is a subject of debate; and
while it is impossible to pinpoint the beginning of such a large heterogeneous
movement, its origins no doubt lie somewhere between 1960 and 1970. Clearly
identifiable as a popular movement by the first Earth Day in 1970, the establishment
of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), also in 1970, solidified
the "environment" as a national cause. The publication of Rachel Carson's Silent
Spring (1962) is frequently mentioned as the beginning of modern environmentalism
(Sale 1993: 6; Shabecoff 1993: 107); however, to say that Carson's book was solely
responsible would be an overstatement. Many of the ideas in her book had been
growing in post-war America during the 1950s, otherwise Silent Spring would not
have resonated so acutely with the American public. After Silent Spring, there were a
host of books62 that struck a nerve with the general public's growing distrust of big
government, technology, and the military-industrial complex (Winner 1977: 6). Most
significantly, these authors helped to redefine the environment as a threat to humans
rather than as something to be enjoyed. In essence, they made explicit the
connections between technology and technocratic domination that critical theorists
had long proclaimed.
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See Bookchin 1962; Goodman 1962; Ellul 1964; Marcuse 1964; Commoner 1966, 1971;
Schumacher 1973.
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Obviously pollution was not new; it had been an accepted price for the
benefits of progress since the beginning of the industrial revolution. However, the
extent of the threat increased dramatically with the advent of the petrochemical
industry and nuclear power. Thus the primary difference was the scope of the
problem; but another important difference was the fact that even relatively affluent
Americans were affected. Where wealth previously enabled a minority of Americans
to separate themselves from the excesses of progress, this was no longer the case.

Reform Environmentalism: Success, or failure?
Although it is true that legislation to protect the environment passed prior to
1970, enforcement remained sporadic at best. Moreover, most of these laws focused
on protecting human health rather than the environment itself. It was not uncommon
for industrial wastes, and in many places raw sewage to be discharged directly into
waterways; or for solid waste, hazardous or not, to be incinerated, land filled, or
simply dumped without regard for the environment (Tarr 1996). It is not surprising,
therefore, that after years of neglect any amount of effort would see results.
However, more than thirty years after the first Earth Day (1970), we remain
far from establishing a sustainable society. The passing of the first major federal
environmental legislation (1969) and the establishment of the U.S. EPA (1970)
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marked the beginning of a concerted national effort to reverse environmental
degradation. Since then over one hundred major legislative acts have been passed,
and over $150 billion are spent annually cleaning up or protecting the environment
(Shabecoff 2000: 9, 90). To what avail? Robert Brulle (2000) sums it up well:
"Virtually all the projected trends point toward significant and irreversible problems
due to ecological degradation. These projections must be taken seriously if we are to
formulate actions to mitigate their consequences" (4).
The most significant improvements occurred in water quality, but even here
over forty percent of U.S. waterways are not fit for drinking or recreational usage
(Brulle 2000: 1). Stopping the direct discharge of waste into lakes and rivers
obviously helped, but the primary source of water pollution comes from non-point
sources (e.g., agriculture run-off), which are still not effectively regulated. Air and
land have faired even less well; this is at least partially a result of shifting the
pollution from a highly visible media (i.e., water) to a less visible media (i.e., air, or
soil) (Tarr 1996).
Although the issue of global warming is highly contested, the other effects
from fossil fuel use less so.63 Acid rain, smog, and dramatic increases in respiratory
related illnesses testify to the deleterious effects of fossil fuel usage. As a
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Of course, all of this can be questioned with regard to the interpretation of scientific data. See for
example the spins by Lomborg (2001), or Easterbrook (1995). However, the controversy over the
interpretation of scientific data only adds credence to the grassroots emphasis on experiential data,
which will be discussed in the following chapter.
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consequence of fossil fuel burning, atmospheric carbon dioxide levels have steadily
increased since the mid-nineteenth century (Flavin 1999: 59). Largely as a
consequence of fossil fuel, 129 metropolitan areas, home to over 107 million
Americans, do not meet air quality standards (O'Meara 1999: 128).
As of 1990, U.S. industries were still releasing approximately twenty billion
pounds of toxic chemicals into the environment every year (Commoner 1990: 31); the
fact that these chemicals are not clearly visible does not make them any less harmful.
In addition, endocrine disrupting hormones from environmental pollutants, such as
plastics manufacturing and waste incineration, have been linked to decreasing sperm
counts. Since 1938, counts have declined fifty percent, and testicular cancer has
increased two to four fold (Halweil 1999: 148-9).
These are just a few of the ongoing environmental problems but there are
many others: development issues such as urban sprawl, acceptable "use" of federal
lands, large dam projects, habitat loss and the list goes on. In addition to these "old"
problems, many new threats to the environment and human health arise daily through
technological developments. A host of new chemicals offer unknown dangers once
released into the environment, or when the issue of disposal is confronted. Over
seventy thousand new chemicals are created every year, while only a fraction of these
are tested for their effects (Shabecoff 2000: 149). Even the testing that is done, such
as the LD-50 (i.e., the lethal dose required to kill fifty percent of the test subjects),
cannot determine the chronic or synergistic effects on all biotic forms. Genetically
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modified food (GMF) is another example. Some humans ingesting GM corn have
reported severe allergic reactions (Kaufman 2000), and the pollen of the altered corn
plant has been implicated in a massive die-off of butterflies (Yoon 2000). The ripple
effects of apparently “inconsequential” changes in the environment cannot be ignored
as harmless.
The state of the global environment as a whole must also be considered. The
United States, contrary to the beliefs of many, is not an island.64 Progress toward
cleaning up and protecting the environment in the United States must not be achieved
at the expense of other countries. Clearly, the U.S. cannot resolve its environmental
woes by exporting pollution, but this is exactly what has taken place through "free
trade" agreements, such as NAFTA and GATT (WTO's precursor) (Shabecoff 2000:
163). Industries unable, or unwilling, to meet United States environmental standards
have simply packed up and moved "south of the border" or wherever else the
standards are less stringent. Not only is this approach unethical (i.e., dumping it on
those that do not have the power to resist), it is clearly not prudent. Since ecological
systems are inter-dependent, we are ultimately hurting ourselves.65
In sum, although there have been limited successes, we remain far from a
sustainable society. The reasons for this failure concern the strategy of mainstream
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The current (2003) administration’s stance on issues such as climate change and GMF could lead
one to believe otherwise.
65
If inclined to believe the evidence, global warming, the hole in the ozone, and depleted fish
populations are indicative of this interdependence.
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environmentalism. Any progress, in terms of legislation and cleaning up the
environment, achieved during the 1970s was all but wiped out when Ronald Reagan
entered office in 1980. The EPA was turned over to pro-industry conservatives;
proposed legislation was sidelined; and an anti-environmental backlash emerged (i.e.,
the Wise Use movement) (Shabecoff 1993). In this hostile context, environmentalists
were forced to use different tactics. Prior to this, mainstream environmentalists
primarily utilized litigation and legislation to achieve their goals. Organizations such
as the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council, had in some measure,
reached their objectives by lobbying for new laws or when necessary taking legal
action. The shortcomings of this approach became evident with the change in
administration.
Many of the laws were full of loopholes, but a greater problem concerned
enforcement. While the laws may remain, the amount of enforcement tends to vary
considerably depending on the degree of commitment on the part of the current
administration. Moreover, corporations and environmental organizations both
realized the shortcomings in attempting to achieve compliance through legal action.
Environmental organizations lacked the funds to fight corporations in court and the
corporations did not want the publicity. Compromise (or capitulation) through
negotiation was the end result (Dowie 1995).
Although hailed as a significant breakthrough for addressing environmental
problems, negotiation and compromise have been criticized on a number of grounds.
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For one, many corporations bought their way onto the boards of mainstream
organizations by making generous donations in exchange for a seat (Gottlieb 1993:
159). Obviously, an industry representative cannot be expected to remain unbiased in
this position. Secondly, the bottom line for industries has not changed—their goal is
still to maintain or increase profits. That said, it is clear that the only reason industry
appears to play along with the "negotiation" game is because it is to their advantage.
And this is true, corporations benefit from this tactic; compromise is less expensive
and generally less work.
From the environmentalist's point of view, the negotiation process entails an
endless system of tradeoffs. Pollution is simply shifted around, while the root
problems of production and consumption continue. In short, mainstream
environmentalism is invested in the same system that supports and is supported by the
polluters, as such it is largely ineffective. In terms of Feenberg’s theory of
instrumentalization, mainstream environmentalists appear content with the current
degree of “differentiation.” Significantly, all of the major environmental problems
discussed above can be linked to large (differentiated) technological systems. Reform
environmentalism has for the most part failed to effectively address these
technologies.

Environmental Justice
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The roots of EJ extend as far back as the conservation-preservation debate,
and lie in the struggle of working class, minorities, and women to improve their basic
living and working conditions. Robert Gottlieb (1993) argues that this history has
been largely ignored and criticizes environmental historians for their exclusive focus
on mainstream environmentalism (i.e., conservation and preservation). Gottlieb
(1983) claims that these histories tell only the story from the perspective of white,
upper-class Americans, and tend to center around debates over whether or not to
develop wilderness into playgrounds for the wealthy—a decision far removed from
the average American (6-7).
There is another perspective, that is, of how working class people have
struggled to improve their working and living conditions. From the late nineteenth
century on, various groups have organized on a site/issue specific basis to improve
their conditions. Significantly, these movements have been organized and run
primarily by women. One well-known example is the Chicago-based Hull House
settlement established by Jane Addams in 1888. Gottlieb (1993) explains how Hull
became:
both the meeting ground and a key symbol of the movements for
change contesting the urban and industrial order of the period.
Focused on the conditions of daily life in their neighborhoods, the
settlements immediately confronted questions of housing, sanitation,
and public health (60).
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Environmental health issues were a central concern, and Addams succeeded in
making dramatic improvements in garbage disposal practices in the surrounding
tenements. Alice Hamilton, a trained medical doctor, is another person associated
with Hull House. Hamilton investigated the industries where many of the residents
worked, and suggested less-harmful substitutes for the toxic substances used in
industrial processes (e.g., lead and phosphorus) (Gottlieb 1993: 49).
Although workplace health and safety has remained a significant concern for
workers and unions, the degree of success achieved in this area is clearly tied to wage
and job security. Worker leverage evaporated during the depression and was eclipsed
by the Second World War. Not until the prosperous post-war period were workers
able to establish an organized resistance for better working conditions. There has,
however, remained a tension between environmental concerns and job security.66
On a broader scale, a number of authors in the 1960s and 1970s opened the
eyes of Americans to the toxic threat created by unrestrained military and industrial
growth (see n. 13 above). The hidden dangers that many Americans had experienced
for years were suddenly receiving national attention. The difference was who,
specifically, was being affected. That is, people were becoming involved in
environmental issues based on who they were and where they lived and worked
(Gottleib 1993: 208). This is the basis for the EJ movement that became explicit in
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For an excellent case study, see Andrew Hurley’s (1995) Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race,
and Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana 1945--1990.
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the 1970s. The EJ movement is composed primarily of groups that traditionally have
been exploited—the poor, minorities, and women.67 The fact that these groups
receive more than their share of pollution is not a coincidence, and this is what makes
their cause an issue of justice.
Incidents such as Love Canal (1978) and Three Mile Island (1979)68 in the
1970s made the dangers discussed by Rachel Carson (1962) and others a reality.
Citizens were forced to organize to save their homes and families. Obviously, this in
itself was not new; certain groups had long suffered under the hand of big business
and government. But in the context of the 1960s, with the rise of the civil rights
movement and the New Left, exploitation in all its forms was coming under scrutiny
(Gottlieb 1993: 318). Love Canal and similar incidents expanded the movement to
such an extent that it could no longer be ignored.69

Events in the early 1990s forced mainstream environmentalism to take notice
of the EJ movement. First, in 1990 a number of civil rights and EJ leaders wrote a
letter to the most prominent national environmental organizations, claiming that the
environmental movement was largely "nonrepresentative and fundamentally racist"
(Brulle 2000: 217). They demanded that the organizations hire more minorities and
67

In this sense, EJ is to some extent based on standpoint theory, which has its origins in Marx.
The Three Mile Island incident involved a partial meltdown of the reactor at a nuclear power plant
near Harrisburg, Pa. The Love Canal incident will be discussed in detail in chapter five.
69
Of course it didn’t hurt that the residents of Love Canal were mostly white and middle-class.
68
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include more minority related issues. The motivation for the shift finally occurred in
1991 when "the People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit" was held in
Washington, D.C. Gottlieb (1993) explains that the purpose of the Summit "was to
begin to define a new environmental politics from a multi-racial and social justice
perspective…[and] to redefine the central issues of environmental politics, not just to
join a coalition of special interest groups" (3, 4). What was essentially at stake in
both of these incidents was the definition of environmentalism and of the
environment itself. Minority leaders wanted support, but also the autonomy to
address issues in the way they felt best suited the needs of their constituents. The
fundamental difference centered on the fact that EJ is concerned with where people
live and who they are, instead of non-human nature.
As a result of these two incidents, organizations such as the Sierra Club placed
minorities on their boards and attempted to incorporate EJ issues into their agendas.
However, the results have been unsatisfactory to many of the people involved in EJ
movements. One complaint is that the large national organizations are taking away
desperately needed funding and that they frequently co-opt local projects. What the
locals want and need is funding, not lip service or a token spot on a board (Allen
2001).
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Mark Dowie (1995), however, claims that grassroots EJ can infuse
mainstream environmentalism with passion to create a "fourth wave"70
environmentalism. Mainstream environmental organizations are in fact taking notice
of grassroots EJ issues. 71 I am skeptical, however, that the infusion of grassroots
environmentalism, as Dowie advocates, will alleviate the problem of entrenched
bureaucracy and professionalism in mainstream environmentalism. Most likely, the
fervor will be co-opted by the same old rhetoric which is what appears to be
happening as national organizations join the EJ chant.

Conclusions
Feenberg’s critical theory of technology provides both a means of analyzing
the various environmentalisms and a normative critique thereof. Clearly, in that his
theory is concerned with transforming technology, it is fundamentally concerned with
the “built environment.” This is not to say that non-human nature is irrelevant, but
that the built environment is the starting point for transformation. As the built
environment is transformed, our relationship with non-human nature changes as well.
However, the impetus for change must be citizens’ engagements with technology.
When people confront an environment that is not conducive to their conception of the
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Kirkpatrick Sale (1993) suggests that there have been three waves of environmentalism up to this
point.
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The U.S.E.P.A. has also added an Office of Environmental Justice to address these issues.
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“good life,” they desire to change it. Hence, an environmentalism motivated by a
critical theory of technology would at least start with a “direct action” strategy to
change the “built environment.”
Given preservationists’ focus on non-human nature and their legislative
approach, there is little possibility of connecting with Feenberg’s critical theory of
technology. The radical end of the spectrum definitely offers a more pungent critique
of the system, is obviously not short on action, and is willing to engage technology
(i.e., destroy it). The problem, however, is that they are too narrowly focused on
protecting non-human nature. There is virtually no possibility of connecting their
ecocentric ideology to Feenberg’s anthropocentrically oriented critical theory.
Ranting about the rights of nature is ludicrous when much of the world lacks the basic
necessities of life. Moreover, radicals are for the most part Luddites, attempting to
reverse the technological progress (and population) of modernity. In Feenberg’s
terms they are attempting to “de-differentiate” modernity. This is not to say that their
actions are pointless, only that they will remain a fringe element at best.
To their credit, modern reform environmentalism focuses on transforming the
built environment to create more sustainable and healthy living conditions. As well
intentioned as they may be, reform environmentalists have largely failed to achieve
their goals. The problem is their legislative approach that relies heavily on
technocrats and politicians. They are in Feenberg’s terms using primary
instrumentalization to maintain or increase differentiation between the technological
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and social spheres. Reflecting on the various environmentalisms in terms of the
strategy, focus, and approach to the problem of differentiation we can derive the
following matrix:72
STATEGY

FOCUS

DIFFERENTIATION

Feenberg’s CT of Tech

Direct Action

Built environment

Decrease

Wilderness Preservation

Legislative

Non-human nature

Ignores

Radicals

Direct action

Non-human nature

De-differentiate

Modern Reform

Legislative

Built environment

Maintain/Increase

Environmental Justice

Direct action

Built environment

Decrease

Chart 2: Breakdown of environmentalism by strategy and focus
Of the environmentalisms discussed, grassroots EJ is clearly the most
representative of Feenberg’s critical theory of technology. This is particularly evident
in how activists directly engage technologies to bring about less-differentiated, more
concretized systems. They are, in Feenberg’s terms, attempting to reconcile primary
and secondary instrumentalizations of the built environs. EJ therefore represents the
best instantiation of his suggested critical theory of technology.
While the EJ movement as a whole has met with mixed success, those that
have networked together to fight a common cause have been more successful. As in

72

This is obviously a gross over-simplification. These are, however, the most important distinctions in
terms of the current project. For a more complete breakdown, see Brulle (2000).
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the case of environmentalism, EJ is also an extremely diverse movement. The toxics
movement that emerged from the Love Canal incident is one such example. What
began as a Not-in-My-back-Yard (NIMBY) movement, was transformed into a Notin-Anyone's-Back-Yard (NIAMBY), and finally into a united front. The next chapter
will detail the tactics employed by this successful movement.
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Chapter Five
The Toxics Movement as an
Instantiation of Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology

“In siting, what is rational for the many is irrational for the few.
Siting thus becomes a modern ceremony for selecting victims for
sacrifice” (Edelstein 1988: 195).

I have thus far outlined a modified version of Feenberg’s critical theory of
technology and delineated grassroots environmental justice (EJ) as the strand that
resonates most with his theory. However, grassroots EJ like environmentalism itself
is not a homogenous movement; rather, it is the name given to the hundreds of
diverse groups involved in struggles to protect the places that people live, work, and
play. Hence, it is not possible to simply suggest a link between Feenberg’s critical
theory of technology and “EJ.” A case study provides an illustration of how the
ideologies and strategies of one movement could actually mesh with Feenberg’s
theory. In short, I am offering a case study as an instantiation of this theory, just as
Feenberg has done with case studies of the Internet and AIDS activism.
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To this end I have chosen to examine the toxics movement, the success of
which is undeniable. The movement took off at a time (early 1980s) when the
majority of mainstream environmental groups were beginning to languish. The
accomplishments of the toxics movement are evident in that the total amount of toxic
chemical releases decreased forty-eight percent from 1988 to 2000 (U.S.EPA 2002:
12). In addition, from 1988 to 1995 the release and transfer of seventeen targeted
chemicals dropped nearly sixty percent (U.S.EPA 1999: 6). These statistics coincide
with the efforts of grassroots activists, which have resulted in the closure of hundreds
of hazardous waste landfills and prevented the opening of many new ones.
A significant point, however, is that while on-site releases decreased fiftyseven percent, off-site releases increased seven percent (U.S.EPA 2002: 12). This
shift is a result of waste increasingly being shipped off-site for treatment. In 1979,
over ninety percent of waste was treated on-site (Colten and Skinner 1996: 94), while
today the majority of waste is now transferred off-site. A large number of these onsite waste depositories have become Superfund sites as industries failed or relocated.
What this means is that industries are now doing a better job of storing, handling, and
processing toxic chemicals on-site, but that overall toxics are being transferred offsite in the form of “hazardous waste.” As a result, there is increasingly the issue of
where to locate these offsite waste disposal facilities. Inevitably some group—most
likely a poor minority community—is negatively affected by these disposal practices.
I begin the case study by explaining the origin and history of the Love Canal
incident—the event that triggered the birth of the toxics movement. This enables the
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reader to see how movements such as this begin through the specific life experiences
of individual citizens. This background is also important for understanding that
certain individuals, corporations, and institutions were in fact responsible for what
happened. In addition, it illustrates the tensions between technocratic power (primary
instrumentalization) and the concrete lives of citizens (secondary
instrumentalization). Next, I discuss the establishment of the full-blown toxics
movement, and in particular the emergence of Lois Gibb’s organization—The Center
for Health, Environment, and Justice (CHEJ). Finally, I discuss CHEJ’s background
theory and the strategies it has used so successfully. Along the way, I will make
explicit the connections with Feenberg’s critical theory of technology.

Love Canal

The origins of the Love Canal incident go all the way back to the late
nineteenth century. William T. Love attempted to construct a power-providing canal
by harnessing water from the Niagara River. Work on the canal did not get far before
the development of central station power (early 1890s), and the depression of the
1890s put an abrupt end to the project. A hole one mile long, forty-five feet wide,
and ten to forty feet deep was left behind (Brown 1979: 8).
The abandoned canal became a municipal and chemical disposal site in 1920
(Gibbs 1998: 21). This was perfectly legal because there were no specific laws
dealing with hazardous waste disposal at the time (Colten and Skinner 1996). Hooker
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Chemical Company, a subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corporation, began
dumping at the site in 1942 and purchased it in 1947. Hooker, alone, estimates that it
dumped more then 21,000 tons of various chemicals in the canal73 (Levine 1982: 10).
With the canal full in 1952, Hooker sought a way to relieve itself of the liability;
hence, when the Niagara Falls School Board (NFSB) offered to purchase the
property, it seemed like an excellent opportunity. Ironically, when the NFSB first
made an offer, Hooker’s Executive Vice-President rejected it, stating “we should not
sell the property in order to avoid any risks” (Colten and Skinner 1996: 158).
Nevertheless, Hooker sold the property to the school board in 1953 for one dollar.
The bargain price included a disclaimer stating that Hooker could not be held liable
for damages resulting from the chemicals at the site (Gibbs 1998: 21). Residential
development and the construction of an elementary school soon followed.
The story of the school's construction reveals more questionable actions. The
initial excavation uncovered a number of drums of unknown chemicals; and although
the architect in charge advised against building on the site altogether, the solution was
to move the school a mere eighty-five feet north of the original (Levine 1982: 12).
The school was completed in 1955. Even though complaints began almost
immediately, the situation did not come to a head until the mid-1970s when residents
began to complain of chemical odors in their basements, surfacing sludge, gapping
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Some residents also claimed that they had witnessed U.S. Army vehicles entering the site (Brown
1979: 22).
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holes from eroded drums, exploding rocks,74 and burning feet (Levine 1982: 15). No
doubt sparked by increasing complaints, the Niagara Gazette published a series of
articles (1976) about Love Canal. One of the reporters for the Gazette, Michael
Brown (1979), poignantly describes what he witnessed:
I saw where dogs had lost their fur. I saw children with serious birth
defects. I saw entire families in inexplicably poor health. When I walked on
the Love Canal, I gasped for air as my lungs heaved in fits of wheezing. My
eyes burned. There was a sour taste in my mouth (xii).
The Gazette articles, in conjunction with the deteriorating health of her own son, led
Lois Gibbs, a Love Canal resident, to take action. Her son75 began having seizures
soon after starting school (Gibbs 1998: 27). When efforts to transfer him to another
school failed, Gibbs began organizing her community.
Ironically, the first investigation by a government agency was triggered by the
presence of high levels of pesticide in Lake Ontario fish and not the complaints of
citizens.76 Public outcry, however, eventually led to an investigation of the Love
Canal residential area by the City of Niagara Falls in 1977. This investigation found
chemical contamination in 21 out of 18877 basement sump pumps (Levine 1982: 15,
17). Based on these findings, health officials believed the situation was serious
enough to warrant a public statement advising all pregnant women and children less
74

Phosphorus (Brown 1979: 6).
A year later, Gibb's daughter was also hospitalized for health problems (Gibbs 1998: 28).
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The New York Department of Environment and Conservation traced the contamination to the Love
Canal site and eventually filed suit because of a failure to respond (Levine 1982: 15).
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At the end of the day, over two hundred compounds, including twelve carcinogens, were identified
at Love Canal (Gibbs 1998: 22).
75
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than two years of age to leave the area (Levine 1982: 28). This announcement
became the basis for a sustained effort to relocate all the residents of Love Canal.
Residents claimed that if fetuses and young children were in danger, then so was
everyone else. How could a line be drawn between those who would and would not
be affected? Unfortunately, it took another two years of battling government officials
to finally move everyone out of the area.
Residents encountered a series of "misunderstandings" with government
officials and politicians. Even when Love Canal residents were invited to public
meetings, they were not treated as participants (Levine 1982: 34). The fact that
residents were excluded from the process was one of the greatest hindrances to
speedily resolving the crisis. As it was, the rhetoric increased, but progress did not.
In their frustration, Gibbs and other residents formed the Love Canal Home Owners
Association (LCHOA)78 (Gibbs 1998: 24).
There were fundamental differences in perspective between the residents on
the one hand, and government officials on the other—a difference typical of “expert”
versus “citizen” associations. Residents were driven by a desire to protect their
families from the contamination. Although not all residents suffered harm, many
believed that it was only a matter of time. In short, they believed that it was not
worth the risk to "wait and see." Gibbs (1998) summed it up well: "I didn't see why
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The organization focused on homeowners because one of their primary concerns were declining
home values and property tax issues. However, there were several other organizations (including a
group of renters), some of which did not agree with LCHOA's tactics (Levine 1982).
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you needed scientific certainty, when people's lives are at risk" (92). Government
officials saw things differently.
State health officials attempted to convey an attitude of objective data
gathering. Although Love Canal residents initially perceived health officials as allies,
their self-portrayal as objective fact gatherers soon came under scrutiny. That is, their
"objectivity" became increasingly difficult to believe in the face of their actions (or
lack thereof). The New York Department of Health (NYDOH) dragged their feet on
reporting data, "lost" results, and remained non-committal on the results they did
report (Levine 1982: 110). These actions ultimately led Love Canal residents to
believe that the NYDOH decisions were more political than scientific: "Every action
at Love Canal, from the health studies to the final evacuation, was taken for political
reasons. None of the decisions made were based on scientific evidence even though
the evidence existed" (Gibbs 1998: 204). Thus, we see that regardless of the quantity
and quality of data, the crux of the issue is that the data must still be interpreted.
With the exception of Congressman La Falce (D-NY), politicians were not
much help either (Brown 1979: 16). They seemed to blow with the winds of popular
sentiment. Governor Carey, who was facing re-election at the time of the Love Canal
crisis, made statements under the media spotlight only to equivocate later. Away
from the reporters, Carey altered many of his assertions, claiming for instance that he
never outright said he would relocate residents (Levine 1982: 68).79
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Carey had publicly agreed to relocate the first two rings of homes surrounding the Love Canal
(Levine 1982: 176—177).
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In light of the statements and actions of government officials and politicians,
it is easy to understand the lack of trust on the part of Love Canal residents, which
"took hold when people began to doubt not only the virtues but the wisdom of the
bureaucrats and their scientists and consultants" (Levine 1982: 22). The idea that the
government existed to serve and protect its citizens had been severely tested and left
wanting. The LCHOA summed up their sentiments in their organizational statement:
"Government officials (specifically the EPA)80 refuse to use its authority to force
industry to properly dispose of their waste to protect our health and environment.
Why? Because industry has power and money" (Gibbs 1998: 24-25). This statement
leaves no question about who the LCHOA believed was behind the government’s
failure to act.
Although some residents had been temporarily relocated to motels as part of a
remediation project, government officials continued to waffle on whether broad-scale
relocation was necessary. In response, Gibbs (1998) explains how the LCHOA used
every opportunity to gain media attention and keep their plight before the public's
eyes (165). But it took the release of an EPA chromosomal study (May 1980) to
convince government officials that a mass relocation was necessary (Levine 1982:
139). The study revealed that Love Canal residents had an abnormally high rate of
chromosomal breakage—a key indicator of environmentally induced cancer. The
damage was done, so to speak. It would take another five months before officials and
80

Resident's attitude toward the EPA later mellowed to some degree. Compared to other agencies, the
U.S. EPA did seem to be trying to help the residents. It was their chromosomal study that ultimately
led to the relocation of residents.
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politicians could reach an agreement about how to fund the relocation. In the interim,
residents began to suspect they were headed for yet another round of "'ignore, deny,
sound alarms, retreat and minimize' pattern of government intervention" (Levine
1982: 151). Officials attempted to discredit the results of the chromosomal study, but
fortunately the wheels of bureaucracy had been set in motion. On October 1, 1980
the government offered to buy out the homes of all nine hundred plus families of the
Love Canal community at fair market value (Gibbs 1998: 204).
The battle between Love Canal residents and government officials
dramatically illustrates Feenberg’s discussion of primary and secondary
instrumentalization (chapter two). Citizens constantly tried to contextualize the
perceived risks. After all, they were the ones actually smelling, tasting, and feeling
the effects of the exposure from the chemicals buried in the canal. Using the media,
they kept their plight before the public. Government officials, on the other hand,
attempted to de-contextualize the risk by “scientifically” assessing data in terms of
institutionally established standards. They were, in other words, using primary
instrumentalization to differentiate the technological and social spheres. Citizens, on
the other hand, utilized the four moments of secondary instrumentalization to combat
the four moments of primary instrumentalization employed by technocrats (see chart
one, chapter two).

After Love Canal
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Unfortunately, it took an incident as tragic as Love Canal to motivate the
existing powers to act. Congress had passed the Resources Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976 and the Superfund legislation (1980)81 was underway
when Love Canal came to the fore in 1978, so it was not the case that policy makers
were unaware of the seriousness of the problems. However, no concerted actions had
been taken to alleviate the massive problem of hazardous waste. In fact, all the EPA
had accomplished by 1980 was to establish the severity of the problem. Their study
revealed that over thirty thousand potential Love Canals existed in the U.S. (Gibbs
1998: 9).
As discussed in the previous chapter, mainstream reform environmentalists
tend to support a legislative-regulatory approach to pollution control. The "cradle to
grave" RCRA legislation is no exception. Wastes are tracked from the time they are
produced until they are disposed of. Nevertheless, hazardous wastes must be
discarded in some way, whether it is in a landfill or into the air via incineration.
Industry favors the legislative approach for obvious reasons—it is easy to get around.
Even if laws are passed, they must be enforced, and to do this regulatory agencies,
such as the U.S. EPA or the Office of Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
must have funding. The Reagan administration virtually halted environmental
enforcement by gutting the funding of regulatory agencies. In short, continuing to
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RCRA legislation mandates the monitoring and tracking of hazardous waste from its site of origin to
its disposal. The Superfund program was implemented by the federal government to cleanup
uncontrolled hazardous waste sites.
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support the legislative approach enables industry to continue a "business as usual"
attitude.
Grassroots environmentalists, on the other hand, take a direct approach, which
forces industry to address the production processes generating hazardous waste. In
contrast to the compromising approach of mainstream environmentalism, the
grassroots approach is much more ready to draw a line in the sand. Larry Yates
(2001), a Grassroots Organizer for the Center for Health, Environment, and Justice
(CHEJ), explains:
It’s a very different approach, much more rough and ready, much more
about power, much more about making things happen and not so
concerned about what sort of relationship you have with Senator so
and so, or their aide. So yeah, there's a difference between inside the
beltway kind of approach [i.e., mainstream], an approach that doesn't
mobilize grassroots people, and an approach that does. It's a big
divide.
The toxic movement, spearheaded by CHEJ, facilitated dramatic changes in the way
industry operates. Even though there were no laws preventing the land filling of
hazardous waste (i.e., assuming all the permits and requirements were satisfied), the
expense of doing so increased to such a degree that it was no longer cost effective.
Industry had to "voluntarily" seek out ways of minimizing toxic waste (McAvoy
1999: 136), which is what led to the dramatic shifts in the handling of waste (see
statistics above).
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Local struggles between citizens and polluters have long existed, but prior to
Love Canal becoming a national media event (1978) these struggles were sporadic
and locally confined (Szasz 1994: 14). "The crisis at Love Canal awoke a nation, and
to a lesser extent the world, to the hazards of toxic chemicals in our environment.
Love Canal sparked a nationwide grassroots movement of people concerned about
environmentally-linked health effects" (Gibbs 1998: 1). It is important to understand
that the public’s response did not come out of nowhere; they were primed for action
when the media trumpeted Love Canal. The ideology behind the toxics movement
was nurtured by a number of key authors in the 1960s and early 1970s.82 Works such
as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1962) and Barry Commoner's Science and Survival
(1966) severely questioned the direction of modern science and technology was
taking (Tesh 2000: 43). Love Canal simply confirmed what many already believed;
that is, industry backed by government was poisoning America.
The media created an icon with their coverage of Love Canal (Szasz 1994:
52). Americans could easily identify with the media's—"this could be you"—
portrayal of the event. Icons typically fade quickly in our post-modern fractured
spectacle, but before the Love Canal incident could pass from the minds of
Americans, Superfund legislation had been enacted and a new movement—Not-inmy-back-yard (NIMBY)—had begun (Szarsz 1994: 68). As local groups began to
organize under the NIMBY banner, they soon established a unified front. The most
82
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significant development of this period was the emergence of activist networks.
Groups such as the National Toxics Campaign and Greenpeace assisted in bringing
local communities together (Szasz 1994: 71-72).
Gibbs was at the forefront of the new movement. In 1982 she used her
experience from Love Canal to form a national organization—Citizens Clearing
House for Hazardous Waste, now called the Center for Health, Environment and
Justice (CHEJ). The many accomplishments of CHEJ include: (1) helping to pass
legislation giving citizens the “right to know” what chemicals are in their community;
(2) legislation that provides up to $50,000 per Superfund site for technical expertise;
(3) a successful campaign to persuade McDonald's to stop using Styrofoam (Nader
1998: xiv). Their greatest achievement, however, is the closing over one thousand
landfills and stopping hundreds of new waste incinerators—actions that ultimately
contributed to increased recycling and the development of less toxic processes (CHEJ
Highlights). Taken together, these actions have undoubtedly prevented numerous
communities from sharing the same fate as the Love Canal residents.
These accomplishments are even more momentous given that they were
achieved in the ultra-conservative 1980s, when mainstream environmentalism lost
ground (Szasz 1994: 5). Unlike the successes of mainstream environmentalists,
which have ebbed and flowed with the tides of Washington politics, CHEJ and the
toxics movement continue in their achievements. For these reasons, it is worth
exploring their strategies and methods in more detail. Where applicable, I attempt to
relate these strategies to Feenberg’s critical theory of technology.
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Background Theory

In an effort to better understand how CHEJ operates, I interviewed Larry
Yates, one of its grassroots organizers. Yates was in the beginning skeptical of my
project, and of “theory” in general. He made it clear that CHEJ’s focus was on the
“practical” aspects of assisting local groups in their efforts to resist. However, most
of Yates’ skepticism came from a somewhat narrow definition of technology (i.e., as
physical artifacts).83 After clearing up this misunderstanding, he was at least open to
my project.
Yates claims that CHEJ relies heavily on the civil rights movement as a model
for their actions. He specifically mentioned Alden Morris’s The Origins of the Civil
Rights Movement (1984). A brief look at his work offers insights into how CHEJ and
the toxics movement operate. There are obvious connections between grassroots
environmental activism and Morris’s portrayal of the Civil Rights movement. Morris
draws on existing social theory—collective behavior theory, Weber’s theory of
charismatic leaders, and resource mobilization theory—to formulate his “indigenous
perspective” (276). What sets the indigenous perspective apart, according to Morris,
is the reliance on local (indigenous) resources in the early stages of the movement. In
contrast to the resource mobilization theory, which holds that social movements must
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I will argue below that this narrow definition of technology is a genuine hindrance to extending the
movement’s success.

116

have the support of outside elites to even begin to act, the indigenous perspective
claims that the impetus and resources for the initial organizing comes from within the
community. Morris (1984) does not deny the role or need for outside support, only
that its place is secondary (283).
Another key aspect of the indigenous perspective is the formation of a “local
movement center.” To establish such a center, Morris (1984) claims that the
community must develop “an interrelated set of protest leaders, organizations, and
followers who collectively define the common ends of the group, devise necessary
tactics and strategies along with training for their implementation, engage in protest
actions designed to attain the goals of the group” (284). The local movement center
is therefore vital to establishing, maintaining, and spreading the movement.
Finally, the indigenous perspective illustrates that a middle-of-the-road style
of organization—what Morris refers to as non-bureaucratic-formal—is the most
conducive to facilitating a successful social movement. Movements must be
organized enough to carry out their actions and accomplish their goals, but not so
overly structured that strategic creativity is hindered (Morris 1984: 285).
Gibbs and the other Love Canal residents were not following a prescribed
model; nevertheless they came together and formulated action plans that worked. At
the end of the day their model strongly resembled the indigenous perspective just
discussed. At various times, government officials, politicians, and media persons
provided assistance to the group, but they were not the impetus for the movement.
The motivation and leadership came from within. In addition, the way in which
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Gibbs united with other residents to form a leadership team looked very much like the
local movement center described by Morris. These actions can also be interpreted
through the lens of Feenberg’s critical theory of technology.

Strategies

Through their guidance literature, CHEJ offers step-by-step strategies for
organizing to resist hazardous waste siting. The first step is to gather data to
determine whether or not a group’s suspicions are valid (CHEJ, Leadership
Handbook). Community-Right-to-Know legislation mandates that records pertaining
to hazardous waste storage, processing, and disposal be made available to the public.
However, this is not enough; data must be interpreted to validate the threat posed by a
given industry or hazardous waste site.
When crises such as Love Canal occur technical experts are called on to
determine whether or not a genuine “problem” exists. If their interpretation of the
data fails to indicate that there is a risk, then no such risk exists according to their
technocratic interpretation—despite the “fire rocks,” the burned feet of children, the
acrid smell, or “ooze” in the basement of residents. Even after all the residents were
relocated from Love Canal, the highly controversial Thomas Panel Report (Thomas,
et. al. 1980) argued that there was never a threat to the residents of Love Canal
(Levine 1982: 158). According to this study, there were no “statistical” differences
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between the health of Love Canal residents and the normal population. The entire
incident was blown out of proportion in the eyes of these technocrats.
For the residents, the fact that known carcinogens were leaching into their
community provided sufficient evidence to act. Does it really matter if the
“scientific” analysis of a substance found in the basement of a resident turns out to be
within “acceptable” limits? A technical report will certainly differ from the
description of a resident living with a constant chemical odor in their home. Experts
tend to perceive risk as objective and quantifiable, while citizens take a much
broader, qualitative view (McAvoy 1999: 119). The question, however, is what
makes one assessment more credible than another? Feenberg’s distinction between
primary and secondary instrumentalization provides a useful language for discussing
this. Recall (chapter two) his suggested use of the four moments of secondary
instrumentalization (systematization, mediation, vocation, initiative) to combat the
four moments of primary instrumentalization (decontextualization, reduction,
autonomy, positioning).
Mainstream environmentalists, with their explicit ties to traditional institutions
of science, tend to “decontextualize,” and “reduce” the data (Tesh 2000). Using a
narrowly defined conception of data, they extract information from the local context
and reduce it to quantifiable terms. Technocrats, by employing primary
instrumentalization, attempt to dominate and control nature by reducing it to the
quantifiable. By distancing themselves (autonomization) from the objects of inquiry,
technocrats are able to “position” themselves as the locus of power.
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When instances such as Love Canal arise, the power disparities between
technocrats, and citizens become explicit. Technocrats enter the seen far removed
from the local context of the lived citizenry. They intermittently enter local
communities to extract “objective” data, all the while maintaining a distance between
them and the subjective lives of those affected. This approach has been largely
successful for science and the beneficiaries thereof. The problem is that humans are
also a part of nature. However, as the Frankfurt Schoolers argued, the domination of
nature leads to the domination of humans (Leiss 1972). Grassroots identity politics,
on the other hand, forces new conceptions of data and therefore new definitions of
science.
Grassroots EJ operates on the premise that no one knows a community better
than those who live there. CHEJ, importantly, recognizes the knowledge and insights
of grassroots groups and accepts their assessment of the situation. In essence, citizens
seek to “concretize” the data by connecting it to specific contexts. The widening
definition of data generated by the lived experiences of grassroots activists offers new
ways of tying data to health effects. Endless bantering about scientific data is
resolved in the straightforward commonsensical recognition of the problem. Are they
always correct in their assessment? No, but neither are the "experts" (Edelstein 1988:
183). The problem, however, is that health officials largely ignore indigenous
knowledge as an important source of data and expertise (Tesh 2000: 98). The Love
Canal crisis is a prime example.
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Love Canal residents attempted to convey their knowledge of the situation to
government officials. Residents conducted informal health surveys and offered other
tacit, though important, information. However, this data was ignored by officials who
failed to see it as a valuable source of local knowledge. Living next to the
contaminated canal for years gave residents a store of information that no technocrat
could ever hope to obtain. Because their tacit knowledge could not be quantified or
statistically analyzed, it was considered useless to the experts (Edelstein 1988: 183).
CHEJ encourages grassroots organizations to bypass the debates that usually
surround scientific data. Details about chemical toxicity, or the significance of
release amounts are unknown to the majority of lay people; hence, this is the point at
which most groups seek outside assistance (CHEJ Leadership Handbook). Although
CHEJ has a Science Advisor to assist groups in this endeavor, they stress that groups
should refrain from over-gathering data. “Information is not the hard part. The hard
part is getting people to stop collecting information” (Yates 2001). If a significant
number of individuals in the community are convinced of the problem, that is enough.
Yates (2001) explains:
But you see if the average person in the community gets it…that's
what you need. Your base is with you. … You got twenty or thirty
people together in a community, then I trust them … I say if those
people get together, look at the evidence and they come to a
conclusion, I'm willing to trust them with the conclusion.
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Organizing

After the data has been collected and a majority of the group is convinced of
the problem, the next step is to inform the rest of the community. “Fact Sheets,”
based on the research, are created and distributed door to door. CHEJ provides
environmental track records on a number of major corporations. The goal is to bring
together those community members interested in participating. Citizens make a
genuine commitment to the cause in the initial meeting. Firm commitments are
needed on the part of group members, because concrete actions are necessary to stop
corporations from polluting (CHEJ Leadership Handbook: 19). Once a core group is
established, various options must be weighed—legal action, continually to rely on
regulatory agencies, or attempting to negotiate with the corporation involved.
It is most likely the case, however, that if the group contacts CHEJ, then other
options have failed. Assuming that a corporation must be motivated in some way to
respond, the only options are to either take legal action, or to organize and resist
directly. For obvious reasons, CHEJ does not advocate legal action: “Hazardous
waste decisions are political ones. Lawsuits are expensive, take a long time, and offer
no guarantee of success” (Leadership Handbook: 27). Given that the community was
most likely targeted because of its low socio-economic status in the first place, it is
unlikely that the group would have the resources to resist legally.
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If a participatory, direct-action model is decided on, goals must be established,
committees created, and specific tasks assigned (e.g., research, fund-raising, and
publicity). At this point, research is no longer to determine if there is a problem;
rather, the focus is on “tactical research” to identify strategic targets (CHEJ,
Leadership Handbook). Yates (2001) explains: “When I talk to people, what I'm
primarily doing is going through power relationships. And I'm figuring out that
essential question— ‘who has the power to do what you need?’” These attempts by
activists to situate themselves are analogous to the “initiative” moment of Feenberg’s
secondary instrumentalization. That is, they are countering the attempts of
technocrats to “position” themselves outside the context by strategically targeting
their centers of power.
Establishing and maintaining a strategy is emphasized throughout the CHEJ
guidance literature. Yates (2001) states succinctly why this is important: “You’ve got
to have a strategic focused campaign. You’ve got to use actual people to make actual
social change. Social change doesn’t happen in the abstract.” CHEJ suggests four
questions to guide groups in this strategic research: “(1) Who’s responsible? (2) Who
has the power? (3) Who answers to whom? and (4) Who profits?” (Leadership
Handbook: 35).

Resisting
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To assist groups, CHEJ highlights a number of corporate tactics, and suggests
ways to respond (Collette 1989; 1993). Most obviously, corporations attempt to hide
behind their self-created public image, which is one of the most important means of
gaining entry to a local community. Because their livelihood depends so heavily on
it, corporations invest huge amounts of time and money into protecting this image.
For example, after the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska, the Exxon Corporation invested
millions of dollars in “environmental” projects and even more money in advertising
to inform the public of its good deeds.
Another corporate tactic is to intentionally seek out areas inhabited by lower
socio-economic communities (Collette 1989: 8-9). The Cerrell Report (1984)
establishes that low-income, minority communities are often targeted by corporations
for “Locally Undesirable Land Uses” (LULU). If and when opposition occurs,
corporations frequently attempt to minimize the threat posed by their facility or hold
out the carrot of economic development.
Finally, corporations may attempt to divide communities by supporting
outside groups (e.g., mainstream environmental organizations) or a certain faction
within the group (e.g., homeowners over renters). This tactic gives the impression
that a corporation is attempting to cooperate, while at the same time increasing
dissension within the group (thus increasing autonomization).
Groups can respond tactically to these actions in a variety of ways. First, they
can make it clear to the community what the corporation is attempting to do. Hence,
they must separate the public image of the corporation from their actions by
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educating citizens about the true intentions of the corporation (Collette 1989: 8).
CHEJ maintains “fact packs” on a number of corporations for this purpose. Groups
can also inform their communities of how corporations intentionally target lowincome areas for LULUs. These actions are, in Feenberg’s terms, strategic ways of
exposing the “technological hermeneutic” that corporations attempt to hide behind.
When corporations attempt to overcome opposition by minimizing risk
(through “decontextualizing” and “reducing” data), groups should personalize, or
“systematize,” the threat. That is, make it explicit that the community residents are
the ones that are subject to the risk and not the industry executives. Citizens thereby
counter the attempts of technocrats to decontexutalize the data (i.e., risk) from their
local context.
And the assertion that an industry, or hazardous waste site will bring new jobs
and economic development is simply fallacious. Statistics reveal just the opposite—
development that threatens the community is in the long run not life sustaining
(Bullard 2000: 132). The jobs that are created are either high paying positions that
require significant education and training or they are low paying, high-risk positions
that few would want (Collette 1989: 13).
The most difficult task, but also the most important, is keeping the community
unified. Holding together a strictly voluntary, democratically organized group is
difficult regardless of the circumstances, but without a cohesive group, resistance is
almost impossible. The leaders must keep the group focused on the goal. If an
industry fails to respond to efforts to negotiate, the next step is direct action, that is,
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non-violent media-directed events. The goal is to capture the full attention of the
media with carefully planned and staged protests.

National Campaigns

CHEJ has duplicated the above organizing and resistance strategies over and
over in communities throughout the United States. In the process, several national
level campaigns have emerged. Yates (2001) explains how CHEJ’s ongoing
assistance to grassroots activism facilitated the development of these campaigns:
Over time, out of the groups that we have worked with, networks have
developed, contacts have developed and we promote that, we
encourage that. And discussions have happened and all three of the
campaigns came out of discussions that people had at the grassroots
level had with each other.
CHEJ is currently involved in three national campaigns. The Child Proofing Our
Communities campaign is an effort to transform the increasing concern about
environmental risk and children into a broad coalition to improve the living condition
of children (CHEJ National Campaigns).
The Health Care Without Harm (HCWH) project is an international campaign
aimed at stopping health care providers from using products that emit toxic chemicals
(e.g., dioxin) when incinerated. Since a large portion of medical waste is disposed
through incineration, this is an important project (CHEJ National Campaigns).
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HCWH has been a successful program chiefly because the campaign intentionally
targets the health care industry’s image. Yates (2001) explains:
The angle is Health Care Without Harm. The name of the organization
itself is a strategy, because all healthcare workers ... claim that they are
trying to do this without harm. So when you say that, this is a
challenge. We know you're harming people, and we know you can't
admit it so we're putting you right in the middle of that contradiction…
It’s having a technique involved particularly for them.

The strategically chosen slogan of this campaign illustrates the way in which the
media and the public image of an industry can be utilized to the advantage of an
activist group.
The Stop Dioxin Exposure campaign is a multi-level effort to eliminate dioxin
at its sources—waste incinerators, paper mills, and chemical manufacturers (CHEJ
National Campaigns). It represents an excellent example of the well-worn slogan,
“think globally, act locally.” The program emerged from local activists who were
seeking more leverage to apply to industry.
In the dioxin campaign people came together and said we're fighting
incinerators, we're fighting PVC, we're fighting a lot of different things
all of which has this common thread—that dioxin is being emitted into
the environment. If we go after dioxin it will give us a way to have
some leverage on these different polluters that are operating in our
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communities … For the EPA to crack down on dioxin would be a
handle that they could use (Yates 2001).

Through the Stop Dioxin campaign, CHEJ has helped local groups connect with
national and international efforts to eliminate dioxin production. For example, under
pressure from local activist groups, several cities in California passed ordinances
banning dioxin production within their city limits (Center for Environmental Health).
Dioxin is just one of a number of “persistent organic pollutants” (POPs)
targeted by the International POPs Elimination Network (IPEN). CHEJ has worked
to unite grassroots, activist-based networks with the international effort to ban POPs,
such as dioxin. Yates (2001) explains how this helps at the local level:
The international process around POPs has put pressure on the U.S. to
be stronger, particularly around dioxin. Because one of the key issues
or debates for getting this international treaty was the issue of calling
for the elimination of the production of dioxin … When you work out
the elimination of dioxin, which is part of the treaty, then you're
pushing all of these issues at the local level. It’s a tool.

Indications are that this program is making progress. The POPs Treaty, which
requires the elimination of twelve toxic chemicals, was recently (2001) signed by
more than one hundred nations, including the United States (United Nations
Environment Program 2001).
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The toxics movement is now both local and global. Beginning with a small
group of committed citizens, Lois Gibbs achieved the objectives of Love Canal
residents, then went on to establish a national organization aimed at assisting local
groups in organizing and resisting threats to their own communities. The emergence
of international campaigns from CHEJ’s grassroots work completes the picture.

Conclusions

The toxics movement represents one of a few instances in which an
entrenched technological system has been forcibly transformed into something less
threatening. The strategies used to accomplish this transformation resonate in many
ways with Feenberg’s critical theory of technology. Recall that there is a micro and a
macro level aspect to Feenberg’s politics of transformation. In particular, the
description of the ways in which local groups engage and resist industries is
analogous to Feenberg’s discussion of the “micropolitics of technological
transformation.” His distinction between strategic and tactical actors, his concept of a
technological code, and especially his theory of instrumentalization all resonate with
CHEJ’s strategies.
CHEJ encourages groups to focus on identifying power relations by asking
pertinent questions, such as who profits, or who is responsible? Its goal is to
determine where pressure needs to be applied—what they refer to as “strategic”
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targets. To use Feenberg’s terms, they are countering the “positioning” attempts of
strategic actors with their own “initiatives.”
The blockade against new hazardous waste landfills by grassroots activists
increased the cost of waste disposal to such an extent that industry was forced to
create technological alternatives. A significant point is that "those new technologies
are emerging and they are emerging precisely not because science is coming up with
new ideas or because industry is creative, but because of political pressure from the
grassroots has concretely brought these new technologies into use" (Yates 2001).
From Feenberg’s perspective, the toxics movement forced the existing system to
move from a highly differentiated to a more a concretized system through the
moments of secondary instrumentalization.
Although grassroots activists do not explicitly set out to transform technology,
nevertheless this is the end result. Technological systems are what must be altered
for their living conditions to improve. Industries, landfills, and incinerators are the
parts of technological systems that although not easily altered, are at least easily
confronted by willing citizens. The methods described in this chapter offer
straightforward ways of engaging these technologies. However, as discussed above,
technology is a multi-layered entity. In addition to the physical artifacts themselves
(e.g., incinerators), technology also exists as “ideology,” or what Feenberg refers to
as a “technological hermeneutic.”
To some extent, the toxics movement confronted technology as ideology by
attacking the public image of corporations. Highlighting the fact that industries target
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low-income minority communities is one way of exposing their agenda.
Nevertheless, it is an oversimplification to claim that industry and government are
working together to exploit poor, minority communities. Feenberg offers ways to
deepen this critique. To what extent have activists bought into a technological
consciousness that hinders their perception? With his suggested technological
hermeneutic, Feenberg offers ways of probing the reified consciousness that activists
too readily accept.
Citizens resisting industry and hazardous waste sitings must also see
technology as “social process.” This form of technology is much more difficult to
resist, namely, because citizens themselves embody and are embodied by the
technologies. They are an extension of the very technologies that threaten their
communities. The lifestyles of citizens as consumers, perpetuates the pollution that
threatens their communities. Unfortunately, citizens rarely see this contradiction,
because they are so deeply embedded in the technological systems affecting their
lives. These are important challenges that Feenberg does not adequately address
either.
When citizens confront a crisis such as Love Canal, the American dream,
which is closely linked to the ideology of technological progress, is called into
question. However, if the solution demanded by citizens entails compensation and
cleanup but no deeper change, then they thereby “institutionalize and legitimate as a
problem what might otherwise be viewed as a fundamental crisis and, thus a
challenge to our modern industrial way of life” (Edelstein 1988: 194). The way of
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life—a social process concretized by technological systems—is what must be altered.
The theory of technological commodification discussed in chapter three can
address some of these issues. In addition, the Western Marxist tradition has from the
beginning made the connection between technology and social forms (between the
forces of production and the relations of production), and offers ways of thinking
about technology that can enhance the rather simplistic view held by many grassroots
activists. The final chapter discusses in more detail how a critical theory of
technology can expand on the somewhat successful efforts of grassroots
environmentalists.

132

Chapter Six
Human Need, Commodification,
and Sustainable Societies

The stated purpose of this project is to determine whether or not
environmentalism can fruitfully connect with Feenberg’s critical theory of
technology. To put it another way, I am attempting to establish which
environmentalism resonates most with his theory. A modified version of Feenberg’s
theory has been outlined, and grassroots environmental justice (EJ) has been
identified as the brand of environmentalism that most resonates with his theory. The
case study of the toxics movement illustrates EJ as an instantiation of Feenberg’s
theory.
Again, what I am presenting here is both normative and descriptive. While it
is true that the toxics movement is an instantiation of Feenberg’s critical theory of
technology, it is also the case that the critique must go deeper. In this final chapter, I
focus on the organizational structure of the toxics movement, and suggest more
specifically how a critical theory of technology can enhance movements such as this.
I argue that seeing the connection between production and consumption is crucial to
linking environmentalism to a critical theory of technology, and that this connection
necessitates a theory of human need.
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Structure of the Toxics Movement

As discussed in chapter three, one of the shortcomings of Feenberg’s theory is
the inability to expand transformation beyond the immediate interests of those
engaging technology. He locates the interests and motivations for action within the
participants, which hinders expanding the transformation once these interests are
satisfied. There must be something motivating actors beyond the immediate interests
of the participants.
In that CHEJ provides guidance throughout the United States, it has the
potential of expanding these engagements. CHEJ offers guidance on organizing and
resisting to local groups, who in turn use this knowledge to directly engage
technology. Organizations like CHEJ offer an existing structure for connecting
disparate local struggles. Through their national campaigns (e.g., Stop Dioxin
Exposure), CHEJ is able to target specific technologies and unite local activists
around a common cause. Hence, expanding the implementation of Feenberg’s critical
theory of technology would not require local activists to become intimate with the
theoretical aspects discussed here. As long as CHEJ’s guidance reflects the insights
of this theory, activists could begin to practically employ them in their struggles.
Recall that Feenberg’s critical theory of technology operates at both a macro
and a micro-level. The macro-level focuses on technology as ideology or
hermeneutic, while the micro-level emphasizes the direct engagement of technology.
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We see this same division in the toxics movement. At the micro-level, local groups
are involved in engaging and resisting technologies. They are in effect attempting to
reverse the process of differentiation that is negatively affecting their lives. At the
macro-level, the toxics movement attempts to combat the technocratic power of the
government officials, bureaucrats, and corporations that attempt to exploit local
communities (see Figure 1).
As I see it, the micro-level is clearly the strong point of the toxics movement
(and similar grassroots EJ efforts). Such movements are action oriented, extremely
motivated, and increasingly well organized thanks to organizations such as CHEJ.
The macro-level of hermeneutic, on the other hand, is clearly lacking—activists must
be more reflexive in their engagements with technology.

Combating Technocratic Power

Feenberg’s theory of instrumentalization has the potential of significantly
aiding grassroots activists in their battles with technocratic power. The struggle
between grassroots activists and technocrats reflects his discussion of primary versus
secondary instrumentalization (chapter two). When technocrats—government health
officials, scientists, and policy makers—use non-coercive power to alter citizen
preferences, they employ a form of technology as ideology that must be overcome
(McAvoy 1999: 62). The history of the toxics movement offers scattered instances of
overcoming technocratic power. As the Love Canal incident illustrates, the
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perspective of technocrats fundamentally differs from the perspective of citizens.
Technocrats employ science and technology to make rational-objective decisions
based on easily quantified data. Given that technocrats generally believe
environmental problems can only be isolated and solved by their methods, they tend
to preclude citizen participation (Edelstein 1988: 191). Their ideology, in other
words, pre-selects for particular interests and restricts alternatives (Webler et al.
1992).
Citizens, on the other hand, put safety over profit, and believe that those
bearing the burden should be included in the decision making process. The difference
in paradigms is what leads technocrats to view citizens as irrational, “screamers,” and
citizens to see technocrats as cold, and “corrupt” (Edelstein 1988: 129, 132). Webler
et al. (1992) explains how this bifurcation is largely due to the prevalence of
instrumental reason among technocrats:
Corporations and government speak each other’s language.
Instrumental reason has become the predominant mode by which
technical risk analysis justifies actions. But citizens do not
comprehend risk problems using instrumental reason: citizens do not
calculate the marginal cost of saving a life (31).
Technocrats have the power and the benefits that come with that power. The playing
field is not equal; therefore the interests of the technocrats must be exposed to level
the field. Instantiations of instrumental rationality are real. They are identifiable in
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the words and actions of technocrats, and are tied directly to the highly differentiated
technologies threatening the lives of citizens. Webler et al. (1992) explains that:
normatively, a commitment to instrumental reason is a commitment to
domination. The question “Who bears the risk and who reaps the
benefits?” will expose the political realities of this domination. Those
interests that command scientific knowledge, or are able to pay for it,
will reap the benefits, while groups poor in scientific rationality will
take the burden (35).
But this characterization is too general. As illustrated in chapter five, Feenberg’s four
moments of primary instrumentalization offer a more in-depth analysis of the
language and actions of technocrats. Once identified, activists can respond
strategically with the four moments of secondary instrumentalization.

Expanding the Critique

The toxics movement is a good example of how EJ movements can reshape
technological systems by combating technologically based threats. By blockading
new hazardous waste incinerators and landfills, the toxics movement forced industry
to develop new production processes and reduced hazardous waste. But there are
problems with this approach: at best it works as a system of containment, at worst it
ends up spreading the waste around. Because these systems remain differentiated,
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they are easily transferred to other unsuspecting communities in the United Stated,
and abroad.84
One of the central arguments against globalization (i.e., in terms of “free
trade” and economics) is the lack of uniform environmental standards. Multinational
corporations are free to skate around the globe, polluting at will. As a consequence,
many of the “dirtiest” industries are moving overseas. Hence, even though activists
frequently unite to prevent industries from targeting communities in the U. S., they
cannot stop these industries from taking their waste elsewhere. Regardless of where
or how they “stop-up” the system, it will continue somewhere and in some way
unless efforts are made to further concretize these systems.
Crucially, EJ activists must understand that technology is not simply the byproducts of the artifact that they see threatening their lives—the incinerator that an
industry attempts to put in their backyard—but the entire process, or system, that
supports this artifact. The research and development that designed the processes and
products, the manufacturing process that created the waste, and the transportation
system that ships the waste are all part of the technological system that brings the
incinerator to bear on a local community. This complex web of people and machines
must be sorted out. One way of doing this is to examine the history of particular
technologies from a critical theory perspective.

84

The Cerrell Report (1984) demonstrates that certain communities are targeted for their perceived
inability to resist.
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In chapter three, I discussed how electric power became entrenched through
technological “standardization” and the “positioning” of a few managerial elites. In
Feenberg’s terms, electric power became increasingly differentiated as technocratic
managers “decontextualized” electric power technology to achieve their ends. This
path was justified by the inherent norms of “utilitarian efficiency” (formal
rationality). The argument for leaving these utility systems alone was based on the
fact that they could be counted on to efficiently deliver relatively inexpensive energy.
Few thought about how these monopolies established deeply entrenched systems that
would be difficult to alter.
Richard Hirsh (1999) explains how the deregulation of these systems began in
the 1970s. Many factors contributed to this shift—the energy crisis, a change in
public perception, and new legislation. An unintended consequence was that it
opened the door for alternative energy and technology. Although this movement85 as
such did not continue, largely because of the Reagan administration, it did set the
stage for later developments. With further deregulation in the 1990s, considerable
progress toward developing alternative power sources has been achieved.86 These
efforts to develop and implement alternative power illustrate ways of “recontextualizing,” or concretizing technologies into particular social and
environmental contexts. The systems are, in other words, becoming lessdifferentiated through these efforts.
85

I am referring here to a fairly distinct movement that originated from the energy crisis in the early
1970s, and received substantial support under the Carter administration.
86
Wind power, for example, increased four fold from 1995-2000 alone (L. Brown 2001).
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Thinking about technological systems in this way provides activists with
alternative ways of transforming technology. For instance, if a local group were
confronting a coal-fired electric power plant in their rural community, they would
greatly benefit from this broader perspective. Attacking the source—the smokestack
emitting the pollution—is one way of attempting to achieve the goal of a cleaner
community, but it is extremely limited. Local activists could, for example, push for
deregulation, which potentially lessons the burden on their particular plant. Or, they
could advocate for alternative energy sources, so that when opportunities do arise
(e.g., the 1990s) options would be available. Again, many activists do not consider
these alternatives because they are typically too narrowly focused on stopping the byproducts of particular technologies.
The way in which national campaigns (e.g., Stop Dioxin Exposure) emerged
from the struggles of grassroots activists (chapter five) demonstrates the effectiveness
of this approach. CHEJ assisted in the development of these programs based on the
struggles going on in local communities. In the case of dioxin, for example,
combining legislative initiatives with the force of grassroots activism resulted in an
extremely effective package. Crucially, however, the impetus for change was from
the bottom-up.

Connecting Production and Consumption
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Although grassroots EJ clearly reflects Feenberg’s discussion of the
micropolitics of technology, there are significant differences as well. Feenberg
(1999) suggests that interests originate in the participants (140-142). For example,
Internet users with chronic medical conditions have constructed on-line patient
forums to share information and console one another (Feenberg 1995b). In instances
such as this, participants proactively shape the system to meet their needs. In the case
of the toxics movement, and EJ in general, citizens are motivated by a perceived
threat. They engage technologies to prevent their implementation, and not
necessarily to fulfill a need. Another way of saying this is that Feenberg’s
participants focus on consumption, while EJ focuses more on (by)production.
On the face of it this may not seem problematic, but ignoring the fact that
these two are inextricably linked is a central problem for EJ. For the most part,
grassroots activists are content to maintain the status quo as long as the immediate
threat is eliminated. Citizens must realize that their consumptive habits fuel the
technologies, which in turn negatively affect them. They must, in other words, make
the connection between (by)production and consumption. The toxics movement, like
most EJ movements, is motivated by the idea that they have a right not to be “dumped
on.” What such activists appear to say is “I deserve a toxic-free life so I can make as
much money as possible, so I can pollute some one else’s world.” But this is fictional
if the so-called better life creates their problematized situation. Although the majority
of Americans consider themselves environmentalists, “their lives are so
compartmentalized that they live a lifestyle that supports the pollution habit, without
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even seeing the connection” (Edelstein 1988: 194). The compartmentalized lives are
tied directly to modernity’s highly differentiated societies and prevent them from
seeing that they are invested in the very technologies responsible for the polluting.
The neo-liberal solution of placing more responsibility on the individual is not
the answer. Pushing individual citizens to conserve energy and recycle waste, as well
intentioned as this may be, is simply moving in the wrong direction. It serves merely
to accentuate the radical individualism that undoubtedly contributes to American’s
failure to effectively respond to environmental problems. A collective approach is
needed; and in a highly technologized society, it makes sense to organize around
technology.
Citizens must see themselves as the living material of technological systems—
as social process. Grassroots EJ relies far too heavily on an “us-versus-them” model.
In truth, activists embody this division, and hence fight against themselves. In relying
on this bifurcated model, activists reify the division that must be overcome in order to
make the kind of changes necessary. Citizen-activists must see that they are part of
the very systems that threaten their way of life. The root of this problem is a failure
to make the connection between production and consumption. James O’Connor
(1998) sums up the possible consequences of this failure:
The danger that [struggles against technology] will be sidetracked into
technocratic and reified ways of thinking about the world and capitalist
power is great. Not only technology per say but also the prevailing
division of mind and manual worker along class, race, and gender
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lines, and the democratization of regulatory agencies and state and
international bureaucracies, are at stake (208).
CHEJ’s guidance literature looks like a tirade against “capitalism” and “corporatism.”
Maybe these are to blame but what exactly do these terms mean, and what is their
connection to technology? These reified terms must be probed in order to find
practical solutions. Their strategies attempt to target the locus of power (i.e.,
corporations) which is fine, but how are corporatism, capitalism, and technology tied
together? What products contribute to the waste? Who buys these products and for
what purpose? Asking these questions reveals the connection between the corporate
producers and the citizen consumers, and leads to the crucial subject of “human
needs.” That is, how are they defined, and by whom?

Human Needs and Satisfaction

Environmentalists have attempted to address this subject in various ways, but
they have focused primarily on constraining the human appropriation of nature. The
question concerns the best way of achieving this constraint. One of the chief ways is
to assert the “limits of nature,” that is, to argue that nature is being depleted of nonrenewable resources (i.e., sump), or conversely that nature can only accommodate so
much pollution (i.e., sink).87 Accepting this means that humans must alter their
87
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chapter four).
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consumptive (polluting) habits to some degree. One problem with this approach is
that establishing and controlling limits tends to fall back on systems involving
primary instrumentalization, thus perpetuating the problem. Emphasizing “limits”
also fails to adequately address the connection between human need and the
appropriation of nature (via technology) as the satisfaction of that need.
The issue of needs and how they are satisfied has been an important topic
within the Western Marxist tradition since the early Marx, where he envisaged a
dialectic between humans and external nature that is mediated by technology.
According to Marx (1964[1932]), humans objectify their species being in and through
their creations—their appropriation of external nature—and contemplate themselves
in the worlds that they create (114). The given mode of production and
corresponding social organization frames the way in which nature is appropriated.
Obviously, a major factor is the perceived “needs” of the individual and the
community to which she belongs. Marx (1970) explains:
Hunger is hunger; but the hunger that is satisfied by cooked meat eaten
with knife and fork differs from hunger that devours raw meat with the
help of hands, nails and teeth. Production thus produces not only the
object of consumption but also the mode of consumption, not only
objectively but also subjectively. Production therefore creates the
consumer (197).
In other words, what is produced and how it is produced plays a crucial role in
defining the needs of consumers. There are no pre-givens. Every society has a
particular way of engaging nature with technology to obtain their “perceived” needs.
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According to Marx, the capitalist mode of production reduces human needs to
the basest elements, because it alienates the worker from the product of their labor.
In this we see the origin of the split between production and consumption, with
production becoming veiled by the commodity form.88 The worker is reduced to
basic biological needs because they are forced to labor simply in order to survive.
Marx (1964[1932]) claims that under these conditions, “man (the worker) only feels
himself freely active in his animal functions—eating, drinking, procreating, or at most
in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc” (111). Reduced to simply working to satisfy
physical needs, humans become no different than animals. Conscious free activity
distinguishes humans from animals. According to Marx (1964[1932]), the needs
above and beyond basic needs are uniquely human, such as the need to create, to
accomplish, and to commune with others.
True production in the creative sense imagined by Marx means more than
meeting immediate physical needs. The richness of human sensibility is achieved
through freely interacting with “humanized nature,” that is, through the process of
creatively satisfying needs by appropriating external nature. According to Marx
(1964[1932]), “the whole character of a species—its species character—is contained
in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species
character” (113). Conversely, when humans are reduced to “practical need,” as

88
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occurs under capitalism, human sensibility becomes severely stunted (Marx
1964[1932]: 141).
Under capitalism “everyone speculates on creating a new need in another …
to place him in a new dependency” (Marx 1964[1932]: 147). Who we are is equated
with what we can buy, that is, with money and how much we possess. “Need” is
defined by money, if the possibilities for satisfying needs are determined solely by the
quantity possessed by an individual (Marx 1964[1932]). So framed, the universal
solvent of money eliminates individuality.
Marcuse (1964[1932]) expounds on Marx’s ideas in his discussion of how
advanced technological society replaces “true needs” with “false needs.” False needs
are “those which are superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests
in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery, and
injustice” (Marcuse 1964[1932]: 5). Clearly, with the rise of modern technological
societies “nature,” and “production” have become engulfed by large technological
systems. As a consequence, “need” and “satisfaction” create and sustain these
systems. As such, needs and satisfactions preserve the power and domination of the
established authority. In this sense, the domination of rationality goes to the very
core of human existence. In the technologically constructed one-dimensional society
humans are conditioned to want what they get.
Through targeted advertising, they are dazzled into believing that freedom
equates to the ability to choose between twenty different kinds of toilet paper, or that
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the possibility of owning the same kind of automobile as the “boss” dissolves
inequalities. The example of electric power (chapter three) dramatically illustrates
how a technological consciousness was instilled in people by playing on the Baconian
mantra of “technology equates to material progress.”
Marcuse (1964[1932]) argues that at the root of the struggle for liberation is
“the replacement of false needs by true ones, the abandonment of repressive
satisfaction” (7). The question is how to achieve this replacement in a society
eclipsed by a technological consciousness—where citizens are trained to buy every
new techno-gadget that comes along. It is one thing to say that the majority of
Americans are caught up in overconsumptive, technologically fetishized lifestyles; it
is quite another to suggest how this can change. Grassroots activists of the kind
discussed here at least offer the potential of making these changes. However, the
assumptions behind the prevailing technological consciousness must be exposed for
citizens to see who they are, and how their needs and satisfactions are constructed.
Feenberg’s theory of instrumentalization is simply inadequate in this regard.
Recall that he advocates moving from highly differentiated technologies to lessdifferentiated, more concretized technologies. If the immediate interests of
participants guide the movement toward concretization, as his examples illustrate,
nothing prevents the takeover and concretization of fetishized consumerism. That is,
everyone is happy as long as they get what he or she wants out of a particular
technology. Unfortunately, what people typically want is more!
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I believe these shortcomings can be overcome with two additions, or
modifications. First, it is more useful to frame this movement toward concretization
(via secondary instrumentalization) in terms of commodification. If it is the case, as I
have argued here, that much of the environmental destruction (and threat to human
health) comes from large, commodified systems, then moving toward lesscommodified systems should be an improvement (alternative energy being one
example). I am suggesting that the way in which EJ activists engage technology has
the potential of creating less-commodified systems, but to be effective they must
better understand the commodification process.
Thinking about technology as a commodity that is bought and sold encourages
actors to consider the role of consumption. Paul Thompson’s theory of technological
commodification discussed in chapter three is helpful in this regard. Thompson’s
four moments of commodification—alienability, excludability, rivalry,
standardization—provide a way of connecting needs and interests to specific
technologies and the products generated by particular systems. In addition, his
distinction between “structural” and “technological” commodification enables
activists to target specific aspects of technological systems. It may be the case that
structural issues, such as policies and laws, are to blame for the commodifying
(differentiating) aspects of a particular system. Hirsh’s (1999) analysis of electric
power demonstrates that structural commodification, in the form of regulations,
largely prevented (excluding) alternatives. However, as Hughes (1983) points out,
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there are many technological factors that also contributed to the commodification
(e.g., in terms of standardization, and excludability) of electric power systems.
Pollution as a by-product of technological systems can be considered in a
similar way. EJ has touched on these issues by revealing how certain communities
are targeted for their perceived inability to resist. However, these efforts could be
greatly enhanced with Thompson’s discussion of the four moments of
commodification. They could, for example, tie hazardous by-products with those
attempting to “exclude,” or “alienate” from the beneficial aspects of a system.
My second suggestion pertains to the goal or direction of such movements. I
believe the type of technology that should be held up as a goal is represented by many
of the northern European countries—that is, large-scale, yet sustainable systems.
Granted, the term “sustainable” has been co-opted by technocrats, and used to justify
virtually any kind of development. However, if the goal is to in some way achieve an
equitable stasis of human life on earth, then some degree of resonance with natural
systems must be achieved. I am not claiming that efforts to move toward small-scale,
regionalism should be given up. Obviously, smaller scale systems are easier to
control and alter. When possible, efforts should be made to keep systems from
expanding to the point of no control (i.e., where systems take on their own
imperatives). However, as I have argued, environmentalists tend to act only after
confronted by the threat from mature, large-scale systems.
Of course, the American path to large-scale, sustainable systems would be
radically different than European countries, which are for the most part Social
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Democracies with large, bureaucratic governments. In the United States, the most
likely path to large-scale, sustainable systems would be grassroots-populist based. It
would, in other words, be a bottom-up movement. Combining grassroots EJ’s proven
success at the local level with an overarching goal of sustainable systems, has the
potential of greatly expanding technological transformation.
It is also possible that transformation can be expanded through new
movements directed at globalization, and climate change. Many of these activists
recognize that the overconsumption of the few fuels problems like global warming
and Third World exploitation. Moreover, technology (or development) is seen as
driving or at least enabling these problems. These movements would need to be
examined separately to determine whether or not they can connect with the suggested
critical theory of technology. Obviously, the ideological commitments and strategies
for action of these movements differ from those discussed here. However, this at
least provides avenues for further research.
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Appendix:
Interview with Larry Yates,
CHEJ Grassroots Organizing Mentor
Interviewer (I): Larry, tell me your position with the organization and how long
you've been with them and what you do.
Larry Yates (L): OK, I'm an organizer. The official title, I almost never use is
"Grassroots Organizing Mentor." I started in November of 1998. Primarily what I do
is to work with folks on the telephone in the office and sometimes by email, and
occasionally go out to communities, but we don't have a lot of resources for that.
People who are facing some kind of threat or abuse and who are asking for help, and
my job is to help them understand that organizing is an option and that if they chose
that option how to do it.
I: I got the impression that you've worked for a number of different activist type
groups, is that right?
L: Yeah, primarily with housing and neighborhood issues before I came here.
I: I also got the impression that you felt like the organizing you do here is the same
or basically the same?
L: Yeah, organizing is organizing. It’s understanding power, mobilizing people,
power, community power to have an impact on their issue. With any kind of
organizing you have to learn the content of the issue. There's always technical
aspects, legal aspects or scientific, or whatever it might be. And an organizer learns
to do that. There are plenty of organizers that go back and forth every couple of
years. Lois was talking today about a citizen action organizer she deals with. They do
environmental stuff for a while. They'll do community reinvestment, then they'll
do…anyway they'll switch from issue to issue quite frequently. It’s not an unusual
thing. An organizer looks at organizing as the key skill.
I: And you also said that the problems that CHEJ deals with or the place of
technology isn't unique to this realm?
L: Well, certainly you've got to deal with engineering and technology. If you're
looking at housing, if you're looking at highways, there are a lot of other issues. The
phrase you used--the "built environment"--is a good phrase. I mean people have been
fighting highways since organizing began. Housing is a major issue and a lot of
people work on it. People get more caught up with the technical issues in the work
we do as a general rule, than they do those issues but frankly we try to discourage
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that. We're interested in developing people who know how to use democracy at a
grassroots level and take it beyond the grassroots level. We're not interested in
producing a lot budding junior scientists. That's not our goal. People will learn a lot
about science and hopefully have science demystified, but we're not trying to create
environmental scientists.
I: I see that you stressed democracy in emails--that's the real goal. So can you tell
me as an organizer how you go about that. I would guess that someone would call
and say there's a corporation that wants to put in a landfill, how can you help me?
What's the first thing that you would tell them to do?
L: Well, I start by talking about who we are. That's the source of our authority in any
sense of the word. A couple senses of the word apply, but to some extent Lois' name
and the experience of Love Canal is a source of authority. It gives some credibility to
what I'm saying. But it also is a reference point to bring them to an understanding
about thinking about organizing. So first I would say this is what we are, this is what
we do, and this is how we can help you. I try not to dismiss other options. I mean we
don't encourage folks to go to a lawyer. We don't say going to a lawyer is insane and
useless. Whatever I might think, I'm not going to say that because people need to
make their own choices. Once they accept to some extent the organizing model, and
for most communities, for working class low-income communities this is the only
model that is available to them. It’s not too hard to show the problems with going to
court, if you don't have deep pockets. And most of these groups have passed the
point of trying to logically explain to the polluter why they shouldn't pollute. They've
already tried that and it didn't work. So they're recognizing they have to apply some
kind of force or power. And when I say to them this is the power they have available
to them they get it. Then we start to talk about how to organize. The models that I
talk about are democratic models. Models that increase participation, that involve
people. The materials that we send out get a lot of people involved and you keep
them engaged. And you exercise your power as a community. You have the right to
participate because…part of it is emphasizing democracy at a functional grassroots
level as a democratic organization. Just as big a part of it is emphasizing that this is
supposed to be a democracy and that you have as much right or more right to be
heard and to be effective as someone who just comes in with money as one person or
five people with money. So we're emphasizing democracy in that way too.
I: How does CHEJ decide which projects it will work on--like the national
campaigns for instance?
L: The national campaigns all came out of local fights. In a way we don't decide. I
mean in a way there are obviously some decisions we make. But if somebody comes
to us with the nucleus of a community group and there's an issue that they feel is
serious--95% of the time if they feel its serious that's enough for us. We don't
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evaluate it. We work with everybody who shows up, or who meets those criteria. I
mean if its an issue that falls totally out of our domain like community reinvestment
or nuclear power, we just don't do them, because there are other groups that do, and
there are generally a lot of very special aspects so we generally don't work on nuclear
issues. But if an issue falls within our fairly broad bailiwick and it’s a serious group
and they want to work on it, we'll work with them. Over time, out of the groups that
we have worked with, networks have developed, contacts have developed and we
promote that, we encourage that. And discussions have happened and all three of the
campaigns came out of discussions that people had at the grassroots level had with
each other. Now I'm not saying we didn't encourage or provide opportunities for
people to come together and talk. I'll give you an example of one that didn't work.
Not long after I came here I realized I was talking to people in NYC about NYC
waste and what was happening. And I was talking to people in Virginia and
Pennsylvania about where NYC waste ends up, and I wondered if we could find a
way for grassroots people to come together and find some common ground on what
needs to happen with NYC waste. Rather then have them sort of at loggerheads with
the NYC people trying to get it out of NYC, and the VA and PA people trying to push
it back. For instance, NYC doesn't recycle anywhere as much as it could. And there
are some companies promoting an unjust approach to where this stuff goes. Trying to
find communities like Charles City County, VA. It’s a very poor mostly people of
color community. They've essentially bought the county. So we had a meeting in
Baltimore. We got people together--grassroots activists from NYC, PA, VA, and NJ-and we sat them down together and said can we find some common approaches?
Well, the answer was no! We tried and people had some good conversations and
some of those people are still in touch with each other. But there wasn't a common
ground for a campaign. For a lot of reasons, it just wasn't there and we didn't force it.
We didn't say we're going to go ahead and have a campaign anyway. Obviously I had
some feeling that there would be but the fact is there wasn't and so there isn't. In the
dioxin campaign people came together and said we're fighting incinerators, we're
fighting PVC, we're fighting a lot of different things all of which has this common
thread--that dioxin is being emitted into the environment. If we go after dioxin it will
give us a way to have some leverage on these different polluters that are operating in
our communities. Now I wasn't there when that happened five or six years ago, but
that was a strategy or decision that people made. Lois certainly was very much a part
of that--nurturing it and bringing it along. But if people hadn't felt that it made sense-people at the local level said to me as they did about the NYC trash: "No, this just
doesn't make sense to us"--the campaign would not have moved forward. We aren't
paying anybody outside this office to do this campaign. A lot of people are very
engaged in the dioxin campaign. They do things. They do different actions. They do
it because it fits their local grassroots organizing.
I: How do you get people to engage something at the local level such as dioxin, that
is so much more diffuse than say an incinerator?
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L: Grassroots people have called me up who don't even know what organizing is-they aren't going to get into the dioxin campaign. But people who've been fighting
incinerators, or PVC plants over a long period of time understand that they can use
some handles beyond what they can develop at the local level. Particularly on a very
long tough fight like the folks in Louisiana, where you've got a very powerful
chemical industry, and a very corrupt political system. People are just not winning
and there's a lot of fights and so they need some handles. For the EPA to crack down
on dioxin would be a handle that they could use. But those are people who have
grown sophisticated over time. You know, Joe Blow who calls me up for the first
time, you know I'm not going to pull them into the dioxin campaign.
I: So it’s another level then?
L: Right, right, the campaigns are for people who are already pretty engaged and
who are pretty engaged for the long haul. So we're looking at regional groups, or
they can be very grassroots. There's a group in Oakland, CA called "Pueblo" that's a
grassroots organization, but it’s a permanent organization. They work on several
different issues. They've got a website. One of the issues is shutting down an
incinerator and as part of that process, and other industrial issues they have pushed an
ordinance against dioxin production in Oakland, which is kind of an esoteric thing.
But they've got people out at meetings, and mobilized people behind it, because
they're educated folks. They've worked on it so they are people who are coming from
the grassroots, the blocks and their street corners to go to meetings, or Oakland city
hall to say, "no dioxin should be produced in Oakland."
I: I saw in the paper where an international treaty banning the "dirty dozen" POPs
had passed. Does CHEJ have a connection with this?
L: Yes, a number of us have been to the international conventions…
I: How do those connections work? Are they just informal?
L: There's an organization called IPEN (International POPs Elimination Network)
which we're a part of and in which there's a US section of people who coordinate and
work on this with the belief that there's some value for our dioxin organizing and our
work on PCBs. Other national groups that are involved work on pesticides. We don't
as much, though we certainly do relate to pesticides. Again, we feel like this gives
people a handle; gives people something to work with. The international process
around POPs has put pressure on the US to be stronger, particularly around dioxin.
Because one of the key issues or debates for getting this international treaty was the
issue of calling for the elimination of the production of dioxin. Dioxin is not
produced on purpose; it’s a by-product, so if you have good procedures you're not
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going to produce dioxin at least not in any significant quantities like we see now. For
instance, there's a lot of dioxin produced in paper production. You can produce paper
without producing any dioxin, with a chlorine-free process. Incinerators produce
dioxin. Incinerators are not necessary. There are other ways of dealing with waste.
The vast amount of incinerators are extremely unnecessary. There's a very small
amount that you have to find something similar that’s destructive like incineration,
but it doesn't have to be something that emits a chemical. When you work out the
elimination of dioxin, which is part of the treaty, then you're pushing all of these
issues at the local level. It’s a tool. And the Europeans are going to be moving
forward to eliminate dioxin. They're not going to do everything we'd like them to do,
but they're doing a substantial amount. PVC is likely to disappear. There are
supermarket chains in Europe that just don't allow PVC in their stores. No products
can come into their supermarkets packaged in PVC period. And that's a big
change…Sweden…there was a developing a country that imposed a PVC ban, but
anyway all of that is going to push the US. So again it give us the tools to push the
US policy. As we develop national tools that we can take to the local level.
I: So there are other organizations like the international POPs that work at the macro
level?
L: It’s a little more of a macro thing. Some members like World Wildlife Fund and
Greenpeace, those are very large organizations. They are not grassroots organizations
in the normal sense. I mean Greenpeace is an activist organization and I have a lot of
respect for them, but they're not grassroots based and WWF is not either really. Its
not activist and its not grassroots based. So those are also a part of IPEN, but IPEN
has also been very effective. The other piece of this is that you give grassroots people
the opportunity to take action. Grassroots people from the US--La, Me, and AK-have gone to the IPEN meetings and have spoken to international audiences to make
their case. When somebody does that and they go back to La, they are a different
person. They've learned something, they've grown in respect for themselves. They
don't have the same fear of the chemical companies because they've seen they can go
up against the chemical companies and win, or come out even. So it’s also a means
of development. Of course for the national campaigns its even more true. The dioxin
campaign did an action on the Science Advisory Board that was looking at
reassessment of dioxin. This is a group of scientists who sit up on a panel and
pontificate. People come in their suits and ties and give testimonies then they
pontificate some more and they say what they're going to say. Of course the
scientists are industry hacks, but that's OK, some of them are more on our side or
whatever…But the idea is that they have their own encapsulated science guys
process. The dioxin campaign brought a whole bunch of people here who were in
grassroots activism--a dairy farmer from Minnesota, an African-American couple that
has organized against a military facility in their community, and also people that are
professional environmentalists and activists. They did an action here what we call the
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"bellies." These were plaster-of-paris bellies that were designed at a conference a few
years ago and now have been used in a lot of actions. It’s basically a woman's torso
and pregnant belly. These women lined up on either side of where the scientists come
in with signs that had some comment essentially saying that some scientists were
essentially bought--that they were essentially in the service of the chemical industry.
The chair of the group actually had done work for the tobacco industry. The
connection could be real clearly made. So they didn't say anything, they just stood
there, but there was a very powerful critique. Then they came into the room and
occupied the first two rows of the space so they were right in the face of these
scientists. When the scientists spoke they had to give a statement about conflict of
interests. But the conflict of interest as designed by the NAS is defined very
narrowly--"do you own stock in a company"? "Are you employed directly by a
company"? Well most of the scientists that are company hacks, are consultants, or
they work for a non-profit that gets lots of money. The Center for Risk Analysis at
Harvard for instance gets a lot of direct corporate money but that isn't considered a
conflict of interest under the rules. So while they were presenting their conflict of
interests--they were basically saying they didn't have one; technically under those
rules they didn't--our folks in the audience held up signs stating the different
corporations they had been paid by. This is all very powerful stuff. We got a good
decision out of the process. It also had a very powerful effect on those…that dairy
farmer who is going back to Minnesota is not going to be the same person she was
when she came. She's going to take back that knowledge to her local activists. So we
try to do the campaigns. I'm not saying that we always succeed, but our campaigns
are meant to compliment and strengthen grassroots activism and to come out of it.
And ultimately since we're not paying anyone to do that. We don't have any budget.
I mean we can fly a few people to a meeting and put them up in a hotel for a few
days, that's stretching it for us. But we don't send out organizers to run our campaign.
These also aren't the kind of campaigns that mainstream enviros are involved in. You
know send letters to your congressmen and write a check. If there aren't people out in
the community doing these things, these campaigns don't exist.
I: There seems to be animosity between the grassroots and the more mainstream
environmental organizations. Do you feel this way?
L: Well, its not animosity. It’s a disagreement about how to organize and you have
the same thing across the board. When I was in housing I worked with tenant groups
where…the National Alliance of HUD Tenants that I helped start--grassroots, lowincome, mostly people of color in HUD housing--were speaking for themselves and
meeting with the secretary of HUD and having an impact on policy, and going after
members of congress, and changing their minds. And there would be a big divide
when they would interact with the standard inside the beltway housing lobbyists. It’s
a very different approach, much more rough and ready, much more about power,
much more about making things happen and not so concerned about what sort of
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relationship you have with Senator so and so, or their aid. So yeah, there's a
difference between an inside the beltway kind of approach, and an approach that
doesn't mobilize grassroots people and an approach that does. It’s a big divide.
I: A lot of mainstream environmental organizations seem to be paying more attention
to environmental justice issues. Do you see connections being made between
grassroots mobilizers and mainstream organizations, or do you think it’s simply not
possible?
L: Well anything is possible. It’s kind of different for different groups and I'm kind
of new to the environmental world. Sierra Club, for instance, is locally based. They
have local chapters. I compare it to the NAACP, which is an organization I probably
had more interaction with before, but the Sierra Club and the NAACP are chapter
based. And both of them have great chapters and lousy chapters. And both of them
have national hierarchies that are less sensitive then they could be to what's going on
at the grassroots. But can you build a good local coalition including Sierra Club
folks? Of course. In some places absolutely. Like you can with the NAACP, just like
you can with some union locals. When you get to a group like NRDC it appears to be
much more top down and doesn't have a lot of local membership. I mean they have
members all over the country, but they aren't organized locally. Then I think you're
talking about something that's much more difficult because their whole structure is
not democratic. Essentially there's a self-perpetuating board. I mean, if all their
members quit they'd go out of business, but if their members want XYZ that doesn't
necessarily effect what they do. There's no feedback mechanism. I don't look at it as
mainstream versus not mainstream, but its about democratic or is it connected to the
grassroots versus not? And a lot of these groups have no mechanism of connecting
with the grassroots and they aren't inclined to develop one. And these groups I don't
think their politics are going to change. They may give lip service but I don't see how
it could change fundamentally.
I: It seems that linking those two would be beneficial. That is, the mainstream policy
makers inside the beltway and the locals?
L: I don' think the mainstreams are very good at what they're doing as a general rule.
I've lobbied and I've helped change rules. I go back to a housing example. The
National Alliance of HUD Tenants was changing laws and getting appropriations,
getting money, which is usually the hardest thing to do. It’s easier to change a law
than it is to get a legislator to spend money on your behalf. Because there could be a
lot of laws out there, but there's only so much money. They were doing this in the
1980s in the Bush administration when most low-income advocacy groups were on
the retreat for 10-12 years and were losing most of their battles. They did it because
they had a grassroots based approach, but also a strategic focused approach when they
went after something they wanted and they applied their grassroots strength in a
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strategic focused way in exactly the right spot. They went after 3 or 4 Republican
members of the appropriations committee, and they confronted them and they made
them change their positions. So they got successful changes when a lot of these other
groups were losing on welfare and hunger programs and so on. So I don't think the
inside the beltway approach works.
I: I agree.
L: So to say we should bring together these two different aspects I don't think is
right. They need to step back. They need to get out of the way, frankly. Or, take
their resources and reapply them. Again, groups that have more grassroots resources,
to move back in that direction. The labor movement is a prime example. The labor
movement 20 years ago was not oriented toward grassroots activism. I think that's a
fair statement. Now there's a commitment by AFL-CIO and on down through a lot of
the unions to grassroots activism. So there's an organization that changes too. Now
of course AFL-CIO always had locals, always had a grassroots base, but they weren't
using it. They weren't respecting it. They weren't trusting it, and now they learned
that if they're not going to, they're not going to survive. The environmental
movement overall has a grassroots base, but some groups are much less linked to that
than others. And some groups that don't trust it don't resonate with it. Now whether
those groups can change…it doesn't really matter to me if the groups change. I don't
have any need to have particular groups disappear or continue to exist. A group is a
group. I've been involved with plenty of organizations that no longer exist. There's
nothing sacred about an organization. If the organization can change and modify and
connect with a grassroots base then beautiful. If they can't, I don't know what their
purpose is any more. I think that in the 70s and clearly into the 80s it was possible to
accomplish a lot of things by advocacy with democrats in congress as potential
power, by advocating with folks in the presidential administration or going to court,
and also by going to the media. All of those avenues are much less successful than
they were 20 years ago, because the people…the corporations are not dumb, and they
closed those avenues down. I remember when you could get on national TV and
make radical statements. That ended 30 years ago, because they realized they were
actually being harmed when somebody like Huey Newton, or Abbey Hoffman--not
that those guys did everything right--but they had an impact on people. When the
women’s movement got on TV and said things, there was a resonance out there and
people were saying, "hey, I get that" or "I can relate to that." And so they said we're
not going t do that anymore. Now Noam Chomsky can't get on national TV. This
guy whose considered the greatest living linguist, a philosopher, and all this sort of
thing, a professor at MIT, and he can't even get on national TV. He's respected all
over the world because of his political opinions. But he can't get on national TV
because he's too radical. They made that decision and their closing off other avenues-closing the courts. This decision around Bush vs. Gore makes that obvious. They're
going to decide whatever they want to decide for their benefit. And obviously
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Congress is much less successful. So it really pushes you back to organizing--back to
grassroots.
I: In that sense they're forcing people to democratize.
L: Yeah right, Seattle, the anti-WTO thing, came about because people had no other
option. The labor movement didn't particularly want to get together with
environmentalists--didn't want to be involved with what was happening there. I
mean, some did, I know some very militant labor people but Sweeney didn't want to
do that. He'd rather be talking to Bill Clinton and for Bill Clinton to give him what he
wants. But Bill Clinton absolutely, positively wouldn't do it. John Sweeney saw that
labor jobs were going to go down the drain very rapidly and that he had no access on
policy to democrats, let alone Republicans. And so he had to support something like
Seattle. And the same thing with a lot of mainstream environmentalists, and Nader
people. Nader is a radical guy in a lot of ways, but he hasn't been leading people out
in the street. But Nader people were a key part of organizing that thing, again,
because they saw no other option. So yeah, what you're getting is a situation in which
the middle is disappearing because these guys are so greedy, so short sighted, that it’s
either my way or the highway. This whole area that you could play in the 70s, even
the 80s to some extent, where you could have access to those in power and get some
deals, or work some things out--that's all disappearing.
I: Yeah, the history of contemporary environmentalism tells the same story. When
Reagan came into office and just gutted the EPA, they couldn't play the game that
they normally played. It became negotiate and compromise--they got corporate
people on the boards of mainstream environmental organizations.
L: Yeah that's one of the reasons I got out of the housing movement. When Gingrich
took over they said you got to learn to speak Republican. I said no, you've got to
apply power to this guy. You've got to get this guy to do what you want, not what he
wants. And the fact is, it doesn't matter if people are Republicans or Democrats--you
can organize. I've seen it. We've already worked with a local group that has won a
battle against Christy Todd Whitman. She was going to stop cleaning up a Superfund
site and folks organized. It was across the board. It was the local government, there
were people out there with signs too, they turned her around. She realized that this
was going to look really bad. Of course, they've already done grotesque
environmental things. She backed off. And the dioxin thing is still moving
forward…unlike global warming, POPs stuff is moving forward. The dioxin stuff is
moving forward. I think where people are organizing and focused…I don't think
anyone is doing that on global warming. It really is mobilizing grassroots people and
it’s not an easy issue to mobilize grassroots people on, but I think there are ways to do
it.
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I: That's something I've been thinking about on my project because you know global
warming is something that everyone can relate to. Let's face it people are motivated
by risk or harm.
L: If you did a global warming campaign you'd think strategically about who would
be the most hurt. An example would be coastal cities, particularly cities that are at
risk of storms. If someone were working this at the national level…you have an
organizer in Charleston saying, "remember Hugo? Well, we're asking for more
Hugos." You have an organizer in southern Florida and you say, "remember
Andrew? This guy is asking for more Andrews." You talk to people in low-lying
areas, with beach property. You talk to the insurance companies…you strategically
think about who in particular would move first. In particular…who would be George
W. Bush's face today, not 20 years from now when the shit totally hits the fan, but
who would get in now. And you talk to those people, then you find your allies, and
you may have strange allies--maybe the Red Cross. Who knows? But you bring that
together and you exercise power. What people are doing now is saying that its
everybody's issue, everybody's against it. We…that never works. When I was
talking to a group yesterday in Wisconsin; they got 1700 people that signed a petition.
They're getting frustrated because it’s only like 10-12 of them that are carrying the
weight of the organization. I said well forget about the 1700, that's your core group;
that's your ocean, but you look for an individual person to head up a committee…You
don't organize by saying all 1700 people stand up and come over here. It won't
happen, and that's what people are doing with global warming. Everybody says we
should all care about this so let's all write to George Bush. And they say well
someone else will do it and no one does it. You've got to have a strategic focused
campaign. You got to use actual people to make actual social change. Social change
doesn't happen in the abstract. That's because there are particular groups…look at the
French revolution; you look at anything. There are particular groups that moved at a
particular time and their motion resonated with a bunch of other people and a larger
group moved and if it resonated with everybody then eventually everybody moved,
but they didn't all move at once. It wasn't like everyone got up on July the 14th and
said lets overthrow the monarchy. There was a process that happened; all those
people aren't thinking about that process.
I: So you don't know of any grassroots groups that deal with global warming?
L: Nothing stands out to me. The most effective stuff I've seen is overseas, where
there are people organizing boycotts of American corporations which they consider
the most complicit in these decisions…boycotts are really tough. We are not big on
boycotts here but that's the most strategic thing I've seen. Most of what I've seen on
global warming is pandering and saying everyone should do something.
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I: By putting pressure on corporations at the local level do you see corporations
moving to developing countries?
L: I'm sure some of it that is happening. Now a landfill that's not necessarily
practical. There's some waste that can be shipped overseas, but I think what you're
talking about is probably a cost break point. Before you put garbage on a boat and
send it to Namibia, it’s cheaper to start recycling. This is not to say we don't have to
watch these issues, and that's why we're connected internationally. And that's why
we're encouraging good practices in other countries. Both Health Care Without Harm
(HCWH) and IPEN are both involved in encouraging positive environmental
practices in grassroots groups. And there are grassroots groups in India and Africa
that are fighting these issues and they're being successful. I spent a long time at one
of the IPEN meetings with a guy from India--one of the southern states of India
where they've stopped 2 or 3 incinerators through grassroots action.
I: India does have a pretty good grassroots tradition.
L: Yeah right, the tradition is there and you just have to get some of the technical
information. Parts of India have a very high level of education. There is a certain
kind of democracy there. HCWH and IPEN are working with folks from Africa,
Latin America and all over, so we are very aware. This is not about getting it out of
my backyard (Our magazine is called "Everyone's Backyard"). But at the same time
you don't let something bad happen here just because if you stop it here it may go
somewhere else.
I: At least make them pay for the move.
L: Yeah, pay for the move and set an example. When we have a win we spread the
word…when communities contact us, we say, yeah this has been done somewhere
else. And the argument that if you stop it here it will go somewhere else is: a) a
fallacious argument; b) its used consciously against local organizers. So we tell
people that's not your responsibility. You're responsibility is to take care of your
space. Sometimes groups will say: "put it over there instead"--but we urge them not
to say that. Not because its not morally proper or correct, but its strategically a bad
idea. Because then you end up with two communities fighting each other. You just
say: "this is not a good place for that, we're not going to let you put it here, period."
The reality is this strategy--nuclear power plants being a prime example, there have
been no new nuclear power plants in the US since 1979. It’s perfectly legal. There
are procedures for approving a new nuclear power plant. There's money out there.
There are people that want to do it. You see them salivating right now with Bush in
power, but they haven't been able to do it for 21 years. Why? Because there isn't a
community in this country that you could go to and say we'd like to put in a nuclear
power plant, where they wouldn't fight you tooth and nail. For decades they haven't
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been able to put in a nuclear power plant, so in that sense we stopped up the toilet as
far as new nuclear plants in the US…and we've come pretty close to doing that with
incinerators. There aren't a lot of new incinerators.
I: By stopping up the toilet for new incinerators its forced technological alternatives,
right?
L: It has tended to force technological alternatives because you're raising the price
and the problem with technological alternatives is that when you bring them in they're
expensive. A lot of these technological alternatives, if they were used widely, would
be as cheap as incinerators, but at the beginning they're much more expensive and
people aren't used to them…so if you raise the cost of incinerators you make it easier
to bring in alternatives. You also create situations where those alternatives will be
used. In one of the first EJ fights in Warren County, NC. They took PCBs from all
over the state and dumped it on the roads in the poorest, blackest county in the state.
And people fought really hard to stop it, but it went ahead. But they got a
commitment at the time, that if there was ever available technology the state would
come back and clean it up. It happened that Hunt became governor again about 18
years later…the promise was brought to his attention. By then, some technologies
had been developed and now that dump is being cleaned up with a non-incineration,
non-landfill technology chosen by that community at substantial research working
with scientists and so on…That technology is now happening there. So politically
they forced the situation where that technology is now used. Australia has a policy
for things like POPs. They only use non-incineration, non-landfill technologies. The
reason is Australia is not a big country. They don't have a lot of these, so that just
trying to find a place to put these… They picked a spot and they had this incredible
battle. They get a lot of support from all over the country, and finally they were
forced to adopt these new technologies. So we are very concretely pushing for these
new technologies to be brought into use. They're much less destructive. They're not
perfect either but when you've got POPs out there you've got to do something with
them other then just stick them in the ground and pretend they're going to go away or
burn them, which just creates new POPs. So those new technologies are emerging
and they are emerging precisely not because science is coming up with new ideas or
because industry is creative, but because political pressure from the grassroots has
concretely brought these new technologies into use.
I: And that's exactly why I'm here. Because organization like CHEJ are
democratizing technology. They are forcing corporations to adopt more sustainable
technologies.
L: I will make a distinction. There has to be someone developing new technologies.
God bless them whoever they are, and some of those people are entrepreneurial. The
technologies for both these POP situations I mentioned in Australia and NC--those
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were both developed by small companies…that are trying to take something that
someone developed in a lab somewhere…the fact is, that until there was political
pressure there was no market. And those companies are very shaky…there's so many
people out there with technological skills that if you force a situation where the power
structure has to find a solution--they can find a solution…
I: Like with Dupont and the CFCs and the ozone problem…
L: But it has to be strategic; it has to be focused. That's why HCWH is so exciting,
because they really are transforming the industry. I'm not saying it’s simple or easy,
but compared to what a lot of people are doing they're just rolling right through the
medical industry. It’s not all that complex in term of changing the use of PVC…or
mercury. Some amazing strides have been made. If you look at other industries or
sectors you just don't see this happening. Automobiles you know, all the ideas are out
there. There's no reason that all the automobiles aren't getting 70 mpg…and all kinds
of other things. Well, it’s not happening because no one is strategically focusing to
make it happen. I'm not saying that the auto industry wouldn't be harder than the
health care industry but the health care industry is not easy.
I: I wonder if that's because there's so much money in health care?
L: No, I think it’s because someone strategically went after the health care industry.
I mean a lot of people have come up with ideas for the auto industry but no one is
saying strategically what are we going to do--looking at it as a political problem.
People look at these as technological problems and that's why I gave you so much
grief. You know the problem with the auto industry producing so many SUVs is not
a technological problem; it’s a political problem.
I: The average mpg has dropped over the past 15 years because of the SUVs.
L: Right, they have this stupid loophole that an SUV is not considered a passenger
car. Obviously, in any rational system that loophole would have been closed about 15
minutes after it was opened. But the fact is there's a lot of people that want to sell a
lot of gasoline…a lot of big cars. They work together and they've got some key
members of Congress in place…but there's no body saying: "who has the power to
change this"? Its like we say to people when they call up. First, we figure out what
you want, what's the solution to your problem, then you form a group, then you figure
out who can give you what you want, and then you apply pressure until they do it.
Now if we had the same process applied to the automobile industry. First, who wants
to do something about this, and then what are we going to try to do? Then, who do
we go after to apply pressure to? I mean this country is politically illiterate. That's
the bottom line. Technologically we're real smart, but politically we don't know shit.
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I: Right, but you put pressure on the auto industry and they'll say: "This is what our
customers want."
L: But maybe it’s not even the auto industry that you put pressure on. Maybe you go
after the Department of Transportation. There are a lot of different ways to approach
this. The thing about HCWH is there's this creative process of how do you change
things. The angle is HC "Without Harm". The name of the organization itself is a
strategy. Because all health care workers at least claim…all claim that they are trying
to do this without harm. So when you say that, this is a challenge. We know you're
harming people, and we know you can't admit it so we're putting you right in the
middle of that contradiction…its having a technique involved particularly for them.
They think for the people in Washington they have the kind of things that they do.
But what the people in Washington do is pretty simple. Anybody can learn it. I
lobbied one session of the general assembly in VA, and I figured out how it all
worked. There are some rules…but people don't think that if I want something to
change, or my community wants something to change, or my class wants something
to change, they have to think through a strategic process of how that works. Without
idealizing people in other countries, I think they're more aware of that. One reason is
because the white majority has gotten away with not having to do a lot of
stuff…sometime in the '70s the rules changed. The power structure started squeezing
people here too. So people are having to learn what people of color, Latin
Americans, what people in Europe knew about all along, which is how to think
strategically. As you change your social circumstances, who are your allies? Where's
your target? Those kinds of things? We also don't have a Left tradition in this
country.
I: Yeah, I think there is more of a populist tradition here.
L: Yeah, when I say Left, I'm talking in a very broad sense…When a kid grows up in
France or Germany they know in some sense that there are people out there that think
about class and power and are always trying to strengthen the lower classes relative to
the upper classes…
T: Partly do to the parliamentary versus the two party system.
L: Yeah, the two party system does create this bipolar problem…but anyway, people
in this country who don't have that experience don't think strategically about how do I
make things change. In addition we've got some whole new arenas that people didn't
have before. This whole question of environmental change. Macro-global
environmental change that wasn't an issue 100 years ago. We weren't changing the
environment to any significant degree and now we are…so we have to think about
that in a way we didn't before. And thinking about that politically does require some
new kind of thinking. You have to be able to think politically period, and most
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Americans have a hard time doing that. People call me, and they want to go to court
where basically some technological professional will solve their problem for them
when they don't understand. They want a scientist to come in and say this is what
should happen, which actually scientists don’t do that, but people don't understand
that because they don't actually know much about science. Or…they just want
somebody to be a hero and come in from the outside and solve their problems and
they don't have any technical grasp of how they can do it themselves. That's really
what we're doing at a very elementary level is getting the message across--"yes, you
can do it yourselves; we work with lots of people just like you; its not that hard, it’s a
lot of work, but its not beyond any normal persons capacity…"
I: How do you actually put pressure on corporations in a legal sense?
L: What do you mean, in a legal sense?
I: Do you use the public hearing process to get enough resistance and stop it right
there? Or what if it’s an existing case where there's an established polluter,
corporation and you need some kind of scientific information, data?
L: Well, you're always going to need some kind of scientific information, mostly for
your own group. People have to feel that they actually know what they're talking
about. You've got to have some scientific information, just like if you're going to go
down to the bank you have to have some information about finance.
I: But specific to that corporation that's polluting, where does the information come
from?
L: People can develop this to a large extent themselves. Our science director,
Stephen Lester…Stephen's available to anybody who contacts us about science
situations. Now with the Internet, people can develop a lot of this information
themselves. One of the critical lessons that Stephen talks about and certainly I talk
about is don't over load yourself on the science. In other words…
I: Don't get caught up in it?
L: Yeah, if you have something that is known to be toxic, say you've got arsenic, and
you know that there's arsenic in the landfill and that there are elevated levels of
arsenic in wells outside the landfill, you don't need to know anything else. Stop right
there. Some people will need to know more and some people in your group will be
motivated to know a lot more, but in terms of your basic message--stop right there.
Because when the environmental regulators come to you they say: "Well, you know
there's a gradient here, or…" You can say wait a minute, stop. We already know the
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deal. There's arsenic in there. It’s getting out, and it’s in our wells. Is that true or
not?
I: But how do you know it came from there?
L: Well, you know you have to have some sense that there's not arsenic around.
Again, you do some basic research, but…
I: And who does that?
L: The group basically. We're talking about, if you don't have that simple of a case
you're probably not going to win anyway, because you can't make the case to your
community, and that's where you really have to make the case.
I: The group would hire someone, or take the samples themselves?
L: No, most of the time the regulators have the information, or the polluter has the
information already. Information is not the hard part. The hard part is getting people
to stop collecting information. Really, this is practically universal--very few groups
that I've worked with that didn't have more information than they needed. Usually the
information is with the regulators. That's probably the clearest answer to your
question. The regulator has usually done enough to figure out there's a problem.
They haven't done enough to satisfy themselves that there's a problem because their
job is not to find a problem. Their job is to keep studying and say--"there are
problems on both sides and we're going to look at it, talk to the polluter, slap them on
the wrists a little bit…” It'll never be resolved. Eventually the group will dissolve, or
get sick and move away, die, or whatever. That's the regulators job. But the
regulator has the information and the group can get the information, because its
public information. The answer to your question, how do you go after the corporation
is there's no one answer. It depends on the situation. When I talk to people, what I'm
primarily doing is going through power relationships. And I'm figuring out that
essential question--who has the power to do what you need? Maybe its local
government, maybe state government, federal government, maybe the corporation
itself, maybe some combination. It may be the people themselves have the power to
stop it through some way. I mean, there are a lot of different situations.
I: But how do you keep it from turning into a battle over scientific data, where one
group of experts says this and another says that?
L: You make sure that your strategy doesn't depend on that.
I: So how do you do that? How do you avoid that?
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L: You get your facts together and you focus them at the most basic level. Not
inaccurate, not fuzzy, but basic. This is over here, arsenic is probably not…well, if
it’s highly concentrated arsenic, that doesn't occur naturally. You say you've got this
arsenic here, and nobody around here is dealing with arsenic, and it’s the same
arsenic that's in our wells. Can you absolutely prove that arsenic came from there?
No, if we go to court, or we just go to public hearings, then we could spend the next
20 years saying: "well, maybe that arsenic came from the moon, or maybe that
arsenic came from somewhere else, or maybe its not exactly the same arsenic--'look
at these little fractures down here'." But you see if the average person in the
community gets it…that's what you need. Your base is with you. You're never going
to convince the regulators. It doesn't matter what the regulators think. The company
already knows they did it. You don't have to worry about convincing the company.
You convince the base and then you mobilize the base to apply political pressure
where political pressure needs to be applied…
I: But what prevents the corporation from coming back and saying: "there's no…"
L: Oh they will! They're going to say that. It doesn't matter if your base believes
you. If your base is with you. In other words, you don't put it to the test. For one
thing, there's a misunderstanding about what science does. I'm not a scientist, but
science doesn't resolve these questions to the hundredth percentile. Real scientists
don't claim it does. So all scientists can do is give you more information. But they
can't say this is absolutely the way it is…its like you were organizing around a stop
sign. That's the classic Saul Linsky organizing question. We want a stop sign on our
corner because the cars go right through and run over our kids. There are people who
work with the numbers to figure out exactly where stop signs are supposed to go. But
if a community decides "dam it we don't care, we want a stop sign there"--then they
can get a stop sign. Even though there are people out there who make their living
figuring out where the stop signs go who will come in and say: "technically there's
not enough traffic; nobody has been run over yet…" [Community's response:]"We
don't care we want a stop sign, and we're going to keep raising a fuss until we get a
stop sign"…if the people believe it…That's why I believe there has to be a group.
Because if there's just one person, they may say…but a group is not going to believe
something like that. You got 20 or 30 people together in a community, then I trust
them, because I believe in democracy.
I: What about the ones who castrated themselves to go to meet the mother ship?
L: I'm not talking about a group that's isolated itself. I'm talking about a community
of people not self-selected, that just happen to live in the same place. I say if those
people get together, look at the evidence and they come to a conclusion, I'm willing to
trust them with the conclusion. I'm not willing to say you could determine what
happens the rest of human history, all of human life, but I'm willing to say "I trust you
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guys to figure out the best thing for that community, because you live there. It’s your
health at stake, and I'll trust you to do that." Particularly when the only other choice
is to trust somebody who is only there to make a buck. There's no evidence at all that
he cares, or that he's right about anything, because the regulators just waffle between
those two…
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